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ABSTRACT 
 The thesis discusses aspects of current Social Systems Theory, 
with the main attention devoted both to the level of the compassing social 
system society and to that of function systems, especially law. Throughout, 
I refer to the version of social systems theory developed and presented as 
theory of social autopoiesis in Niklas Luhmann's mature work, while a lim-
ited but important part of the thesis will explain this choice and serve as a 
comparative and genealogical guideline. Central will be the notion and 
idea of what Luhmann calls a Contingency Formula — term that both func-
tions as a problem outline and that indicates how the problem can be 
solved, within the context of the Legal System. Equally centre-staged is 
the scientific, even the philosophical background the Contingency Formula 
is based upon. The reporting and explaining of this background, to which 
luhmannian Social System Theory is indebted in its initial inspirations as 
well as in its relentless efforts of ‘doing justice’ to every new empirical find-
ing, involves, among others, elements of cybernetics, Boolean algebra, 
biology, and approaches to mathematics and topology - as well as of some 
pivotal concepts in philosophy (e.g. contingency). 
 The Contingency Formula and the problematic of modern society in 
relation to Law and Justice of which it constitutes the pivot, constitute the 
focus of my PhD. They are approached through a comparison with tradi-
tional theories of justice and pre-systemic views of society; as it is gener-
ally the case of systems theory, the decisive difference-marker is provided 
by the notion of a function. The systemic narrative also involves the divide 
of coding and programming, and the claim that, in modern society, with its 
constant overproduction of complexity, these are part of its arsenal of 
modes of systemic reducing that complexity. It finally implies contingency 
formulas. These operate as system-immanent second-order observation 
devices that allow function systems to manage their steering dilemmas 
without unrealistically claiming to have access to a (function system tran-
scending) first-order observation of its own interventions. I am addressing 
both the Contingency Formula as general concept and Luhmann's en-
dorsement of Justice as Contingency Formula of the function system law 
(plus Teubner’s alternative offer of a Transcendence Formula Justice), up 
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to a compared analysis of modernity and post-modernity according to the 
social-systemist approach of modern society.
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INTRODUCTION 
 “I have a system!” claims, answering his wife's reproach to have 
lost the cover of a DVD that he had played, Larry David . How should he 1
have lost it indeed, as: “I have a system ! When I play a DVD I always put 
the cover on top of the DVD player”. A short time later in Heaven — it so 
happens that he has died in the meantime - Larry David is escorted by two 
snow-white clad, long-bearded guardian angels, who promptly inquire into 
the matter of the lost DVD cover (which much later will turn out to have 
slipped behind the furniture). "I never lose a DVD, he claims again, I have 
a system! I put the DVD cover on the DVD player!" But with the guardian 
angels Dustin Hoffman and Sasha Baron Cohen this goes down less well 
than it did at home at his lifetime. “That’s not a system!”, reprimands him a 
Dustin Hoffman promoting, for the occasion, a central postulate of luh-
mannian systems theory. He explains: "A system, that would be: you have 
purchased a box of DVD jackets, just plain ones, ready in case you can't 
find yours. That’s a system!” A heated argument ensues, full of strong 
words, at the end of which Larry, deemed not yet ready to stay, is sent 
back to life on Earth.  
 In an episode of his TV series Curb Your Enthusiasm ('Fifth Season's Finale'). 1
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yCwwqsdyAY0 (Last accessed 6 June 2018).
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 What is enlightening here is what the altercation teaches about the 
constitutive antagonism between modern and traditional systems thinking. 
Larry David presents traditional systems thinking - systematic thinking, as 
it could also be called. Traditional or systematic systems thinking is based 
on a strong notion of rule. Of a rule, to be more precise — such as the rule 
Always put the DVD cover on the DVD player - then you are safe. The rule 
might be successful, in which case everything will work out according to 
plan. Modern systems thinking — or systemic thinking, as it could also be 
called — distinguishes itself by the fact that it takes on board experience, 
specifically the experience that, whatever a rule might claim or impose, 
‘stuff happens’. In other words, it is foreseeable already now that some-
thing unforeseen and indeed unforeseeable, might happen. Something 
that thwarts the rule's effective ruling, or in other words stops it from exer-
cising the ‘bite’ it intends to exercise upon actual events. The untheoretical 
simplicity with which the TV series, staging the opposition between tradi-
tional and modern conceptions, shows how it is that things do not, gener-
ally, behave the way we intend or expect them to behave, in life, politics, 
the economy, law or no matter which other sphere of social existence. We 
are asked to integrate this in our routines and procedures. This summar-
ises the concern to which modern, ‘systemic’ systems theory ventures to 
offer an at least momentarily appropriate response, as opposed to earlier, 
‘systematic' systems thought which, far from responding to a concern 
about effective happening, proceeded by imposing a once-for-all-times or-
der or rule under the optimistic assumption that this suffices to perman-
ently nonplus the vicissitudes of effective becoming. Exceptions, unexpec-
ted events, mishaps, mistakes, misunderstanding, errors, losses - all of 
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these factually happen, randomly, contingently, in the absence of any cer-
tain prediction, any pre-established order or in-advance guaranteed secur-
ity (Providence). All happening in the world is left to chance and contin-
gency, all rules involve an (unknown) fraction of exceptions. But one will 
hardly suppose that the dark enlightenment that is summarised in such a 
maxim, has reached many people's mind. One would rather suppose that 
most human lives are lived, consciously at least, in an intrinsically steady 
world, on the basis of the promise of things to be or to stay as expected, 
as long as they are not tampered with, and of a naturally felt faith in this 
promise and the protection it offers against any unexpected or contingent 
accident cropping up unwillingly-unwittingly.  
 No wonder that the believer in the pre-modern, ontological world-
view will be tempted to react as Larry David effectively does, namely by 
denial and resistance. Dustin, the guardian angel is, on the contrary, 
aware of the unsuspected collateral effects that anything we do is likely to 
trigger, and wary of the ever-fertile contingency of outcomes, as well as of 
the strict limits to which this subjects the traditional naïve confidence that 
all that happens is, always or more often than not, that which, a moment 
earlier, had been likely to happen. Dustin Hoffman's guardian angel is — 
apart from his superior skills at defining of what a system is — close to the 
views of the exponents of systems theory and, more largely, cybernetics. 
The world is not composed of steadily being objects that stay put; instead, 
it is a world in which every action triggers an open number of loops (un-
seen effects that might emerge). A system, as social systems theory un-
derstands it, is essentially a device destined to allow to reckon how to pro-
ceed, manoeuvre, steer in such a world. To hold a reserve of spare DVD 
8
covers equals, translated in the relevant system theory lingo, to a way of 
reducing complexity, or at least, to foresee the possibility of disappointed 
expectations. This is a clear explanation, yet, of course, too quick an ex-
planation, of what social system theory is. Like a boat on rough waters, 
which necessitates steering or governing in order to reach its destination, 
or even just to stay afloat when circumstances are not that favourable, in 
Luhmann’s view modern society necessitates of something very similar; 
society must see and steer its way through a sea of unexpected happen-
ings. It cannot, strictly speaking, steer its course — not in the sense of 
mastering all the forces that, at any given point of its trajectory, determine 
its location or direction. Yet neglecting the duty of trying at it might turn out 
an expensive lack of concern.   
 Re-visiting the idea of society as a system (already explored by Tal-
cott Parsons) Luhmann has explored a large number of scientific theories. 
What re-unites them is the fact of questioning, in one way or another, what 
is contingent in modern society. The study of feed-back loops, or cybernet-
ics has offered a set of concepts suitable for understanding and explaining 
systems, which are by their nature complex and involve exceptions to their 
regular operations. Second-Order Cybernetics are linked to the Luhmann-
ian notion of second order observation.  Yet, the idea of an observation of 2
observation, of an observer being observed in the act, was not born with, 
and is not exclusive to, Cybernetics. In fact, it can be found in literature 
and fine arts going back through the centuries. An example is provided by 
story of the communication between two painters, sometimes quoted as 
"Apelles’ Cut", in Pliny's Natural History (XXXV, 81-83). Trying to visit 
 See Foerster, H. von, ‘Understanding Systems’, 2002, Heidelberg, Carl Auer 2
Systeme Verlag, p.101 and ff.
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Apelles, Protogenes, finding his workshop empty, and wishing to leave a 
trace to be seen by the great colleague at his return, paints a line so fine 
that it does not seem even painted by a human brush. Apelles comes back 
and succeeds in painting over that line with an even finer line,  thereby re3 -
alising a paradigmatic case of a distinction within a distinction. In a famous 
painting of Cranach the Elder, the painted veil that Venus holds over her 
modesty gives the idea of an observation of observation, in letting the ob-
server see through the veil. It is in the act of covering it that the goddess of 
beauty exhibits her genital to the onlooker, second-order observing his an-
ticipated observation. John Donne, in his short poem The Triple Fool, in 
which he gives even three examples of second order observation: ‘I am a 
fool I know, for loving and for saying so’.  The poet is staged as observing 4
himself as being a fool for giving in to the temptation of love. By observing 
— declaring — his love, he then offers an example of second order obser-
vation (‘two fools’). Not content with this, he adds a rare example of third 
order observation, by introducing poetry to this game of second order ob-
servation, as poetry is effectively staged as a triply foolish (cf. the title) 
apology of love and its declaration.  
 The range of concepts referred to in the examination of the back-
ground of autopoiesis is a wide and complex one; although mathematical 
topological models and their terminology — which involve terms such as 
 The anecdote, which incidentally, far from having reached its end at this points, 3
includes several further incidents, figures in a different context in Agamben, G. ‘Il 
Tempo che Resta. Un Commento alla Lettera ai Romani’, Torino, Bollati Bor-
inghieri, 2000, p.52. For a state-of-the-art philological account, see Gutzwiller, K. 
« Apelles and the painting of language », Revue de philologie, de littérature et 
d'histoire anciennes, 2009/1 (Tome LXXXIII), p. 39-63. URL : https://www.-
cairn.info/revue-de-philologie-litterature-et-histoire-anciennes-2009-1-
page-39.htm (Last accessed 24 June 2018).
 Donne, J. ‘Poems of John Donne’. vol I. E. K. Chambers, ed. London: Lawrence 4
& Bullen, 1896. 14.
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boundary, distinction, re-entry, recursion, circularity, coding, entropy, and 
finally contingency, which are in turn explained in all their meaning and 
application to social system theory - and with the help of philosophers - 
turn out to be apt to describe what Luhmann claims has been a paradigm 
shift from an ontological and teleological to a systemic worldview; from the 
passage from Unity to Difference, and from Hierarchy to Heterarchy, what 
appears is how society went from a pre-modern order and perception of 
society to a modern one. Beyond any terminological details, the idea of a 
description of society as an autopoietic systems changes the perspective 
on the workings and the operations of society. 
 Beyond the mathematical explanation of difference, “sociology has 
always been concerned with differentiation. (…)  It stands for the unity (or 
establishment of the unity) of difference” . To put it simply, any society, 5
seen as a country, a city a village, has defined itself, through the differ-
ences existing among their people. So it has defined the differences be-
tween city and countryside people; between members of a family as op-
posed to members of another family, with all the this may imply, such as 
feuds, rivalries, or instead alliances, marriages and so forth. Differences 
between nobles and peasants and all that attaches to it. This is a simpler 
form of differentiation that society does of itself. From the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, there is a “switch from theories of progress to structural analysis” . 6
Defining theories arise, on analysis of changes on forms of moral solidari-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012. p. 15
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012 p. 2.6
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ty , to theories of rationalisation of different orders of life , such as religion 7 8
or economy, politics. For classical sociologists “differentiation is the emer-
gence of individuality” ; therefore, it becomes apparent that all theoretical 9
approaches are included when considering the concept of differentiation, 
and allow for society to observe and criticise itself “[d]ifferentiation is nec-
essary to maintain cohesion under conditions of growth”   10
 Of course, “anything that can be distinguished can be described as 
difference” . Nevertheless, this overdetermination (looking at each indi11 -
vidual behaviour in structural problems, differentiated taste, differentiated 
role) has a cost. Talking about individual behaviour makes it more difficult 
to arrive at clear conclusions. Luhmann tries to be clear cut in a topic that 
is overcomplicated and easily overdetermined, so therefore he prefers to 
speak of system differentiation, “any operational connection that generates 
a difference between system and environment” . “System differentiation is 12
thus nothing other that recursive system formation, the on-going applica-
tion of system formation to its own results. The system in which further 
systems arise is reconstructed by a further distinction between system and 
environment”.  It is important to point out that even where Luhmann or 13
 Durkheim, E. ‘The Division of Labour in Society’ Palgrave; 2nd edition edition 7
(2013).
 Weber , M. ‘The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism’ Wallachia Pub8 -
lishers (2015).
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012 p. 2.9
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012. P.2.10
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012. P.2.11
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012. P.2. 12
See also Luhmann, N. ‘Differentiation Theory and Social Change: Comparative 
and Historical Perspectives’ ed Jeffrey Alexandre and Paul Colomy New York 
1990; ch 2 and 3.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012. P.3.13
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other systems theorists refer to "subsystems", this does not mean that a 
higher-ranking whole is divided into lower-ranking parts. That “from the 
perspective of the subsystem, the rest of the comprehensive system is 
now the environment”, should not be understood in a way as if the envi-
ronment were a superior in a hierarchical sense. It is important to under-
stand this when the various systems (or subsystems) that constitute the 
whole of society in the perspective of Social System Theory are at work. 
Luhmann, in fact, is careful not to speak of ‘sub-systems’ when talking of 
the political system or the legal system. They are ‘sub’ insofar as the social 
system society constitutes their environment, they are not ‘sub’ in the - un-
fortunately widely diffused - sense of ‘parts’ of a ‘whole’.  Functions sys-
tems (economic, legal, media, politics, etc.) are all alike in that they are, 
each of them, the ‘product’ of the distinction-drawing membrane between 
them and their environment. The idea of an opposition whole vs part is in-
tegral part of the old-European conceptual equipment. “[I]f applied in this 
context [it] would miss the decisive point”,  says Luhmann, pointing at 14
Derrida, who instead proposes the time related concept of Différance. 
Luhmann's point relates, not to the deconstruction of a supposedly original 
unity, but to the fact of dealing with the emergence of distinctions in a (yet 
unmarked) world. System differentiation means neither that the whole is 
divided into parts, nor point to a “relation" between parts. Instead, “every 
subsystem [constructs itself as a] comprehensive system [...] through its 
own, subsystem-specific difference between system and environment.”  15
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012. P.3.14
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012. P.3.15
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 None of these pushes social systems theory to deny a limited use-
fulness to the Old European semantics of the opposition of whole and part. 
It fits empirical experiences of everyday life, allowing complex objects to 
be understood as parts of a whole. It resolves the old paradox of unitas 
multiplex. Luhmann explains how the paradox boasts two levels: On one 
level, the whole; on the other, the parts. The problem of the setting seems 
to be that it discourages to descend further than the parts, and to ascend 
further than the whole. At the same time, the old problem of a unity of dif-
ference is traditionally hidden by the maxim “the whole is more than the 
sum of its parts”, of which Luhmann says that it is the ‘more’ that stands in 
need of explanation. This unexplained surplus element has been largely 
used to explain hierarchies in social order (and justify power, we may 
add) . The overall solution has been theological. God, the idea of God, 16
appears in and multiplies into everything, offering the triumphantly para-
doxical solution: there is unity in everything. 
 Systems theory distinguishes itself from the entire gamut of the 
theoretical tradition and its manifold accounts of the legal order in two 
ways. The majority of theories of law and the legal order carry a robust no-
tion of a finality of justice. A minority chooses to claim that there is no goal, 
but only a law-internal construction of law-external forces (as e.g. in Marx' 
productivist-economic conception of of law). Autopoietic theory as well ex-
pects systems to have no such thing as goals — whereas marxism, 
though in its own observation an improbable suspect, arguably does offer 
a position of an enlightened finality: changing the world. “[T]he external re-
lations in order to subvert the endemic injustice of the legal order”. Again, 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012. Pp 16
196-197.
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natural law theory, to the extent to which it carries a deductive theory of 
justice, to be inferred from the nature of man or of humanity (or of 
creation), presides another group of finality. For positivism, on the other 
hand, justice takes the role of a mere point of view, and it is only its elimi-
nation that constitutes the passage-way to rationality and to a professional 
level of legal discourse. Luhmannian system theory, on the other hand, di-
sagrees with the very principle of this disagreement: there is, according to 
it, no access to transcending justice either inside or outside. Yet there is a 
strictly immanent notion justice playing its role within the legal system. Jus-
tice is being taken only as a factor of the continuity of the exercise of the 
law. No accomplishment, no perfection, no ‘goal-attainment’ is promised, 
reference is made only to a function - the fact that the question cannot 
stop, cannot be eliminated or displaced, but neither can it be operatively 
solved once for all, and without a ‘modulo’. 
 To follow the line of the reasoning, if the legal system does not have 
justice as a goal, the price to be paid for this would be that justice should 
then rank as a system in its own right - which would lead to a schism, with 
Justice on the one hand, law on the other. Instead Luhmann creates a new 
concept, with the modest vocation of functioning as a mere managing 
agent, a steersman, of each function system. Luhmann calls this Contin-
gency Formula (Kontingenzformel) and sets it up as device embodying the 
most slippery, exposed, fragile, or in any case undefined aspect of each 
social system. In present society, being a functionally differentiated society, 
a society of function systems, deprived of a unique overriding or panoram-
ically inclusive (sovereign), each function system only elaborates upon its 
own inherent horizon. The question is: What helps a function system to 
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develop a goal of its own? It cannot borrow a society-wide common good, 
and simply ‘apply’ it on its procedures. Function systems must determine 
their own course by drawing samples (Luhmann says: "reductions") from 
their own function, their own code. Only in such a way they can give them-
selves an orientation, provide themselves with a resilient recipe of how to 
formulate, precisely, the contingency to which they are relentlessly subjec-
ted, without being able to ask for external guidance. This compass needle 
is Scarcity for the function system economy; it is Legitimacy for the func-
tion system politics; it is something which Luhmann calls Limitationalität for 
the function system science . For law it is Justice. The chapter contin17 -
gency formula contains one of the more recluse aspect of Luhmann’s the-
ory of social systems, There is definitely something like a sensor, a 
tentacle or an antenna that systems theory here extends and that goes far 
beyond its usual positivist or even functionalist outlines — beyond the en-
tire scope of the conservatively "modernist" enterprise with which his work 
is sometimes still identified. My thesis addresses and tries to illustrate this 
difficulty; interestingly, though, it is the contingency formula for religion that 
is possibly best placed to help in understanding what a contingency for-
mula is and what it does. 
 According to Luhmann, the contingency formula of the function sys-
tem religion is God. Now Luhmann barely extends his interest in religion 
beyond a sociological one. Even less he distinguishes between the re-
spective phenomenological or experiential content of different religious 
settings. Issues of the history of religion, such as the birth of monotheism, 
are for Luhmann definitely outside of the scope of social systems theory. 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I,Stanford University press, 2012, p.318 17
and ff.
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And yet, it is the step towards monotheism, towards the contingency for-
mula of the religion system, that offers, paradoxically, the occasion to de-
velop a first step towards a general theory of contingency formulas.  
 There are diverse ways to react to the upsetting fact of the contin-
gency of the world. There is no such thing as a Urmonotheismus, al-
though, in the catholic, church-sponsored work of Father Wilhelm Schmidt, 
this model has importantly inspired some branches of social anthropology 
of the earlier half of the 20th century. Monotheism is a late product – itself 
somehow an example of an unpredictable contingency. The Bible itself, 
paradigm of the monotheistic take on contingency, does not leave a doubt 
about it. All starts with Abram, who, in order to found the new, monotheistic 
nation, has to take up a new name, Abraham, to move out of his native 
Chaldea, and to show that he is prepared to kill his son if asked to.  
 Monotheism, a late invention, is based upon a certain optimism. 
God is master and whatever happens, God has made it happen. There is 
someone, not me – someone else, “badate ben’, non io!”, in the words of 
Mozart and Da Ponte’s Leporello – who authors and commands it all. An 
imperious conception of one’s relation to the world’s contingency, and of 
construing a social and political order of coexistence. There are soft and 
tender ways as well. Soft and tender ways of relating to the fact that every-
thing in the world is contingent and could be otherwise. This radical con-
tingency, which is synchronic contingency, “contingency today” as op-
posed to the more modest and obvious "contingency tomorrow”, which 
reminds us of the Queen telling Alice that “The rule is, jam to-morrow and 
jam yesterday - but never jam to-day.” . The famous contingency passage 18
 Carroll, L. ‘Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass’ 18
CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2005. 
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in Aristotle’s treatise On interpretation  is only about contingency tomor19 -
row. Tomorrow a sea-battle might happen - or not. Everyone is aware of 
that. Radical or synchronic contingency means: right now, things being 
how they are, things could be otherwise than how they are now.  
 The most ambitious formulations of contingency follow this radical, 
synchronic conception, this perfect form of schizoïd thought.  The suspi20 -
cion would be that the solidarity of (1) potentia dei absoluta and (2) radical 
or synchronic contingency is the distinctive discovery of Western moderni-
ty. The latter – at its starting point, under late 13th century conditions – is 
only thinkable because of the former.  
 Contingency has become thinkable, even generally thought of in a 
form emancipated, as it were, from the theo-despotic tranquillisation. No 
one knows whether what we find in the soft and tender ways of relating to 
contingency located in Buddhism, is not a clear-sighted understanding 
even of the most radical contingency. If one were to know, one would first 
have to know the answer to the silly quest whether buddhism is rather 
Aristotelian or Scotist. One might surmise that, the more radical the con-
tingency, the more convincing are the ways of relating to as to a part of na-
ture. Schematically, these "soft and tender ways” of receiving contingency, 
of ‘dealing-with’ contingency, consists in subjecting oneself to it without re-
 Aristotle, ‘De Interpretatione’, Part IX, Loeb, 1989.19
 On radical or synchronic contingency, as in: “things could be otherwise right 20
now than how they are right now”, as opposed to the more acceptable « time be-
fore vs time after” contingency  (which incidentally can include cases like: “I could 
as well have arrived at the airport in time to get my plane, and thus be dead by 
now, killed by its crash »), see Antonie Vos et al., John Duns Scotus, Contingency 
and Freedom (Lectura I 39), Dordrecht, Kluwer 1994, 23ff. The archive of the 
threats, promises, recompensations, and schizogenic powers of synchronic con-
tingency,contains, from Duns Scotus’s suggestion to torture those who reject rad-
ical contingency unless and until they admit that they could as well not be tor-
tured, to Herman Melville’s « Bartleby », Robert Musil’s musings about Wirklich-
keitssinn and Möglichkeitssinn, J.L. Borges’s Garden of bifurcating paths, the still 
instructive, once best-selling study Gödel, Escher, Bach by Douglas Hofstadter.  
18
sistance, giving oneself up, at least degrading oneself to the level of a 
slave or hostage, under contingency’s master-less yoke. A good practical 
example is provided by the way in which one looks for shelter against the 
onslaught of the unpredictable and ungovernable, such as rain, snow, hail. 
No construction of a world-creating one God is either necessary or suffi-
cient to encourage us to look for shelter when it rains. Even unidentified, 
contingency often produces fitting reactions. Bad weather is not the only 
example. Levels of salaries and goods can behave in ways that are largely 
as unruly and unpredictable as the rain. The protagonist of evolution theo-
ry, of systems theory is the tender, submissive – or as Luhmann calls it: 
"learning" or "cognitive" – way of subjecting oneself to over-powerful and 
untreatable contingency.  
 What is generally referred to as the strategy of self-adaptation is 
based upon radical or synchronic contingency. Where there is no hope of 
success, of the enterprise of excluding certain contingencies from happen-
ing, or of making some of them more probable than others, there the pre-
monotheistic take of borderless self-submission recommends itself without 
alternative. The market of neo-liberalism is by no means shaped according 
to a powerful and creatively capable monotheistic divinity: it is an irrespon-
sible abyss out of which anything whatsoever can, and according to the 
neo-liberal doxa, should be, allowed to emerge. 
 The exists another take on contingency, not based upon tenderness 
or unconditional self-subjection. A more optimistic one, and most of all, one 
that is globally successful, and no one seriously thinks of giving it up, be it 
only for a quarter of a second. The building of a house neutralises the 
problem of rain, snow, and hail. Monotheism, not at all as a religious, 
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rather as a social achievement, is in this respect a strict equivalent of a 
house – a point manifoldly observed and underscored by the theological 
tradition. Monotheism allows to take certain measures, to reduce complex-
ity not only, but contingency as well. Perhaps there are oikonomia, the on-
going practice of managing a household, of allowing a house to perdure 
over time, to resist its environment, to cope with its  crisis, to master and 
outlive the threats of its situations,  on the one hand, and a founding or 21
once-for-all-times gesture, e.g. oikodomia (the practice of edifying a house 
in the first place) on the other hand (Agamben himself sticks to the bipolar-
ity between oikonomical and eschatological views).  
 Social systems theoretical views generally, and Luhmann's in par-
ticular, are exclusively oikonomic: to the extent to which they are system/
environment related, systems act in a landscape of possibilities that corre-
sponds to the pre-monotheism sort. The exposure of the system to its en-
vironment is an exposure to the fact that “everything can happen”, and this 
exposure, this basic condition, can never be entirely overcome. However, 
systems, to the extent to which they are successful at ruling out certain 
possibilities from happening, can produce excess possibilities. They can 
act as houses – houses are not systems, as one should keep in mind. The 
logic of systems allows for such houses as can give shelter to politics, to 
the realm of political claims (i.e. what is usually called “politics”).  
 The contingency formula is as 'late’ in the short history of functional-
ly differentiated modern society and of its function systems, as monothe-
ism is over the longer history of pre-modern societies. It is a necessarily 
 On this see for instance Agamben, G.‘The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theo21 -
logical Genealogy of Economy and Government’, Stanford University Press, 
2011.
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premature response to the question whether contingencies can be pre-
empted from unfolding all of their consequences and implications. While, 
for a long time, available power-resources were resolutely exaggerated, 
and while modernity was perhaps the period of the ruin of these exagger-
ated claims, one could ask to what extent the absence of power over the 
consequences of contingencies can itself have become an object of exag-
geration. Social systems theory, at any rate, recommends a reference to 
and a relation of contingency that strives to counter-act both kinds of ex-
aggerations : the exaggeration of available power resources and steering 
capacities, and the exaggeration of the effective powerlessness of all 
available powers, and the new, spurious justifications of neglect and with-
drawal that it entails.       
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1 - Mathematical Models, Heterarchy, and Circulari-
ty: The Background of Social Autopoiesis. 
 1.1 - Cybernetics and Boolean Algebra: Old Models for a New 
Discourse. 
 In order to understand Luhmann’s theory of modern society, it is 
necessary to look at the background theories and ideas that influenced 
him as a sociologist. Before discussing modern society as a system, or 
discussing what modern society is, or even what a system is, it is neces-
sary to at least introduce the mathematical models that influenced Luh-
mann’s work, and place them in the correct context. Without understand-
ing this background, Luhmann’s description of modern society cannot be 
properly grasped, nor can his theory be discussed in the context of Twen-
ty-First Century law and society, even less so in the very different world of 
the 21st century, twenty years after Luhmann’s last writings.  
 There are a number of scientific models that contribute, even if only 
indirectly to Luhmann’s way of thinking, and in shaping some ideas that 
converged into Social Autopoiesis. Luhmann had some precise problems 
and questions in mind in relation to the idea of society that needed an ef-
fective analysis and description; incessantly forging, or filling with new con-
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tents, such concepts as organisation, communication, cognition, entropy, 
complexity and contingency, among others; as well as modern concepts, 
modern models, new ways of posing old questions, new problems to over-
come, or at least to describe, in terms of behaviour, and in terms of the 
development of society in a modern discourse.  
Among the theories that had an impact on Luhmann’s thinking and 
gave him ground to elevate his own constructions upon them, quite a few 
have their origins in what is known as Cybernetics or especially Second-
Order Cybernetics. There are several significant figures in this field, from 
the point of view of their multifold contribution to a number of disciplines. 
They come from partly very different directions. Norbert Wiener 
(1894-1964)  was an American mathematician and philosopher interested 22
in social issues; he has coined the term Cybernetics; Heinz von Foerster 
(1911-2002) , an Austrian-American pioneer in matters of radical con23 -
structivism; Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972)  an Austrian biologist 24
famous for his inaugural attempts to construe a General System Theory; 
Gotthard Günther (1900-1984) , a German philosopher, interested in lo25 -
 See Wiener, N. ‘Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and 22
the Machine’, MIT 1948; See also Wiener, N. ‘The Human Use of Human Beings’, 
Da Capo Press 1950.
  See Foerster, H. Von  ‘Cybernetics: Transactions of the Sixth Conference, (ed23 -
itor), Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation: New York, 1949,  220 pp. See also See Foer-
ster, H. Von ‘Observing Systems’ Intersystems Publications; 2nd edition, 1982.
 See Bartalanffy, L. von ‘General System theory: Foundations, Development, 24
Applications’, New York: George Braziller, 1968; See Also Bertalanffy, L. von 
‘General system theory - A new approach to unity of science (Symposium), Hu-
man Biology, Dec 1951, Vol. 23, p. 303-361. And Bertalanffy, L. von ,’ General 
System theory: Foundations, Development, Applications’, New York: George 
Braziller, 1975.
4 See Günther, G. ‘Cybernetic Ontology and Transjunctional Operations. Univer-
sity of Illinois, Engineering Experiment Station. Technical Report no. 4. Urbana: 
Electrical Engineering Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1962.
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gic and German philosophy; W. Ross Ashby (1903-1972) , a British psy26 -
chiatrist interested in cybernetics; Warren S. McCulloch (1898 – 1969) , 27
an American cyberneticist and neurophysiologist; Gregory Bateson (1904- 
1980)  a British social scientist and cyberneticist, as well as anthropolo28 -
gist; Humberto Maturana (1928-) and Francisco Varela (1946-2001) , two 29
Chilean biologists, who first introduced the term 'autopoiesis' in relation to 
living cells with the capacity of self-reproduction; Stafford Beer (1926 – 
2002)  a British theorist in management cybernetics (and pupil of Warren 30
McCulloch); George Spencer-Brown (1923 - 2016) , a British Mathem31 -
atician, and several others. These men are but a few exponents of this 
scientific current, which started in the early Twentieth Century. 
What is Cybernetics, and why is it relevant for a sociologist like 
Luhmann? The term cybernetics derives from the Greek naval term kyber-
netēs, (κυβερνήτης), which means “the steersman”, so among its many 
definitions cybernetics it can be viewed, especially for our purposes, as the 
‘art of governing’ - more traditionally a boat, or perhaps anything that can 
be ‘steered’ (maybe even a society?), and it is widely defined as “the sci-
entific study of control and communication in the animal and the machine”, 
as defined by US cybernetics pioneer Norbert Wiener. Other possible 
 See Ashby, W. R ‘Introduction to Cybernetics’, Chapman & Hall, London, 1956 26
Available online at http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/books/IntroCyb.pdf (this is the sec-
ond edition of 1957) Last accessed 12 June 2017.
 McCulloch, W. 'Recollections of the Many Sources of Cybernetics', 1969, pub27 -
lished in: ASC FORUM Volume VI, Number 2 -Summer 1974.
 Bateson, G. 'Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (Advances in Systems Theo28 -
ry, Complexity, and the Human Sciences)', 1979,. Hampton Press. 
 Maturana, H., Varela, F. 'Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Liv29 -
ing  Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science), 1979;
 Beer, S.’Cybernetics and Management', English Universities Press, 1959.30
 Spencer-Brown, G. ‘Laws of Form’. New York: Dutton, (1969/1979)31
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definitions, some of which have become significant in the relevant literat-
ure are “the art of steermanship” (W. Ross Ashby), "The science and art of 
understanding” (Humberto Maturana) and the more recent: ”The study of 
systems and processes that interact with themselves and produce them-
selves from themselves” (Louis Kauffman) . Other views of what cyber32 -
net ics is include cybernet ics as “ the science of effect ive 
organisation” (Stafford Beer); as well as cybernetics in the sense of a sci-
ence that, not only deals with how things are done, but also focuses on 
form and pattern, rather than matter and energy (Gregory Bateson);  cy-
bernetics is also the art of manipulating defensible metaphors, focusing on 
how they can be constructed and what can be deducted as their direct 
result (Gordon Pask).  
As a theory that concerns itself in observing what living and non-liv-
ing things do (i.e. machines - or people), cybernetics is also defined as 
“the science of government” (A. M. Ampère 1775-1836 - French math-
ematician and physicist), which carries within the same idea of ‘steering’; 
or more specifically, Ampère invented the suggested term for a ‘science de 
gouvernement', ‘cybernétique’ . All these views, say Kauffman’s and Am33 -
pere’s, come from complete different intellectual situation or horizon. As 
well as, again from a historical point of view, James Clerk Maxwell 
(1831-1879 -  Scottish scientist in both fields of mathematics and physics), 
 Louis Kauffman (1945 - ) an American mathematician and cyberneticist, whose 32
work is conspicuously influential in the cybernetic field. Often the name of Kauff-
man is quoted by Luhmann in his work, and we could even say that this sentence 
by Kauffman is Luhmann’s theory in a nutshell. 
 André-Marie Ampère used the term ‘cybernetique’ for the first time in 1834 in 33
his 'Essai sur la philosophie des sciences’, which discusses the science of civil 
government. http://www.ampere.cnrs.fr/textes/essaiphilosophie/pdf/essaiphiloso-
phiesciences_1.pdf (Last accessed 1st September 2017
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and his work on what he calls "a governor” . It is not clear whether Max34 -
well has recourse to the Greek notion, but this fits exactly into the problem 
horizon of a first autochthonous, then displaced notion of governing. On 
this point, Luhmann is interesting in this respect also for the reason that 
German is a language in which the very root gubernare, ‘government’ is 
absent. Instead of talking about a Government, they call it a Regierung. 
Even Foucault, "art de gouverner" is translated in German as 
Regierungskunst. 
 Albeit many are the definitions of cybernetics , one in particular 35
that sounds helpful in hindsight for those already acquainted with Luh-
mann’s theory is "the art of securing efficient operation” ( L. Couffignal) . It 36
is perhaps because of the word “operation”, which, although used  here in 
a mathematical context, becomes then recurrent in the socio-legal world of 
Niklas Luhmann. Still, all of those definitions sit with a theory that wants to 
observe society and its operations; second-order-observation, governing, 
efficiency, communication, organisation. Apart from the terms, it is the 
modus operandi of cybernetics that allows a general change of perspec-
tive. Cybernetics, as already mentioned, is concerned not with what some-
thing “is’, but with what something “does”; it is “a way of thinking” (Ernst 
von Glasersfeld)  and as such it allows for a collaboration among tradi37 -
 Clerk M., J. ‘On Governors. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London’. 34
(1868) 16: 270–283. doi:10.1098/rspl.1867.0055. JSTOR 112510. See also: 
Mayr, O. ‘Maxwell and the Origins of Cybernetics’, (1971) Isis.  62 (4): 424–444.
 On this see: https://www2.gwu.edu/~asc/cyber_definition.html Last accessed 8 35
May 2017.
 Louis Couffignal  1902 – 1966, a French mathematician and cyberneticist.36
 Ernst von Glasersfeld 1917 – 2010, a German philosopher, who coined the 37
term ''radical constructivism'' and member of the  American Society of Cybernet-
ics.
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tions and disciplines. Norbert Wiener, a cyberneticist, is concerned, among 
other things, with a concept that becomes pivotal at some point in Luh-
mann’s work, and will be therefore widely discussed here in various con-
texts; said concept is contingency.  
Contingency is of course not a Twentieth Century invention of cy-
berneticists or physicists. The term goes back to Aristotle (de interpreta-
tione/peri hemeneias), and means in its Aristotelian definition "neither im-
possible nor necessary”, and as a concept it has been dealt with in philos-
ophy throughout the centuries. In the early Twentieth Century then, Nor-
bert Wiener writes  of his idea of contingency applied to the concept of 38
society at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. He talks of a completely 
new world and of a new perception of society, due to new discoveries and 
the setting aside of the “old ways of thinking”, to say it with Thomas 
Kuhn , who said there was a different way of thinking at any given time, 39
and therefore spoke of ‘paradigm’ and of ‘paradigm shift’, in the sense that 
old information or concepts can be and are seen in a different way all the 
time. Kuhn referred mainly to the scientific world and gave the term a dou-
ble meaning; on the one hand ‘paradigm is the whole of notions shared 
among a community of scientists (but not only, it can be any community), 
and on the other hand, it is a model, an example of a traditional way of do-
ing certain things, or of values . The ‘paradigm shift’ is illustrated, for in40 -
 Wiener, N. ‘The Human Use of Human Beings’, Da Capo Press 1950.38
 Kuhn, T, ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ The University of Chicago 39
Press,1968.
 For a different, more contemporary, philosophical discussion on paradigm, see 40
Agamben, G. ‘What is a paradigm’ Lecture at the European Graduate School 
2002.  http://www.maxvanmanen.com/files/2014/03/Agamben-What-is-a-para-
digm1.pdf. (Last Accessed 1st September 2017). https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=G9Wxn1L9Er0 (1 of 10), (Last Accessed 1st September 2017).
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stance, by the ‘duck-rabbit optical illusion , as Wittgenstein made famous 41
in his Philosophical Investigations, in order to describe and to highlight two 
different ways of seeing, depending on one’s perspective: "seeing that" 
versus "seeing as" .  42
This ‘shift’ occurred caroused all disciplines; as an example, talking 
of science in modern times, Isaac Newton’s theory as to the perception of 
the universe was in its time a ‘break with the old’, Newton, rather than any 
other scientist caused a real a paradigm shift of considerable proportions 
with his research, and, albeit controversial, it became dominant in the 17th 
and 18th centuries. Newton’s certainty of physical laws that applied in the 
same way and with the same modus to a series of different systems and in 
different momenta with the same unchanged causal laws, saw another 
shift towards the end of the 19th Century.  In fact, for a long time after 43
Newton the observation of the world was done - like Newton did in Physics 
- in rigid terms, which did not contemplate the notion of probability.  Wiener 
observing from the point of view of the cyberneticist, considers that it was 
Josiah Willard Gibbs (1839 - 1903), an American scientist concerned pri-
marily with physics and mathematics , who introduced contingency and 44
probability in physics, something unheard of before that time. Of course, 
there may be very many points of view, indeed one per each of the impor-
 Unattributed drawing from the 23 October 1892 issue of  the German satirical 41
magazine  Fliegende Blätter. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabbit–duck_illusion#/
media/File:Kaninchen_und_Ente.png (Last accessed 1st September 2017)
 Wittgenstein, L. ‘Philosophical Investigations’ ‘Philosophische Untersuchungen’ 42
(1953). Wiley-Blackwell; 4th Revised ed. edition (6 Nov. 2009)
 Newton, I. ‘Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica’, 1687; ‘The Mathe43 -
matical Principles of Natural Philosophy’, CreateSpace Independent Publishing 
Platform, 2017.  
 On this see: ‘The Scientific Papers of J. Willard Gibbs, in two volumes, eds. H. 44
A. Bumstead and R. G. Van Name, Woodbridge, Connecticut, USA, Ox Bow 
Press, 1993 (First Ed.1906)
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tant scientists of the time, but we are considering  here uniquely the cy-
bernetic perspective. 
According to Wiener, it is Gibbs, more than Einstein or Planck, who 
sparked a real revolution in physics in the Twentieth Century, albeit it was 
not clear until much later, after his death.  Specifically, Gibbs allowed for a 45
different approach to the way of managing entropy. Entropy is a concept 
from physics and specifically from thermodynamics and it concerns energy 
(usually temperature) and its transformation. In physics entropy is ex-
plained as a series of formulae, but the concept of entropy is applicable to 
any type of system. Entropy, to put it plainly, concerns the disorder within a 
system and, more to the point, its randomness or changeability. In other 
words, as systems do not operate in a predictable manner, there is the 
need to take into account their inherent contingency, and therefore the 
need of managing, about limited steering possibilities, about ways of moni-
toring and surveilling processes that actually happen, that happen, obvi-
ously contingently. Entropy increases disorder. But of course there are is-
lands of what had been called negentropy, that is the exact opposite of the 
randomness and contingency of entropy; it is - to a degree - order, organi-
sation and structure within a closed system. Luhmann understood that fac-
tual transformations within the structure of modern society, could be cor-
rectly described only at the price of introducing concepts such as entropy 
and contingency into the analysis, and  developing a new applied meaning 
to the concept of contingency in order to explain a set of new modi 
operandi of modern society. 
Wiener, N. ‘The Human Use of Human Beings. Cybernetics and Society’, Da 45
Capo Press, 1988, pp.18 and ff.
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The promises of Cybernetics are  that “it offers a single vocabulary 46
and a single set of concepts suitable for representing the most diverse 
types of system”; that “it offers a method for the scientific treatment of the 
system in which complexity is outstanding and too important to be 
ignored”; that it “offers the hope of providing effective methods for the 
study, and control, of systems that are intrinsically extremely complex.”; 
also, “cybernetics treats the subject from a new, and therefore unusual, 
angle”  It is easy to see how all this must have been appealing to a soci47 -
ologist initially of the school of Talcott Parsons, from post-World War II 
Germany, who was on the lookout for a new method to tackle the descrip-
tion of society in a new, unique way. 
The question that remains is why the study of sociology taken up, 
not by a social scientist, but by a researcher whose main academic study 
and professional was in law, should buy itself into such a resolute centre-
staging of a genuine scientific project. Luhmann had developed the idea of 
society as a system. This was not a new idea, it appeared also in tradi-
tional sociology, but he wanted to take it to a new level, as he saw (or pos-
sibly even foresaw) the ever-increasing complexity of society in the future, 
in the same way as systems develop an internal ever increasing complexi-
ty (and, therefore, in the language of the 19th century,  entropy) as the op-
erations add up to one self-carrying flow. In what way this occurs will be 
explained forthwith, after clarifying what a system is, according to the 
 All the following quoted definitions are from Ashby, W. R ‘Introduction to Cyber46 -
netics’, Chapman & Hall, London, 1956 Available online at http://
pespmc1.vub.ac.be/books/IntroCyb.pdf (this is the second edition of 1957) p.4. 
and ff.
  Ashby, W. R ‘Introduction to Cybernetics’, Chapman & Hall, London, 1956 47
Available online at http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/books/IntroCyb.pdf (this is the sec-
ond edition of 1957) p.4. and ff.
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Luhmannian conception of social systems, how it comes into being, and 
how the continuity of its operation can (or, rather: cannot) be guaranteed. 
What is a system? How does a system come into being? There are 
different definitions of  ‘system’ depending on various fields; but the gener-
al idea underlining all those definitions is that it consists of a set of parts, 
or things, or principles, which are organised and work together as a whole; 
an organism (albeit an artificial one for our purposes), a scheme, a 
process, a practice, which exists in order to do something. Cybernetics, 
beyond the various definitions, deal with ways of behaving and deal, not 
with what something is, but with what that something does.  So, at this 48
point, we could explain it even more simply, by saying that the archetype 
of a system is a delimited, differentiated, space, and in which space some-
thing does happen, in the sense that something continuously happens; or 
it can be interpreted as something that does not stop happening, or that 
does not stop unfolding; something in fact that exists in the form, not of 
some being, of some un-deconstructible substance, but of an ultimately 
unpredictable, on-going process. As to the term ‘system’ referred to ‘soci-
ety’, one can measure the distance between a whole group of traditional 
images of the world and of society that will have to change accordingly, in 
fact ”the word “society” does not refer to a clear cut idea. Even the com-
mon term “social” has no incontestably objective reference” , as Luhmann 49
himself states at the very beginning of what could be considered his more 
 Ashby, W. R ‘Introduction to Cybernetics’, Chapman & Hall, London, 1956 48
Available online at http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/books/IntroCyb.pdf (this is the sec-
ond edition of 1957) p. 1.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’ vol. I’ Stanford University Press, 2012, p.149
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detailed and mature publication. In other words, the discussion on society 
is left open  and, for its nature, ongoing. 50
 Another influence in shaping the Luhmannian idea of society as a 
system is Boolean Algebra  and, roughly a century later, the seminal work 51
by George Spencer-Brown (1923-2016), a British mathematician whose 
most famous work, ‘Laws of Form’, was on Algebra and the calculus of in-
dications, or more exactly the mutual presupposition of two operations: 
distinction and indication. One does not work without the other. Thus, 
Brown work suggests the concept that every act of ‘indicating', whatever it 
might be, can only start by “drawing a distinction”  within a hitherto unlim52 -
ited, blank space. Luhmann's intuition in this respect was limited to apply-
ing this to social systems, to the extent to which they are based upon dif-
ferentiation, upon carving themselves out from a pre-existing continuum. In 
other words, social systems theory claims that there is a blank space we 
draw what we can actually call a system. The book is seminal and offers 
concepts and paradigms, such as distinction, or boundary interactions, re-
entry, recursion, and therefore, circularity, all in relation to algebra, but 
which concepts Luhmann applies to his model of modern society. 
In fact, in its most fundamental structure, the apparatus of Luh-
mann’s theory is based on the notion that a system is a difference, that a 
social system emerges owing to a process of distinguishing itself from an 
environment. This difference between the system and its environment is 
Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’ vol. I’ Stanford University Press, 2012, p.xiv50
 Let us be clear that Boolean algebra does not develop at the same time as Cy51 -
bernetics, but goes back to  George Boole in the early to mid Nineteenth Century. 
Nevertheless, it merges with Luhmann’s inspirations and ideas in his social sys-
tem theory, in the shape of the idea of the ‘distinction’ that Spencer-Brown illus-
trates and develops.
 Spencer-Brown, G.: ‘Laws of Form’, New York: Dutton, (1969/1979)52
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really what might be called, borrowing from a psychoanalytic vocabulary, 
the Urszene, the primal scene, of the universe for which Luhmann stands. 
But this description gives immediately rise to much more complex con-
cepts than the ones encountered so far, such as the paradigm of re-entry, 
of self-referentiality; which means, in fact, that the system itself is con-
tained in the description of the system. This theoretical approach is not 
new, it was formulated, in view of a very different subject-matter, namely 
language, at the beginning of the twentieth century by the Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand De Saussure (1857 - 1913), who considered language is a self-
contained system.    53
 As mentioned, at the very beginning of Laws of Form, Spencer 
Brown “orders” - in the sense of a hypothetical imperative - his readers to 
‘draw a distinction’ . This simple command, the nature of this order or in54 -
struction, in the form of an imperative, needs to be examined briefly. 
Spencer Brown starts from a ‘blank space’, a space with no distinctions. 
Maybe any social scientist, if confronted with a proceeding of the Spencer-
Brownian kind, will have doubts whether an approach of the sort can pos-
sibly have a claim to preside the study of society. Luhmann, though, trying 
to capture the universe as which he construes the social reality, a reality in 
which process-concepts such as communications and operations, distinc-
 See for instance: Saussure, De, F. 'Cours de linguistique générale', ed. C. Bally 53
and A. Sechehaye, with the collaboration of A. Riedlinger, Lausanne and Paris: 
Payot (1916); trans. W. Baskin, Course in General Linguistics, Glasgow: Fontana/
Collins, (1977) See also: Wells, R.S.  (1947) ‘De Saussure's System of Linguis-
tics’ 3:1-2, 1-31 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00437956.1947.11659300 Last ac-
cessed 12 June 2017. 
 Just to clarify: GSB does not claim that the reader is under the duty of receiving 54
and fulfilling orders. He only claims that knowledge alone is not competent - 
knowledge, and its grammatical form: the indicative. Therefore, like many 
thinkers of the 20th century, from Wittgenstein to the theorists of speech-acts, he 
chooses not the indicative form, not the form of description or analysis, but that of 
a (hypothetic) imperative.
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tions and decisions play the leading parts, must constantly work with 
choices that are not determined, that are in other words, not saturated with 
sufficient reasons or motives, in the way in which the substantial concepts 
of the past had been. The choices, or at least some portion of the choices 
and the decision taken, could always be taken otherwise than they factu-
ally are, to the extent that no one knows in advance, so one can perfectly 
suggest that whatever precedes the imperative of drawing a distinction, 
happens in a blank space. This type of proceeding does come up with an 
order, no doubt — an existing order as opposed to an order given, or in 
other words, a command. although this order is not present where usually 
orders are present in traditional philosophical takes, such as the order of 
nature, of creation. The order that emerges in the context of social sys-
tems, has not been given before; instead, it is it is the cumulative collateral 
result of a large number of distinctions happening at the same time - in a 
way that can easily be compared to that in which a word has its meaning 
not within itself, but must be understood and interpreted, and it is determ-
ined by its - constantly continued - use.   
 At the same time, a rule’s meaning determines what actions are to 
follow.  If there have not been any previous instructions, on which instruc-
tions should the system rely? The resolution of this can be in considering 
the simultaneity of use and meaning, which leads to the meaning and use 
being understood ‘mit einem Schlage’.   Still, Wittgenstein concludes, it is 55
not possible to obey one order only once. This means therefore that the 
order to draw a distinction will not happen only once, but the system will 
 “grasped in a flash” Wittgenstein, L. ‘Remarks on the Foundation of Mathemat55 -
ics’, Blackwell, Translated by G.E. M.. Anscombe, Cambridge MIT 1956. Part I at 
130.
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re-iterate it by itself. This gives a philosophical explanation of the recursiv-
ity of operations of the system.  To give a more recent application of Wit56 -
tgenstein’s example, we can look at programming languages. In program-
ming languages such as Java (or C++), within a determined class, an ini-
tialisation by a loop command causes the program to run several (or an 
infinite number of) times using the same command. The program, as small 
as it can be, is indeed an actual system, and it is a recursive one. The 
program comes to an end when the elements of the class run out. To be 
noted, the earliest programming languages were much simpler, but still 
based on binary codes of 0 and 1, as sets of instructions. Spencer-Brown, 
as a scientist, was clearly aware of them, at least historically, but not only, 
as his theory shows. To make a parallel: the binary code, the instructions 0 
and 1 are correspondently outside and inside of Spencer-Brown ‘mark of 
distinction’ . 57
The symbol that specifically Spencer Brown uses to ‘mark’ a distinc-
tion is shown in Figure 1.  
 
  Spencer-Brown, G. ‘Laws of Form’. New York: Dutton, (1969/1979)56
 The first ever program was by Ada (Countess of ) Lovelace (1815-1852), an 57
English mathematician and writer, who in 1842-43 translated into English from 
French the work  of an Italian mathematician, Luigi Menabrea who wrote about 
the invention of a machine by a French mathematician, Charles Babbage, himself 
considered the “father of the computer”. In her work, Lovelace added numerous 
notes and algorithms, and she is for this work considered the first ever  computer 
programmer. Her notations were finally implemented in 1953 when Babbage’s 
machine was built. See Menabrea, L.F.; Lovelace, A. (1843). "Sketch of the Ana-
lytical Engine invented by Charles Babbage... with notes by the translator. Trans-
lated by Ada Lovelace". In Taylor, R.. Scientific Memoirs. London: Richard and 
John E. Taylor. pp. 666–731.
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By means of placing this sign (called ‘the mark’), Spencer Brown trans-
forms an unmarked space into a space marked by a difference, where the 
two similar perpendicular lines have created a boundary. This boundary 
separates two sides in the space and to go from one side to the other, the 
boundary must be crossed. Each side of the boundary can be indicated. 
From this Spencer Brown derives two ‘laws’; the ‘law of calling’, where the 
distinction is repeated and the value that is derived is equal to the value of 
one distinction (as shown in Figure 2), and the ‘law of crossing’, where the 
mark of distinction is crossed within the boundary, therefore the second 
distinction is applied to the first and, as a consequence, annulled (as 
shown in Figure 3). 
 
 
If applied to the legal system, the law of calling would simply see the first 
operation in form of legal communication, such as, for instance, the estab-
lishment of a legal rule, which would commence the distinction between 
the legal system and its environment, and will be then repeated in the 
same way. That would not change the first operation, it would not increase 
the system complexity, and therefore it would be exactly the same as the 
communication would have happened only once. No time would be in-
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volved. The law of crossing, however, if applied to the legal system would 
instead involve a crossing of the boundary. This would represent the re-
entry into the system. System means “non linear recursion” , What re-en58 -
try means, to try to put it simply, is any communication dynamics. These, 
on their part, involve the need to exclude causality, or at least, to be un-
sure about cause and effects. So when a system, such as the legal sys-
tem, communicates, it needs to first see all the causes and effects to pan 
out every time communication happens. As Luhmann points out , with all 59
the communication that happens at any one time, there are many causes 
and many effects also all happening simultaneously. Let us not forget the 
role of the environment. The “environment selects”  and Luhmann saw in 60
the Darwinian view an important and fitting element in the organisation of 
society; the attempt of society to monitor itself . 61
Spencer-Brown also states that in the same way a difference is 
drawn if in an unmarked space a circle is drawn.  Luhmann utilises this 62
example to depict self –reference.  This is clearly understood if an arrow 63
 Foerster, H. Von ‘Der Anfang von Himmel und Erde hat keinen Namen: Eine 58
Selbsterschaffung in 7 Tagen’, ed. by Albert Müller and Karl H. Müller. Wien: 
Döcker  p. 47.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Gleichzeitigkeit und Synchronisation. In: Soziologische Aufk59 -
lärung 5: Konstruktivistische Perspektiven’. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 
95-130.
 Darwin, C. ‘Origin of Species’ William Collins; UK ed. edition (2011) ch. 4.60
 On this see Baecker, D. ‘Why Systems?’  http://soc.thu.edu.tw/fskang/LU/61
Why%20Systems-Dirk%20Baecker.pdf Last accessed 12 February 2018. See 
also: Baecker, D. ‘Problems of Form’ UP, 1999 
 Spencer-Brown, G. ‘Laws of Form’. New York: Dutton, (1969/1979) p.1.62
Luhmann, N. ‘System as Difference’, Organization Articles, Jan 2006,Vol. 13(1) 63
p.42.
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is added to the circle, as utilised by Kauffman for describing self-reference, 
to give the idea of the circle pointing to itself (Figure 4).   64
 
 
These ways of representing a distinction have an inherent peculiarity; they 
are both composed by two marks, which, supposedly, according to 
Spencer-Brown’s and Kauffman’s definitions, must be considered as one 
mark only. Although, it is to be noted, the second mark cannot be drawn 
without having already drawn the first one. This means therefore, that the 
entire logical process starts with self-reference. Ultimately, this means that 
there is no difference between difference and self-reference. Now, Luh-
mann adds here that there is no difference, therefore, between self-refer-
ence and observation.  This fact that the mark of distinction is made of 65
two marks, shows that there is a paradox embedded within this theory; a 
distinction within the distinction. This distinction cannot be noted at the be-
ginning, at the moment of drawing a distinction, but only later on, when the 
observation element is introduced, that is to say, the calculus shows self-
 On this see Kauffman, L. ‘On Knots (Annals of Mathematics Studies)’, Prince64 -
ton University Press, 1987.
 Luhmann, N. ‘System as Difference’, Organization Articles, Jan 2006,Vol. 13(1) 65
p.43.
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reference, that the paradox become apparent and it is also clear that it 
was in it from the start.  66
 What does difference mean, though, in reference to society? What 
is difference in this context, and is it opposed to unity? If we look at the 
idea of society historically running up to the Twentieth Century, society has 
had many interpretations and definitions based on an anthropocentric 
view; people make society and they are defined by a common language, a 
regional ‘culture’, values, tradition; all unifying elements of a unified view of 
a (local, regional) society. More generally, society has historically being 
conceived as made of people and their relations to each other, the con-
sensus among themselves; and the fact that their on peculiar characteris-
tics (language, values, traditions) make them different from another soci-
ety, such as another nation; but “Society does not weight exactly as much 
as all the human beings taken together” .  A more abstract concept of so67 -
ciety has always been absent until modern times. Until the moment when, 
in fact, the relationship between man and society became problematic, 
more or less around the mid Eighteenth Century, when people started not 
to be as socially unmovable as they had been until that point. At this mo-
ment unifying concepts such as ‘consensus’, such  as, values, such as 
tradition’, are substituted by other concept such as, for instance, and only 
for a time, the Social Contract. This did not last long, Hobbes, and 
Pufendorf had their time, but had to leave the way to something that was 
less of a simple legal construct and more of an explanation of the more 
complex concepts that make a society.  
 Luhmann, N. ‘System as Difference’, Organization Articles, Jan 2006,Vol. 13(1) 66
p.44.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society vol. I, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.7.67
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 1.2 - From Unity to Difference and from Hierarchy to Heterar-
chy. 
 One of the main innovative features of the new paradigm, called the 
Autopoiesis of social systems, is that it involves the notion that social sys-
tems are closed systems, as opposed, of course, to the open systems of 
classical sociology , but also of the mathematical models from which 68
Luhmann took his inspiration. Systems become so by creating themselves, 
by continuously delimiting their "area" in each of their operations, thus by 
continuously drawing a distinction between themselves and their environ-
ments. This is a simple, basic, even somehow crude scenario in science 
— in the general theory of systems — which is commonly at the base of 
advanced or second-order cybernetics. However, it becomes of a great, 
almost revolutionary value when applied to the study of society.  
 This distinction or difference underlying the being of a system, has 
been studied in is general implications by Maturana and his collaborators, 
taking up an older intuition going back to the works of Jacob von Uexküll 
(1864-1944) . In dealing with matters social, talking about the legal sys69 -
tem, for instance, the revolutionary paradigm it brings is not surprising. 
Positive law versus Natural Law, a never ending quarrel. Positive law ap-
pears historically, a long time ago, in the form of the plea for codification, in 
order to prevent variation and the lacking uniqueness in the law. Bentham 
teaches exactly that – largely in vain, but on the continent the same polit-
 See for instance -Parsons, T. ‘An Outline of The Social System’, (1961), 68
Blackwell Publishing (2007);
 Uexküll, J. Von ‘A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: with A Theory 69
of Meaning (Posthumanities)’ University Of Minnesota Press, 2010.
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ics has had much success. These people said, what we need is to provide 
ourselves with a once-for-all law, forever identical to itself. The second 
group, the Natural Law lawyers, are at the opposite end: laws should be 
founded and decided upon moral principles and ethics. As the notion of 
power-conditioned legitimacy, and especially the notion of legitimate de-
cision-making on its base, are rejected, the difficulty is precisely the step 
from the naturalist view to the nitty-gritty disputes of the everyday life of 
the law. In the end, Luhmann  (and many other observers) will have to 70
note that this supposed contraceptive of change – positivisation, as the 
remedy that should protect law against every challenge to it being what it 
is, based on the hope that after the publication of the code, i.e. in the 
presence of the new positive law, no further law will be necessary (at best 
minor more detailed sub-laws) - has resulted in an hitherto unseen birth 
explosion of difference in law, of change. This is because by positivisation 
what has been proved is that the law is perfectly open to manoeuvering. If 
one can codify once, one can codify again, as often as one likes. So, in-
stead of finally attaining stability and identity, we have attained, by impos-
ing positive law, contingency, manipulability, possibility, to an otherwise 
unheard of extent.  
The question of unity versus difference is an old question with rami-
fications in several older disciplines of knowledge. Certainly Luhmann 
shares with a philosopher like Adorno the distrust in the category of the 
‘whole’, but what this position means for them is two different things. The 
problematic of  Adorno, the resistance against philosophical totality claims 
in Hegel and after Hegel, is a philosophical problematic. In the case of 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Rechtssoziologie’, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1980, 190ff.70
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Luhmann, if the totality vision of society is not a totality, this is because, in 
and especially after Hegel’s lifetime, society is predicated upon non-totality 
- functional differentiation. Adorno’s critique is part of the long line of philo-
sophical Hegel-criticisms : Kierkegaard, Marx. For Luhmann, the Hegelian 
totality claim is wrong, or rather misleading, on the level of its every day 
operations – it does not allow to observe that it is communication, number-
less communications, that continuously constitute society. 
If we start with Adorno versus Hegel, unity (das Ganze; ein Ganzes) 
covers/uncovers a multiplicity of fundamental questions. The system, as 
Luhmann uses the word, in order to refer to a action-capable unit always in 
the middle of a game against an over-powering adversary- its environment 
- has a long genealogy in earlier conceptions of such units – whether big 
or small. In particular, the philosophical tradition is here among the an-
cestors. What is das Ganze for Hegel, for Marx, for Adorno? If we read 
Adorno , we find a man who is tired of a functionally unified world. For 71
Adorno, only a Mozart Sonata or a Wagner Opera or a Schoenberg piece 
can be called ein Ganzes because their likes, precise and perfect works of 
art, are effectively wholes - just in the way in which in other traditions, a 
flower is a whole, or the sunlight at dusk. This does  not apply to society or 
to law: “Das Ganze ist das Unwahre" . When instead we are with Hegel 72
 Adorno, T. ‘Minima Moralia:Reflections on Damaged Life (Radical Thinkers): 71
Reflections on a Damaged Life’, Verso Books; New Edition edition (21 Oct. 2005) 
No 29, 55.
 Adorno, T. ‘Minima Moralia:Reflections on Damaged Life (Radical Thinkers): 72
Reflections on a Damaged Life’, Verso Books; New Edition edition (21 Oct. 2005) 
No 29, 55.
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das Wahre ist das Ganze , the first implication seems to be to set up an 73
irresistible power to lead humanity in the right direction.  
The Weltgeist is another configuration of the same idea. The world 
realises itself in its totalisation. We can say that this "Das Ganze ist das 
Unwahre" works also for Luhmann (although he rarely speaks of music or 
art or literature), as documents of a strange theory of modern society. 
Between Luhmann and Habermas the issue at stake is effectively that: 
Luhmann is opposed to the idea of modern society as synthesis or total-
isation of systems; systems go each in their own direction; there is no 
power that can unify or synthetise all. For the Hegelians, when they are 
not artists like Adorno (who, apart from a sociologist and philosopher, was 
also, as a composer, a pupil of Alban Berg) there is this strong idea of a 
system either static or revolutionary, but which expresses “das Ganze”, the 
“unity”, the “whole”. A suppression of negativity is nothing but a false con-
ciliatory statement in favour of an existing centre of top of the pyramid, or 
transcendence.  
 Beyond the dichotomy unity-difference, already revolutionary, there is 
another concept that has an interest for Luhmann. The concept of 
‘module’, ‘modular’, found in Spencer -Brown carries in its definition an 
idea of cycle (modular), but also of separation by function, as in modular 
programming for instance, where modules are separated by functions, and 
each function performs a specific job, often a repetitive one; and all go to-
gether to make the whole machine, or system perform in a particular way. 
This is easily seen as applicable to social systems, not only to mechanical, 
 Hegel, G. W. F. “Phenomenology of Spirit 1807, See also Richter, U. ‘Das 73
Wahre Ist Das Ganze, Sagt Hegel - Adorno Sagt: Das Ganze Ist Das Unwahre. 
Methodologische Reflexionen Über Drei Weltentwürfe’, Published Online: 
2014-01-09 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1524/hgjb.2002.4.jg.350 Last accessed 19 
June 2017.
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scientific ones, but also, for instance, to the legal system and other social 
systems. 
Before entering into the workings of Luhmannian social systems, 
there are other explanations of concepts that precede the definition of so-
ciety as a social system. For instance, the opposition hierarchy vs heter-
archy, or hierarchy vs something different, perhaps less prestigious or less 
sovereign, but in the same proportion more complex, reflects a contrast, a 
polarity between antiquity and modernity in society.  The passage from 
one to the other was of course not abrupt, and not so clear cut. Several 
have been the attempts in sociology, among other disciplines, to try and 
define what modernity is . For instance one aspect relates to the individu74 -
al that becomes aware of his own uniqueness, of his right to freedom and 
of his rights in general, of the ‘reality’ of his own subjective perception of 
the world, of his own self-creation . All this happens after the Middle 75
Ages, where a then dominant Weltanschauung had its fundamental pre-
supposition in the idea or doctrine of a God, who all decides, sees, and 
judges; and when new ideas started to seep in the artistic world showing a 
slight change in attitude during a period called Early Modernity.  
One particular example of a changing of perspective is represented 
in Hieronymus Bosch’s Garden of Earthly Delights , where the painter has 76
rendered the unique fantasmagories inspired to him, ultimately, by the vis-
ion of an "earthly paradise", though the theological nomenclatura behind 
 See for instance Gay, C. M. ‘The Way of the (Modern) World: Or, Why It's 74
Tempting to Live As If God Doesn't Exist’. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998.
 On this see Berger, P. L. "Western Individuality: Liberation and Loneliness," 75
Partisan Review 52 (1985).
 Hieronymus Bosch, ‘The Garden of Earthly Delights’, c. 1480-1505, oil on pan76 -
el, 220 x 390 cm (Prado, Madrid) 
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the title is of only minor importance in this context. This painting has been 
subject to numerous interpretations , but the first impression every viewer 77
receives is the utter modernity of its form — the unrestrained freedom that 
the painter allows himself. This altar piece, a triptych, shows men and 
women mingling with fantastic creatures, which are generally considered 
as expressions of many devilish temptations, but at the same time, they 
can also be read as some sort of an ante litteram type of order of the type 
described by Luhmann as ‘heterarchical’; each does what he wishes, there 
are no orders, no imposition, everyone seems to be free to follow their de-
sires. 
What the painter seems to wish to tell us, is that humans decide of 
their own fate. It is almost a cause and effect kind of approach to life; no 
one is there to show them what to do nor what is right or wrong, there is 
the sense of a subjective morality. This, for the world-view of the 16th cen-
tury was certainly understood as something sinful and potentially devilish, 
but to the modern eye it takes up an entirely different aspect. Moreover, by 
closing the triptych, one can see on the external door, in the top left corner, 
the figure of God looking down to the Earth as a mere observer, excluded 
from all that is going on among men on the Earth, as if he did not have any 
longer, any imposing powers.  
Did Bosch, in spite of what were his deliberate and official inten-
tions, want to make a statement that looks so hugely modern in our eyes? 
 See for instance Silver, L. 'Hieronymus Bosch, Tempter and Moralist' http://77
www.percontra.net/archive/5silver.htm. Last accessed 4th May 2018. See also 
Gombrich, E. H. ‘Bosch's 'Garden of Earthly Delights': A Progress Report’. Jour-
nal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, Volume 32, 1969: 162–170. See also 
Baldass, L. von, ‘Die Chronologie der Gemälde des Hieronymus Bosch’, in: 
Jahrbuch der königlichen Preuszischen Kunstsammlungen, XXXVIII (1917), pp. 
177–195. All these critics points to the lust and sinful aspects depicted in the 
painting, as a sort of warning to all of the transient world we live in. Transient, or 
contingent?
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It is not possible to know, but looking at this painting now, what is repre-
sented there by Bosch seems to be showing elements of a totally new 
view on society, a partial break with tradition, almost a new social order. If 
one would dare pushing the interpretation further, one may even see some 
aspects in common with Luhmann’s view of society, where God is not at 
the centre of the scene, but on the side, as a mere observer, unable - or 
unwilling - to intervene.  
The old-European pre-modern hierarchically rigidly stratified struc-
ture of society evolved; several consecutive series or sequences of innov-
ations have pushed society out of the "Old-European" structure into the 
operational setting that constitutes modern and current society, in terms, 
for instance, of the individual’s rights and freedoms, leaving way to the En-
lightenment, and especially Kant’s philosophy with idea of man-made 
laws. Modernity officially started at this point, with a paradigm shift on 
many levels. Redefining law, politics, economy, and society at large, as 
God-independent agencies had a number of consequences. People’s 
place in society was no longer a dependent variable of God’s will, and so-
ciety has lost its hierarchical certainties and its conservative radicalism. 
Modernity, on the other hand, as dealing with admitted conditions of con-
tingency, will have to show some sort of rigidity as to its rules. Through the 
past two and a half centuries, although under the one, identical denomina-
tion of ‘modernity’, the society model that has given rise to today's first 
world has evolved into a more socially flexible society.  
The notion that has been coined to express this move is "heter-
archy", from “heteros" (ετερο), ancient Greek for "the other", referring to all 
couples and types of relations and proportions that are of the type "the 
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one/the other", as opposed to "hierarchy", from Gr. "hieros" (ἱερός) , sac-
red, holy; a term that justifies the relationship of subordination by reference 
to some third value. It points to the fact that the realm of dependencies is 
wider than that of justified dependencies. It also reflects a different, more 
complex structure. These changes caused an ever-increasing complexity 
in social relations and the need for managing modernity’s hurdles. The re-
action was to centre upon the individual and its possibilities, which started 
its career as a being defined by the ever more complex societal relation-
ships it never stops creating — not because some notion of "progress" is 
in-built into human time, but because the moves that allows the individual 
to deal with its own environment, are inexorably predicated on ever-in-
creasing complexity.  78
The individual in social-scientific and philosophical discourses of the 
20th century modernity is cast by German Idealism into a specific 
Weltverhältnis, a unique world-relation. Versions of this - such as Husserl's 
Lebenswelt  integrate the individual  into a social universe. Luhmann, 79
however, finds it impossible to conceive the individual as "part of a whole", 
part of a society: there are conceptual limits of such a relation, for reasons 
largely already outlined by Foucault in the 20th  and Nietzsche in the 19th 
century.  Nietzsche's claim that ”God is dead’  and Foucault's claim  that 80 81
the idea of history as aiming towards a goal had already, with their philo-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Ecological Communication‘, University of Chicago Press, 1989.78
 Husserl, E. ‘The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenome79 -
nology' (1936), Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Luhmann, N. ‘Ecological Communication‘, University of Chicago Press, 1989, p.80
212. See also Foucault, M. ‘Les Mots et les Choses' Gallimard, Paris, 1966.  And 
Nietzsche, F. ‘ Human all too Human: A Book for Free Spirits . Penguin Classics 
1994; ('Menschliches, Allzumenschliches: Ein Buch für freie Geister ' 1878.)
 Nietzsche, F. ‘The Gay Science (The Joyful Wisdom)’ Digireads.com; 2nd ed. 81
edition, 2009, Ch II, Aphorism No 125.
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sophical means, covered part of the Luhmannian ground. Foucault had 
innovated by substituting a discontinuous succession of epistemes’  for 82
the continuity of history, salvation, progress. For Foucault, each of these 
eminently mortal stages tends to take itself, obviously, but obviously false-
ly, as being the final one.  
Although Luhmann was not a philosopher and his theory is, by its 
themes and topics, far removed from both those thinkers, these two rather 
revolutionary claims in modern philosophy somewhat fit in with Luhmann’s 
new perspective on modernity. Especially Luhmann has no concept of 
"hegemonic" or comprehensive discourses. In modern society semantics 
(Luhmann's term, not all-too far from what Foucault calls discourse) are 
always differentiated semantics. Each system produces its own descrip-
tions of the world and of itself. The reason is that for Luhmann there is no 
meaning beyond the boundaries of social systems. Still, the Nietzschean 
renewed affirmation that ‘God is dead’ leads towards a rejection of ethics; 
similarly, the Foucaultian idea of history as epistemes reinforces a more 
general view of a modern society once all "great narratives" (as philoso-
pher Jean-François Lyotard has called it, in 1979, in his Postmodern con-
dition) and all common all-encompassing teloi have fallen out of use.  
With the change from hierarchy, with its inherent drive to simplicity, 
to heterarchy, which cannot but produce ever more complexity, the social 
issues progressively change and become ever more convoluted and het-
erogeneous. Consequently and gradually, it is no longer about the power 
of God, but about the power of the individual; there is no longer a history of 
humanity leading towards a common goal, but single, self-defined epis-
 Foucault. M. ‘The Order of Things: Archeology of Human Science’,  Routledge, 82
2001.
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temes of knowledge; what matters is no longer religious ethics, but rather 
negative ethics, and a type of sociological analysis that is no longer a mat-
ter for ontology but for management, and, finally and more clamorously, 
society is, as Luhmann formulates, no longer made of people, but of com-
munication.  
This idea of systems associated with society seems to indicate two 
main things, which make it unpopular: the first is that the idea of society as 
a system suggests that there is some sort of order and reason in the world 
(an idea difficult to fathom); and the second is that systems are associated 
with an idea of organisation - that is because systems can organise things 
in a way unknown and not correlated to those things - and consequently to 
an idea of domination and control. So, order, but at what cost? This is per-
haps the reason behind the accusations to Social System Theory (and to 
Luhmann himself) of being right-wing . In fact, it is not at all this way. 83
Modern society is tense to control and monitor itself, but control and com-
munication go hand in hand, at least, if not especially in social sciences . 84
Interestingly, Habermas, in a recent interview admitted that: “My impression 
is that the whole world has become more conservative and shares the attitude 
towards life summed up by my colleague Nicholas Luhmann in the formula: 
‘Everything is changing and nothing works any more’”.  85
Usually, when first approaching Autopoiesis of society there is the 
hope or understanding of seeing the opposition between, on the one hand, 
 Especially as Luhmann was opposed by Habermas, who was openly affiliated 83
to left wing theories. This misunderstanding continues today: Borch, C. ‘Niklas 
Luhmann (Key Sociologists)’ Routledge; 1 edition (2011)
 Wiener, N. ‘Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 84
Machine’ (1948) 
 Stuart, J. ‘A rare interview with Jurgen Habermas’ FinancialTimes, 30 April 85
2010. https://www.ft.com/content/eda3bcd8-5327-11df-813e-00144feab49a Last 
accessed 12 February 2018.
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something like the effective reality of Autopoiesis as a process that hap-
pens and can be observed; and, on the other hand, something like an ul-
timate substantial element, a representative of the traditional conception of 
society, something which points beyond it and which is exemplified in 
something like a transcendence, a telos and consensus It is Luhmann’s 
realisation of complexity’s role in modern society that has triggered his 
admission that there is no longer space for the display of teleological 
schemes, as, for instance, in Aristotle.  
Luhmann therefore speaks of modern society as a society where 
there is no longer a space for goals - destinations commonly shared by all. 
This proposition seems again rather obscure at first looks and seems to 
stand in need of an effective explanation. A teleological conception of so-
ciety is tied with antiquity but not to be confused with religion. In fact, an-
tiquity is not particularly religious as such. It has, apart from the Jews, no 
monotheism, and the Jewish one sustained a kingdom of its own only for a 
very limited time. It is however religious in reference to Old Europe. Luh-
mann wants to avoid having to speak of Christianism, and to some extent 
even of religion. This is because religion is in fact a function system in its 
own right, so there is no systemicist objection against it. Greek Antiquity is 
in a much more subtle relation to religion than the Christian history. The 
society we are discussing, modern society, is in continuous reference to 
pre-modern Christian society, not to any religion or rite of antiquity. For in-
stance, in Aristotle the aim of life, the telos was happiness, but when he 
speaks of telos (τέλος) , he also speaks of tele (τηλε - mistery) and telein 86
 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, Green Lion Press (1999). See also Aristotle ‘Nico86 -
machean Ethics’, OUP Oxford; Revised edition 2009 -  10.5. 117a 22-23. .See 
also Achtemberg D. ‘Cognition of Value in Aristotle Ethics’, SUNY press 2002, p. 
49 and ff.
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(τελεῖν - to initiate), which are all not accidental homophonies, but semant-
ic aspects of the very same word, the same root. The result of someone’s 
initiation, or in fact any a pagan-religious ceremony, is happiness – and as 
this is a result the participants actively try to achieve, it is also their goal. 
This is not an invention of the philosopher Aristotle; much earlier it is wit-
nessed in Athens, e.g. by the Victory Odes by Pindar . 87
The initiated are those who are happy because they understand the 
principle given by Zeus. Also, Sophocles states that only the initiated are 
triolbioi (tre times happy) as they have seen the mistery . Hence, those 88
who do not participate in the ceremony are called ateleis (non-initiated) 
those without knowledge of Zeus, and consequentially conduct a life 
without telos, an unachieved, imperfect life.  The commonality with Chris89 -
tianity is, on this point, a very obvious one. Here, there are sacraments 
that take up the role of the mysteries, and especially there is the funda-
mental rite of initiation : baptism. Baptism brings the person in the kingdom 
of God and bestow upon him the right the goal of one day be allowed to 
see the light of his face. The whole idea of a life that is directed towards an 
accomplishment, an aim, has been present in philosophy throughout its 
evolution and has influenced the conception of history. Of course this is 
not to be interpreted as an argument against any type of accomplishment. 
Rather, and more simply, there is no commonly shared telos for Luhmann. 
Maybe the society of Luhmann - and already of Max Weber, - has no soci-
ety-wide notion of perfection. Then, also, the view that antiquity cannot 
 Pindar, ‘Victory Odes’, Cambridge University Press, 1995 (fr 137)87
 Sophocles fr 387.88
 On this see Agamben, G. ‘La ragazza Indicibile’, Mondadori Electa, 2010 P.16 89
and ff.
51
give us what Europeans have been looking for in Antiquity, since the 
Renaissance already, that is  a full alternative to Christianity. 
1.3 - Circularity, code and re-entry. 
Another decisive concept found in Laws of Form is recursivity . To 90
explain what recursivity is, we might remember a drawing of the Dutch 
artist M. C. Escher, ‘Drawing Hands’, which shows two hands in the 
process of being mutually drawn by each other, and drawing each other. 
Alternatively, we can think of recursivity as a torus, a doughnut. The torus 
is a topological concept (or space) that refers to a mathematical process 
that sees an operation repeating itself, or a procedure applied repeatedly 
such as in a computer program .  To explain it in lay terms, the torus is a 91
flat surface, like a rectangle, turned into a tube and then with the ends 
joined together to form a doughnut. Why going through all this trouble? 
Because the three-dimensional topological figure that is the torus, is the 
representation of a space, where exceptions happen, which, to put it 
briefly, cause the hole in the middle to appear . There are exceptions, yet 92
 According to the English Oxford Dictionary ‘recursivity’ is a word created in the 90
1950s, car ‘recursiveness’, from the 1930s, again a mathematical concept. The 
origins are from ‘recursive’ . Both terms of carry out a recursive procedure; to per-
form the same sequence of operations on successive results; as well as the 
mathematical definition of performing a mathematical or computational operation 
again on the result of the previous operation. The root goes back to the mid 17th 
Century, from classical Latin recursāre to keep running back, return again and 
again.
 On this see for instance: Lamb, E. ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About 91
Holes’, in Scientific American, December 2014. https://blogs.scientificamerican.-
com/roots-of-unity/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-holes/ Last accessed 
1st February 2018. 
 McCulloch, W. S. ‘A Heterarchy of Values Determined by the Topology of the 92
Nervous Nets’, http://vordenker.de/ggphilosophy/mcculloch_heterarchy.pdf Last 
accessed 3rd February 2018.
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the system is highly reliable . One example of a reliable torus is a hurri93 -
cane; it has a hole in the middle, where wind is absent . Exceptions  in 94
fact happen everywhere, and they happen in society. Luhmann talks of 
“disappointed expectations”, which are the exceptions, the hole of the 
torus.    
As cybernetics is concerned with the explanation of behaviour gen-
erally understood as teleological - an essential characteristic of mind and 
life - in terms of control and information, it looks for patterns like recursivi-
ty, which refer to the achieving and maintaining of goals. These states are 
seen as models for the autonomy characteristic of organisms: their be-
haviour, while purposeful, is not strictly determined by either environmental 
influences or internal dynamical processes. Social systems are seen as 
independent and will-endowed. For instance, considering the legal system, 
the question comes up whether the role it attributes to justice is really a 
teleological one. If justice is often considered to be the goal of the legal 
system, another interpretation might take it to be a response to the ab-
sence of any pre-existing goals, as a way of providing the legal system 
with some instructions as to the direction to take in its everyday tasks, 
even if there are no goals left and if there are therefore no definitive in-
structions to be derived from goals. In any case, the legal system’s re-
quirements in a second-order cybernetic approach are the reference to the 
identity of the system, which describes itself within the boundaries of judi-
cial theories.   
 See  Foerster, H, von,’Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics 93
and Cognition’, Springer, 2003, p.244 and ff.
 On this and recursivity see McNeil, D. H. ‘What’s Going On With The Topology 94
of Recursion’ Para 4.4  http://see.library.utoronto.ca/SEED/Vol4-1/McNeil.htm 
Last accessed 3rd February 2018.
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Warren McCulloch, one of the pioneers of the field, defined cyber-
netics as well as cybernetics of cybernetics, or second order cybernetics, 
introducing a second level of observation; cybernetics, gives way to an ex-
perimental epistemology that is concerned with the communication within 
an observer (first order cybernetics / observation) and between the ob-
server and his environment (second order cybernetics / observation). The 
influence of this concept on Luhmann is clear when we read in relation to 
social systems about second order observation of the system, beyond the 
system simply observing itself, but from the point of view of the external 
observer from the environment . 95
  As previously explained, one possible definition of cybernetics could 
therefore be “the science of effective organisation” .  In fact, a system or96 -
ganises itself through recursive operations and reflexive questioning, 
through self-observation, that is to say, it splits into an observer and an 
observing system. This way allows the system to maintain itself by being 
able to distinguish between itself and its environment, that is, to distinguish 
between and recombine internal and external references.  Similarly, the 
idea of circularity presupposes the idea of  difference, considering that the 
re-crossing of the boundary (or in other words, the form) of the system, 
with the re-entering of the boundary of the difference between system and 
environment. This means that the re-entry is already contained in itself, 
that is, the distinction re-enters the distinguished. For instance, the com-
munication within the legal system will produce legal norms recursively by 
utilising the concept of legal validity. The legal/illegal code utilised by the 
 McCulloch, W. S. ‘A Heterarchy of Values Determined by the Topology of the 95
Nervous Nets’, http://vordenker.de/ggphilosophy/mcculloch_heterarchy.pdf Last 
accessed 3rd February 2018.
 Beer, S.’Cybernetics and Management', English Universities Press, 1959;96
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legal system should not be prematurely imagined according to what we 
imagine to be norm; it is simply utilised as a rule of attribution and connec-
tion when there is the need to consider whether something is legal or ille-
gal. If it were a norm, the paradox would arise as to whether the distinction 
between legal and illegal should be considered itself legal or illegal.  
 This re-entry of the legal system into the distinction legal/illegal can 
be productive of what might be seen a perfect example of a paradox, 
which can be resolved in logical terms by moving to a different level. The 
change of level is obtained by introducing the figure of an observer. Logi-
cians have distinguished two levels, object-level and a meta-level. This 
would compare respectively, with a self-observer and an external observer. 
The self-observer would observe himself, so it would be simply self-refer-
ential, while the external observer observes the system observing itself, 
this level would represent second order observation. This is also the point 
at which the distinction between cybernetics and second-order cybernetics 
enters into play. The important difference is that cybernetics would deal 
with a system simply as an object, while second order cybernetics under-
stands the system as an agent in its own right, which in turn deals with an 
observer.  Ultimately, this indicates that every social system operating thus 
is a self-describing system. As already noticed, cybernetics is concerned 
with the explanation in terms of control and information of teleological be-
haviour, which is an essential characteristic of mind as well as life.  
 More precisely, cyberneticists still borrow from Aristotle in terms of 
teleology, but try and adapt the concept to a situation of modernity (or 
post-modernity). Not only does the fact that according to Luhmann’s theory 
of social systems individuals are not part of the social systems, but situ-
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ated outside society and all social systems, in that they constitute the most 
important component of their environment, not mean that they are of any 
“lesser” importance.  According to another conception, which has its roots 
in Descartes  more than in Aristotle , that of Noam Chomsky , the hu97 98 99 -
man being is endowed with inborn goals that shape its "ambition" and 
therefore its identity, and constitute it as “perfect”. In modern society, man 
has no longer such all-encompassing, life-long goals, as it had in pre-
modern times, such as in Feudal times, for example, both in the West and 
in the East (let us think of Japan), where a man had to dedicate his life’s 
work, and his loyalty, to his Lord; but the same happened throughout his-
tory. Icelandic people spent centuries upon centuries dedicating their life to 
sheep farming with the single-minded goat to earn a (often poor) living in-
dependently . Those goals were the same everywhere: loyalty to a Lord, 100
to the King, to the the State, to God, and the reward was (supposedly) 
liberty and happiness. Through revolutions, wars and many times of 
bloodshed, man has learned a different lesson. His goals have changed 
direction .  101
 See for instance: Detlefsen, K. ‘Teleology and natures in Descartes’ Sixth Med97 -
itation’ In Series page. (2012). In K. Detlefsen (Ed.), Descartes' Meditations: A 
Critical Guide (Cambridge Critical Guides, p. Ii). Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press. 
 Aristotle. 'The Organon and Other Works' Open source collection. Translated 98
under the editorship of W.D. Ross. Full text at Internet Archive (archive.org). 
p. 649 in text. n647 in page field. Retrieved 2009-10-22. Aristotle, Metaphysics 
Book Theta (translated with an introduction and commentary by Stephen Makin), 
Oxford University Press, 2006.
 Chomsky, N. ‘Linguistics and Descartes’. In: Smith JC. (eds) Historical Founda99 -
tions of Cognitive Science. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 46. Springer, Dor-
drecht 1991.
 See for instance Laxness, H. ‘Independent People’, Vintage Classics (2008). 100
 See Martineau, H. ‘How to Observe Morals and Manners’,  Charles Knight and 101
Co, 1838 p.203. See also Tocqueville, A. Democracy in America' (vol. I 1835; vol 
II 1840). Trans. and eds, Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop, University of 
Chicago Press, 2000.
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 Even if individuals in everyday life still pursue happiness, or efficien-
cy, or economic advantages, or other tasks, and in that sense still follow a 
‘teleological behaviour’. Cybernetics are concerned with behaviour as re-
cursivity, that is in relation to outcomes, to results, including of processes 
and actions that had been intended to have other, very different outcomes 
and results, which tries to achieve and maintain goals, and with actions. 
These states have been seen, by the previously acknowledged scientists, 
who have provided the biological sources of Luhmann’s autopoietic par-
adigm,  as models for the autonomy characteristic of organisms: their be-
haviour, while purposeful, is not strictly determined by either environmental 
influences or internal dynamic processes. Systems are seen as indepen-
dent and autonomous . 102
 This red conceptual line from organisms and their behaviour to sys-
tems and theirs does not constitute an objection to the fact that the legal 
system presents a number of differences if compared to biological sys-
tems. First of all, autopoietic systems are not autonomous in the sense of 
independent. They depend on their environment. Luhmann’s notion that 
human beings are outside the system, has one major aspect in the fact 
that, in this way, it is possible to avoid some specifically "human" problems 
such as the need of goals or the restriction to tasks. The paradox already 
mentioned in a different context, the notion of a ‘difference embedded in a 
difference’ applies, and so does the same solution as in the case of every 
other system. In the specific case of law, it would be also necessary to 
have a final ‘stop’ in the system actively preventing the law from finding the 
 See for instance Bourgine, P. Varela, F. J. ‘Towards a Practice of Autonomous 102
Systems: Proceedings of the First European Conference on Artificial Life’. (1992) 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Pr., pp. xi-xvii . See also Wiener, N, ‘Cybernetics: Or the 
Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine’ Martino Fine Books; 
2nd ed. edition (2013).
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response to the ‘final quest for law’.  In any case, ultimately, the law in its 
self-observation and self-description must accept “itself”, that is to say, it 
must find a specific function bestowed upon it by its environment, society 
(that is, other functionally defined and differentiated systems) and must 
sustain the amount of internal coherence that is sufficient for it to go on. 
The internal coherence is, though, limited to the fact that the system can 
reproduce itself autopoietically, it is a matter of consistency in identity, not 
in terms of causality. Moreover, it does not mean the absence of paradox-
es. 
 Once again, the legal system, as a self-describing system , is oper103 -
ationally - that is normatively - closed, but is cognitively open, because it 
can observe and is not precluded by any external factor from “learning".  104
The social systems (legal, political, economical and so on) do not commu-
nicate with each other. This is because each system has a code that 
makes the legal communication not understandable, so to speak, by, say, 
the political system, which has a different code. It is cognitively open, in 
the sense that the system can learn. Although this idea was accepted by 
several authors writing before Luhmann and outside the scope of sociolo-
gy, such as the biologist Umberto Maturana and the epistemologist and 
mathematician George Spencer-Brown, most of these authors objected 
themselves to its application to social systems, because in their world 
view, it was unthinkable that human individuals are not included within so-
 Self describing means that the legal system puts into action a set of distinc103 -
tions that no other societal agency knows (or attempts) to handle. Law, in the 
type of society we are in, is "managed" by the legal system and no one else. To 
this extent it is also operationally closed. The operations it puts into action are all 
of one kind, insofar as they are dealing with the distinction directrice lawful/unlaw-
ful. 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st 104
Published in Pbk. 2008;
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ciety.  Therefore, to this extent, when speaking of the legal system, the 
paradox of the distinction within the distinction is bound to resurface. It is 
however overcome only when, once again, the necessary operation is 
identified as legal communication.  Social Autopoiesis indicates that there 
are two ways to react to disappointment: cognitively, that is by learning 
and adapting to the facts, and normatively, that is by not learning nor 
adapting or, in other words, by sticking “counterfactually” to the original 
expectations even after their disappointment.  The legal system uses lan-
guage for its operations of communication but with its own specific termi-
nology that has no relevance outside the system. This shows that the sys-
tem can recognise its boundaries and can distinguish between internal is-
sues in relation to what is ‘legal’, and external issues of interest which 
however cannot be dealt with and cannot even be perceived otherwise 
than within the system. These are therefore only remotely perceived  105
 Norms are created within the system and serve as criteria in terms of 
decision making. They have no correspondence in the environment, which 
means that the system is normatively closed and, as such, freed from the 
burden of morality, which rests with psychic systems . And this is one of 106
the reasons why psychic system are confined to the environment as ob-
servers. Ethical issues such as racism, or any kind of discrimination, be-
comes normative only when the legal system declares racism illegal. Simi-
larly, the distinction between normative and cognitive, between facts and 
norms, must be made by the system itself as it is not something that can 
 Foerster, H, von,’Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and 105
Cognition’, Springer, 2003, p. 6 and ff.
 To be noted that this is a new type of burden to be carried alone by the psy106 -
chic systems -  as before the era of what Luhmann calls "modern society" psychic 
and social systems were not neatly separated.
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be found in the world. Looking at the way the system works, one might be 
tempted to assert that the guarantee of justice is not something that can 
derive from the environment, but rather from the consistency of the opera-
tions that recognise and distinguish the interests and the facts that are pro-
tected by the law from those which are not and are to be eliminated. The 
problem of combining internal and external references is resolved always 
by internal operations, which is what Luhmann refers to as ‘closure’.  
 1.4 - Internal Stability: Eigenvalues and Eigenbehaviour. 
 It remains to see how the legal system as an autopoietic, operational-
ly closed system can guarantee the stability of its internal operations. But, 
in fact, can it? Can a system guarantee coherence and consistency in 
terms of operations and, if looking ultimately at what the legal system con-
sists of, in legal practice? About this possibility systems theory is every-
thing but optimistic. Sometimes, a judge claims to have learnt from a legal 
theory. But does it really happen? For Luhmann’s degree of adversity to 
demagogical overstatement it is already an important achievement if legal 
theory succeeds in telling itself a credible story about what happens in le-
gal practice rather than having to import such a description from its (intra-
societal) outside.  
 One such story is encapsulated in a term – a term formed after a long 
line of mathematical and scientific terms, namely the term “eigenvalue”; a 
closer look into it is necessary. Luhmann refers to eigenvalues in order to 
refer to the acquired internal stability of the system caused by autopoietic, 
recursive operations. Cyberneticists have postulated that the operations of 
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a system are maintained constant in their evolution by some structures 
that remain stable in the operations of the system . 107
 The above mentioned concepts of difference, heterarchy, and eigen-
value (or any concept with the suffix eigen-) work together.  German math-
ematician's David Hilbert’s concept of eigen- represents a fundamental 
point. This is that eigen- relates to emergent properties in the duration of a 
process. These are not substantial, that is, do not relate to ‘being’ in some 
older philosophical senses of the term, but they do generate something out 
of nothing. In other words, when, in a world of experience, we randomly 
select, or perceive, something such as sensations coming from different 
sources, and do so repeatedly, we end up forming categories in our mind 
about those selections (smells, objects, sounds), which will allow us to 
categorise. This happens because of the recurring behaviour, but this re-
curring behaviour is random and started out of nothing. The importance of 
it is that it is a way to bridge between the world described in physics and 
mathematics and the word of experience.  108
 One could even surmise a whole very specific type of ethics, or 
rather of the social scientist’s professional deontology, which would tend to 
see the right approach or method as being much less given to criticising 
and much more to observing. Instead of criticising, taking into account the 
 On this see Baecker, D. ‘Organisation als System’. (1999): Frankfurt am Main: 107
Suhrkamp. See also Baecker, D. The Intelligence of Ignorance in Self-Referential 
Systems. In: Robert Trappl (ed.), Cybernetics and Systems 1994. Proceedings of 
the Twelfth European Meet- ing on Cybernetics and Systems Research, Vienna 
5-8 April 1994, vol. II. Singapore: World Scientific, pp. 1555-1562. 
 
 Foerster, H. v. ‘On Constructing a Reality’1973, 211-228. https://pdfs.seman108 -
ticscholar.org/5934/573a5be75bc6c7030a3ce3c6278e872e2d4c.pdf - last ac-
cessed 13 February 2018; Foerster, H.v. (2003) Objects: Tokens for (Eigen-)Be-
haviors. In: Understanding Understanding. Springer, New York, NY, p 261-272.  
See also Piaget, ‘The Construction of Reality in the Child’ 1955. https://pdfs.se-
manticscholar.org/ba16/facb32fec367cc0f4c9f1e04e80943f2c89a.pdf Last ac-
cessed 13 February 2018.
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consequences of every action. This is the achievement of functional differ-
entiation. Of course one could equally contend that the autos (self) is in a 
sense the great absent of autopoietical theory, remains eternally at the 
postulate level. It is the self of which nothing can be said than precisely 
that it is in the making of itself. There is a real difficulty in the task, say, of 
de-substantialising the self. The self – that sounds like some being. In a 
sense the notion of German ‘eigen’ which applies to a doing, seems to 
contain less difficulty. One might suggest that even "autopoiesis", being 
somehow off the mark, could be advantageously replaced by with a word 
like eigenpoiesis. 
 The opening up of the problematic of structures springing from the 
recursive reference of what is called eigenvalues is one of those aspects 
of Luhmann's theory of society that are theoretically most promising.  Sim-
ilarly, the notion of a system’s stable conduct in continuously or repetitively 
making appeal to the same distinctions in dealing with its environment has 
clear reflections in the notion of eigenbehaviour.  This is a notion that has 
first been applied to, and makes sense in relation to, the behaviour of 
autonomous cognitive systems, and Luhmann uses it to describe autopoi-
etic social systems. Incidentally, let us remember that an autopoietic social 
system is not necessarily also autonomous; they are autonomous in bio-
logy, but not in Social System Theory. The term ‘autos’, self, as in 
autopoiesis, postulates the self-making characteristic of an autopoietic be-
ing a being that has no need of the hypothesis of an external maker. The 
same term autos, as used in autonomy, self-command of a self that rejects 
external commands, contains a strong value-related reference, an aspira-
tion. It is generally desirable to be “autonomous”; on the contrary, to say it 
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is desirable (or undesirable) to be “autopoietic”, is meaningless under all 
circumstances. Under similar appearances, we find thus a wide gap sep-
arating autopoiesis and autonomy (though both can coincide). Perhaps a 
Grenzbegriff, a boundary- or limit-concept. The non-exchangeability of 
autopoiesis and autonomy is essential given attempts of finding in the dis-
tinction autopoiesis/autonomy the appropriately impoverished Luhmannian 
version of what is known, in Political Philosophy, as the chief enigma of 
democracy theory: the distinction “constituent power”/”constituted 
power”.   109
 Nevertheless, rather than autopoietic, it might make more sense to 
refer to what Luhmann calls the autopoietic system, as being much more 
precisely pointed at by a term such as eigenpoietic, in that “eigen” points 
toward stability rather than identity, and towards process and recursivity 
rather than defence of a pre-existing same. The concept of eigenbehaviour 
relates to cognitive systems, which, through their closure or self-referential 
recursivity, not only allow the continuation of systems, but produce regular-
ities. In making itself, the legal system also tells itself as a story, as some-
thing like a reasoning autobiography. While it organises itself by each step 
it takes, as a functionally differentiated system, the legal system has the 
capacity of self-organisation, this capacity is not intrinsic to the system but 
it derives from the relationship between observer and the thing observed. 
In other words it supposes an external observer. Organisation occurs 
when the relation between two entities becomes conditional on a third 
value or state, which directs the autopoietic attention in direction to the 
 On this see Negri, A. ‘Insurgencies. Constituent Power and the Modern State’. 109
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009. See also Hardt, M., and Negri, 
A.. ‘Empire’, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
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theory of functions with more than one variable.   110
 The function system or machine will have an internal state S, an ex-
ternal input ‘I’ and a mapping ‘f’. If ‘f’ changes, the organisation of the sys-
tem changes. The mapping is the difference between two ways of looking 
at the object of the observation: the difference between the observer’s ob-
servation of the system and the observation that the system has of itself.  111
The questions of “applied system theory”, such as that of good and bad 
organisation and the autopoietic contributions to it, take off at this point. In 
function-based systems theory the agreement is that good organisation is 
not absolute, but relative to the external input or disturbances and the goal 
of the system at hand. Systems capable of adjusting their organisation in a 
way to be able to pursue their goal(s) are therefore called ‘self-organising’.  
 Moreover, as already mentioned, autopoietic systems are less 
defined by a goal than by an internal series of operations, which form an 
internal organisation, so to speak; therefore, whether the self organisation 
is a ‘good’ organisation is not a theoretical issue, or generally speaking: 
anything that refers to the moral distinction, the distinction between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’, is, including in view of issues of organisation, related to ethics 
and difficult to separate from issues of ideology, whose status in social 
autopoiesis is, at best, unclear. What is clear is that self-organisation ne-
 The term ‘conditional on’ has its opposite or converse in ‘not conditional on’ 110
and the term ‘organisation’ consequently has its converse in the term ‘separabili-
ty’. Separability occurs in functions of several variables or in complex machines, 
in which some parts (or sub-parts or sub-machines) are observed to be acting 
independently or separately from the others, but still as a part of the whole ( “ma-
chine” here is intended to stand in for any system that shows behavioural regular-
ity).
 Ashby, W. R. ‘Principles of Self-Organising Systems’, in ‘Computer Science 111
and Technology and their Application’ vol. 9 ‘Principles of Self Organisation’, 
Pergamon Press, New York, 1962. pp.255 and ff.
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cessitates the adaptation of the system to its environment.  that the irrita112 -
tion by the environment creates order  by noise , where for “noise’ is in113 -
tended an external perturbation, which is cybernetic and is nothing but a 
principle of selective variety. The order so reached is not necessarily a de-
sirable, let alone a ‘good’ order, still leads to systems finding a sort of in-
ternal organisation. In other words, this is another way of showing that 
there is no escape from the necessity of embracing unrestrained contin-
gency (even if predictability and probability offer the luhmannian 
‘method”'of managing contingency). Luhmann’s theory of society does not 
present itself, as so many other theory-suggestions do, as a cure, even a 
panacaea for excessive contingency, or what might be experienced as 
such. Indeed, “irritation” or “perturbation”, the choice of these terms seems 
to relate to the deep-seating and not always sufficiently clear postulate that 
complexity and complexity management are not possible under conditions 
of perfection. Perfection means: what emerges coincides with what was 
expected. Learning, on the other hand, is predicated on a loss; it makes 
only sense where there is something to be learned, some result that does 
not correspond to what had been expected. The continuation of systems is 
- and here we find one of Luhmann's foremost arguments - predicated on 
a disappointment of expectations – giving rise to a formidable paradox of 
 Ashby, W. R. ‘Principles of Self-Organising Systems’, in ‘Computer Science 112
and Technology and their Application’ vol. 9 ‘Principles of Self Organisation’, 
Pergamon Press, New York, 1962. pp.262 and ff.
  This expression comes from an experiment in physics. If a number of plastic 113
cubes weighting enough to barely float, are put in a bucket full of water and the 
bucket is subjected to a series of external disturbances, or’ noise’ the cubes will, 
after a while, order themselves into regular clusters. On this See Foerster, H. von, 
Poerksen, B. ‘Understanding Systems, Conversations on Epistemology and 
Ethics’Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag, Heidelberg, 2002. p.91.
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successful/unsuccessful problem solving . 114
 To explain the concept of eigenbehaviour further, one must compare 
for a moment the ‘objects’ of a linear epistemology (without an observer) 
with a neo-cybernetic epistemology. The ‘objects’ become ‘tokens for 
stable behaviour’ or what might be called, ‘eigenfunctions’.  This simply 
means that the interactions between a subject and an object and relative 
observation can be of different types:  
1-observation relative to the action of the subject; 2-observation relative to 
the object; 3-coordinations of operations of the subject (i.e. the law);  4-co-
ordinations between objects; 
 In terms of law these interactions are all operations within the legal 
system are in one way or the other, realisations of one of these basic op-
erations. The observations are ‘compounding coordinating operations’ per-
formed by the legal system within the single operator of the coordination, 
which transforms and rearranges the behaviour of the operations to guar-
antee the coherence and connectedness of the outcome of these opera-
tions. This engages in a continuity of recursive operations of observations 
and coordinations ab infinitum. If the observations and coordinations are 
taken as variables, these show eigenbehaviour, in relation to reflecting or 
defining operations. In fact, in their domain, these variables show equilibria 
(functional, operational and structural). The variables are in a comple-
mentary relationship with the eigenvalues. The eigenvalues, because of 
their self-defining nature, imply topological closure. This is like a snake bit-
ing its own tail. The snake biting its own tail represents also how the rela-
tionship between object and subject is within the topology of closure. In 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub114 -
lished in Pbk. 2008. 
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terms of legal system the object (the law) as cognition computes its own 
cognition through the cognition of the ‘other’. The legal system, or any leg-
al discourse, starts originating its own ethics of independence. Topologic-
ally, the snake is the same as the torus, the analysis of  whose behaviour 
can give an interesting insight in terms of heterarchy, stability and value 
anomaly. This is important in relation to the consistency / contingency di-
chotomy.  
             Heterarchy literally means ‘the rule of the other’ (from Greek: het-
eros, the other [of two] and archein, to dominate, to begin), therefore it is 
no longer the case of a summum bonum that rules over others, which 
lead, for instance (in the history of the common European notion of ‘hier-
archy’  to the holiness of power. Lawgivers cannot pretend to derive their 
rules from a higher moral authority or any legitimacy of imposing its diktat 
as a matter of law. As a consequence of the rejection of this authority, 
there exist no absolute values any longer, and every operation is con-
ceived circularly.  Moreover, not having a hierarchy of absolute values es-
tablished at the top, leaves way to the  possibility of value anomaly, which 
in a hierarchical society would be considered as ‘disappointment of ex-
pectations’ as previously described. Not only, but experiments in which B 
is preferred to A, then C is preferred to B, but then A is preferred to C, 
which is prima facie an inconsistency, have shown how this is an ‘incon-
sistency of an order too high to permit a construction of a scale of values’. 
In a hierarchical organisation with absolute values, C would be the ultimate 
choice, creating thus a hierarchy: C is above B, which is above 
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A .Though, this is not the outcome of the experiment. Here a heterarch115 -
ical organisation presents the emergence of uncertainty, which leads to 
independent answers and possibilities.  In other words, a heterarchical 
system shows self-organisation.  McCulloch showed that the ‘reflex arc’ of 
the nervous system, which builds a circularity consisting of stimulus and 
response, leads to a stability of action, that is, of operations, which in turn 
means - if applied to the legal system - a stability in terms of law enact-
ment and judgments.  
 At this point the topological representation is bi-dimensional, it is 
simply a loop. Still, it exist the possibility of ‘choice’. This, caused by value 
anomaly (the equivalent in sociological terms would be either ‘disappoint-
ed expectations’ or more generally ‘contingency’) will have an effect inas-
much as some incompatibilities arise during the circular operations of the 
sensorimotory circuit. At this point, only one of the possible choices is al-
lowed to continue in its circular behaviour, while the other is blocked (the 
anomalous behaviour) and deviated by inhibitors which McCullogh calls 
‘diallels’.  
 System theory disables all promises of construing or saving any total-
ity. This is not only a stereotype of Luhmann-criticism; it is a longstanding 
intrinsic problem of the luhmannian understanding of modern and current 
social theory. It might lead us to surmise that the luhmannian lesson on 
Justice, radical as it is, it cannot help entering into conflict with the most 
widespread social common sense . This is, after all, the lesson that 116
 This is, according to von Foerster, how people tend to choose, in a circular 115
manner. See Foerster, H. von, Poerksen, B. ‘Understanding Systems, Conversa-
tions on Epistemology and Ethics’Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag, Heidelberg, 2002. 
pp 101 and ff.
 On this see Möller H. G. ‘The Radical Luhmann’, Columbia University Press 116
(2011).
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Justice both ‘does with us what it wants’ (no less than the justice of the 
gods of antiquity) and that at the same time emanates from a limited 
agency within society, a function-system among others, which as such 
cannot be subjected to the verdict of some higher decision power (cf. the 
important point that is at stake when today a government claims the power 
of firing its judges). Together, these two, society-universal justice, plus the 
socially differentiated agency that is in charge of it, nail us on a life-long 
cross - with as a crossbar the universalist claim to provide all justice that is 
available society-wide, and as a vertical bar the limitation that only one lim-
ited function-system is in charge of all justice. No one would be able to ar-
gue that this is an immediately convincing or intuitively comfortable way of 
solving the issue of law in society. For instance, it is clear that its mainten-
ance needs to be "rigid" - arguably much more so than any pre-modern 
societies.  
In fact, while Luhmann speaks of "psychic systems", of "conscious-
ness", in order to refer to that which he locates at the opposite side of what 
he calls "social systems", and while Habermas has famously tried to 
counter this by reference to a husserlian Lebenswelt, far more common 
and unpretentious terms of everyday language, such as that of "people" 
suffices to locate the rift between the meaningful world of common dis-
course and common sense, on the one hand, that of function systems, and 
therefore justice as a function system, on the other hand. As far as people 
are concerned, as "ourselves" are concerned, there is no such thing as an 
ontology without a teleology. Luhmann, specialising on social systems, 
never mentions "people", thus remains utterly devoid of any help in rela-
tion to "populism" (a movement which had not existed in his life-time). He 
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does leave a precinct outside of meaningful communication, namely 
meaningful consciousness. Even here, the question remains open 
whether, in their little cages, in prisons for instance, what is called every-
day life does induce, more often than not, to leave their goals where they 
are and enslave themselves to facts rather than goals. Learning for in-
stance is built on the temporary suspension of goals – of all goals apart 
from that of learning.  The confusion is located within the problem, not in 
the eyes of Luhmann, or Luhmann critics.  
 Within the remit of his developed theory, Luhmann makes it per-
fectly clear what he means by teleology . What is at stake is not what 117
Aristotle thought; to recycle the vast Aristotelian employment of the term 
telos subtly enriching its meaning to make it fitting for the 20th century is 
not his strategy. That’s why he says that Aristotle (and almost everyone 
else) cannot deliver any longer a correct description of contemporary soci-
ety. Modern society does not observe (observe in the sense of subscribing 
to, vindicating, honouring) goals, modern society observes (in the sense of 
take into account) informations. Teleology is out, as far as social systems 
are concerned.  There is no such things as goals left, everything social 
(and again: everything legal) is just a one system-internal construction. Not 
only the legal system has no transcending, essence-defining goal; no func-
tion-system is teleological.  It determines its own directions (a) for now, 118
(b) for its own use. Not even because this setting of goals is its goal. Only 
because the system has no better idea about spending its time.  
The paradigm shift brought about by Luhmann's work on sociology 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’ vol. I, Stanford University press, 2012;117
Luhmann, N. ‘Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalitaet’. Tübingen (J.C.B. Mohr – 118
Paul Siebeck) 1968;
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and especially social theory, consists, as it has become apparent, in the 
choice of directly relating to the observable reality of contemporary society, 
of questioning the inherent problems caused by complexity, instead of try-
ing to avoid them, or hiding them behind a gamut of traditional concepts. 
There is no question that some or most of these concepts have a huge 
significance or standing - it suffices to have a look into centuries of Com-
mentaries on human society, politics, social order, among others, delivered 
by a large number of thinkers since well before the official birth of the so-
cial sciences; yet the great question in a convinced modernist’s eyes - as 
Luhmanns is - whether the tempo of evolution has not become such that 
the way in which society presents itself today is still able to be sufficiently 
captured in these older concepts, whatever their complexity and, potential-
ly, wisdom, is still sufficient in our days. In fact, the "old-European" self-
presentation of society as stratified society, is  no longer apt, in Luhmann’s 
opinion, to render the complexities and contingencies of modernity. Other 
theorists and philosophers have continued to examine society throughout 
the times with the same focus, paradigm and method. The theory of Au-
topoiesis proposes to describe society in a novel and, perhaps it could be 
said, radical way. What Luhmann was doing is best described not as ‘solv-
ing’ these problems, but as developing a style of inquiry capable of han-
dling them, “figuring them out”. Luhmann takes it in a modern, in part also - 
he had been himself very conscious of the split between the two views -  a 
post-modern discourse .  119
On the basis of this detailed rejection of traditional theory termino-
logy Luhmann develops, radically, but also carefully, his own conceptual 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998;119
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basis, starting the line of his own ideas in terms of social system theory by 
taking Talcott Parsons’s functionalist-structuralist paradigm and reviving it 
into a sociological theory based not only on cybernetics but also on evolu-
tionary principles. The theory of social autopoiesis can be read also as a 
contribution to the fundamental dialectic between structure and function. 
Society is in fact described as functionally differentiated. Functions are, 
according to the theory of autopoiesis, what are responsible for the internal 
differentiation of contemporary society. Luhmann uses a number of con-
cepts that are either innovative or borrowed from other disciplines and 
used in order to both unsettle and replace, to analyse and explain ("re-de-
scribe") the fundamental self-descriptions of modernity. For instance, he 
finds unity as a concept in which modern society, modern law in particular, 
portrays itself, as an internal self-representation, insufficient, and replaces 
it with the concept of difference. Law, precisely in the process of striving 
for unity, cannot  but produce difference. On another level, but within the 
same perspective, we find the notion of heterarchy in order to replace 
rather that of hierarchy; this expresses the idea that vertical command 
structures are no longer the underlying model in modern society (as op-
posed to medieval and “ancient regime” societies). These are the concept 
that allow to draw the sharp profile of functional differentiation. The impact 
of such a novel approach ruffled a few feathers in the peaceful world of 
social-scientific institutions of the last third of the 20th century. 
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2 - Philosophy Contingency, and the Promise of Au-
topoiesis: A Philosophy of Socialised Contingency. 
 2.1 - The Philosophical Background. 
In addition to the Cybernetic influence, we are confronted with a 
philosophical context that needs to be briefly explored. We must look at 
the theories in Germany especially at the time when Luhmann started to 
develop his ‘dissenting' view on modernity — placing the core of modern 
innovations, not in the fields of Philosophy, the arts, literary criticism, poli-
tics, or even the exchange between religion and science as leading dis-
course, but in the internal build-up of society. Since the beginning of his 
work in the Sixties, Luhmann distanced modern society from what he 
called the Old European tradition (a term which Luhmann takes from Ger-
man historian Otto Brunner (1898-1982), a specialist on early modern re-
gional powers and constitutions   — it is still not clear how Donald Rums120 -
feld, US president George W. Bush defence secretary, who has done a lot 
for the term's popularisation, had got hold of the term ‘Old-European', but 
this years after Luhmann's death in 1998. Old European elites had under-
stood society as based on stratified differentiation; the stratificational mod-
el was natural, and still widely continues to be taken for natural today. 
Luhmann's aim was to directly confront societal modernity with the help of 
a gaze on later 20th century society, and without assuming a social "na-
 On this see for instance Brunner, O. ‘Land and Lordship: Structures of Gover120 -
nance in Medieval Austria: Structures of Governance in Mediaeval Austria (The 
Middle Ages Series)’ University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992. 
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ture". This approach required Luhmann to have recourse to a new type of 
accounting for social phenomena. What is called social systems theory 
embodies this new type of accounting for society.  
For the "natural" stratificational model, Luhmann substituted a soci-
etal structure based on functional differentiation. Luhmann, trained as a 
lawyer in Germany during the early Fifties and working in the administra-
tion of a regional German government thereafter, discovered his own soci-
ological interest toward the end of the 1950s; important had been a year of 
study with Talcott Parsons in Harvard with Talcott Parsons (1960/61) 
whose functionalist-structuralist paradigm he largely, yet critically adopted, 
combining it with elements from the portfolio of young US disciplines 
(largely on the wake of the Macy-conferences in New York throughout the 
1940s and 50s) among which cybernetics played an outstanding role. 
Luhmann’s specific ideas had however no direct ancestor there, as the few 
Social Scientists who were part of the Macy conference regulars (including 
Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson, outstanding social anthropologists) 
had been very far from conceiving society as a sui generis phenomenon in 
the way in which Luhmann was, from there onward, trying to do. General 
systems theoretical approaches had been around — courtesy for instance 
to the Viennese biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-1972). Luhmann 
was to take up a refined systems theoretical approach in order to gain ac-
cess to a new theory of society fitting his own anxiety of looking at modern 
society immanently as at a new phenomenon of a new kind or type, a kind 
or type of its own, different from pre-modern social formations.  
Considering that systems theory is always also environment theory 
— if not rather "membrane theory" — what needs a specific emphasis is 
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the notion of a problem in this context. The distinction of problem and solu-
tion is general in scientific research and inquiry. In systems theory, what is 
different is that the researcher is not the only addressee of the problem. 
The other, and no doubt the first addressee of "problems" is the system 
itself! How can the system cope with its environment? This is the lifelong 
problem the system is confronted with. Now, to the extent to which social 
systems share with social scientists doing research on social systems one 
identical medium (Sinn, translated as sense or as meaning), the reference 
to the concept of a problem becomes even more inclusive. Given that 
Luhmann specialises on  social systems, his theory abounds in problem-
notions that represent what the system is exposed to, but also what the 
theory itself is exposed to, which finds itself under the duty of understand-
ing social systems as problem solving agencies. Complexity, contingency, 
the requirement of "reducing" complexity, that of absorbing contingency, 
the question of how new, heterarchical modes and relationships can be 
installed, the question of how  paradoxes need to be invited in, yet also to 
be dismantled or rendered inoffensive for the current processes to be able 
to continue, are all "problems" of this specific systems theoretical type. We 
should also not forget that the main preoccupation of the Social Sciences 
in our context is surely not that of providing idiosyncratically "Luhmannian" 
answers. It is rather to provide access, today, to his insights and discover-
ies. 
 Back to the German Federal Republic, Luhmann is working 
throughout the Sixties in an intellectual atmosphere imbued with highly 
politicised general ideas. While Sartre, in France, solemnises marxism 
qualifying it, in his main philosophical work, Critique of Dialectical Reason 
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(1960), as l'horizon indépassable de notre temps,  the post World War II 121
generation in Western Germany, which grows up under the explosive 
double condition of an economic hausse that goes beyond the most optim-
istic forecasts, and a need to critically look at the generation of their par-
ents and grand-parents who have followed, or at least invited in the Hitleri-
an catastrophe, is no less tempted by what can be easily understood as 
‘leftist’ commitments. It is unsurprising, considering the historical preced-
ents and circumstances, that especially the field of the Social Sciences 
had been dominated by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory.   
The Frankfurt School had been founded in 1923 under the name of 
an Institute for Social Research at Frankfurt University. Now, after the divi-
sion of Germany in an Eastern and a Western German state (1949),  intel-
lectuals in the Western part felt the need to re-examine Marxism in a 
western optic.  The long history of the socialist Workers' Movement be122 -
fore and after the First, the Second World War had displaced the move-
ment largely to the east of Europe, with the emerging of a number of So-
viet-dependent new states. The remanent, but soon over-pouring socialist 
commitment in West Germany in the in the second half of the 20th Century, 
had naturally developed very quickly strong roots and sympathies among 
the students and teachers working in the University, and especially in the 
field of social theory. 
Although during the Nazi persecutions many of the Frankfurt 
School’s members had to leave Germany and Europe, a significant group 
of them returned to Germany in the Fifties, making the Frankfurt School 
 Sartre, J.P. Critique of Dialectical Reason, Verso; 2nd ed. edition, 2006.121
 Martin, J. ‘The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and 122
the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950’ – Boston, Little Brown 1973, p.3 and 
ff.
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and Critical Theory a sort of ‘re-discovery’ in the Sixties. Since a certain, 
widespread, marxist engagement, so to speak, had given rise to the so-
cialist regimes of the eastern block and become institutionalised as ‘state 
ideology’, and been transformed into what had later been called "real so-
cialism”, the revolutionary question of replacing the liberal and social-
democratic principles, that were more or less consensual in the German 
West, with the terms "historical materialism",  had tested different and 123
much more high-strung ambitions in the West. What was created there 
was a highly intellectualised form of Marxism, which heavily influenced 
what was soon calling itself he ‘new left’. There was a lot of criticism and 
self-criticism. The conclusion was that the agent of revolutionary change 
could no longer reside in the proletariat, but only in the intellectuals, even 
in ‘Reason’ (re-defined in the sign of revolutionary-political)  itself , at124 -
tracted the obvious criticism from leftist intellectuals that the Frankfurt 
School was simply perpetuating the traditional German Idealism and had 
turned critical theory in a sort of intellectual elitism.   125
One must not all-too schematically identify the Frankfurt School in 
its general aim as an institution which welcomed scholars of different polit-
ical persuasions, although a great number of them were left wing, with 
Critical Theory representing rather a series of problems of which some 
members of the Frankfurt School were first class exponents.  In the 126
 Martin, J. ‘The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and 123
the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950’ – Boston, Little Brown 1973, p.3.
 On this see Marx, K Engels, F. ‘The Communist Manifesto’ Yale University 124
Press, 2012
 On this see Therborn, G. ‘The Frankfurt School’ in New Left Review I/63, Sep125 -
tember-October 1970
 Connerton, P. ‘The Tragedy of Enlightenment: An Essay on the Frankfurt 126
School’ Cambridge University Press, 2010 , p.IX
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Twentieth Century ‘Critical’ has very much to do with a list of programmatic 
ideas, which were not only and perhaps not most decisively "anti-capital-
ist", but which are present among some of the members of the Frankfurt 
School, especially in the works of Max Horkheimer (1895 - 1973) , 127
Theodor W. Adorno (1903 - 1969) ,  Herbert Marcuse (1898 - 1979)  128 129
and Jürgen Habermas (1929) , among others, thinkers in whose works 130
strong claims as to receiving and channelling a strong Marxist (or "neo-
Marxist", or  in any case, as long as there had been an Eastern model of 
Marx-inspired socialism - a “Western-Marxist”), as well as, equally obvi-
ously, Hegelian influence are dominant.  
As these thinkers are largely identified as pertaining to a critical tra-
dition, one might say that they have bestowed a fresh and more specific 
meaning upon the term “critical". Not obviously the term "critical", which in 
its many coexisting meanings, is a fully fledged product of modern times, 
but its linguistic root, is from Greek. Aristotle uses the word kritikos, in the 
sense of a factor that enables an observer to place or draw a distinction. 
Generally, in antiquity and throughout pre-modern times, the word related 
to the way of discerning. Then the term arrives with a different meaning in 
the Eighteenth Century. It is an organising part of the French Revolution 
 See for instance Horkheimer, M. ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ (1937), Hor127 -
kheimer, M. ’The Eclipse of Reason’ (1947), Horkheimer, M. ’Between Philosophy 
and Social Science’ (1938) and Horkheimer, M and Theodor W. Adorno, 'Dialectic 
of Enlightenment', (1947)
 See for instance Adorno, T.W. ‘Minima Moralia:  Reflections from Damaged 128
Life’, 1951
 See for instance Marcuse, H. ‘Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of 129
Social Theory'  (1941). 
 See for instance Habermas, J. ‘On the Logic of the Social Sciences ‘(1967) 130
and  Habermas, J.’Technology and Science as Ideology’ (1968), Habermas, J. 
'The Theory of Communicative Action' (1981), and Habermas, J. ‘The Philosophi-
cal Discourse of Modernity' (1985).
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and, much earlier already, of Enlightenment thought throughout Europe. 
The reference to Kant’s work  goes without saying, but the term circu131 -
lates in a variety of meaning throughout the spheres of textual science in-
side and outside religion and law/legal history. The general meaning has 
remained stable: to be engaged in critical efforts means to pursue the task 
of examining the validity of a text and its limits.  The term is used by 132
Marx in his Das Kapital , also as ‘Kritik’. At this point one may feel that 133
German Philosophy had made the term its own and from this moment it 
will be difficult to disconnect it from it.  
Disconnecting - or in other words: distinguishing the term's current 
use from any possible future one - is perhaps not the only perspective that 
needs to come to mind. Rather, what might prove more decisive is the 
strangely un-severable knot between critical approaches in all walkways of 
intellectual and political discourse and their apparently inherent claim to 
legitimacy. Firstly, German philosophical tradition is rooted in Idealism, 
with Kant and Hegel as Fathers, from whose work a left and a right wing 
derived, permeating the whole of the philosophical world and arriving thus 
to Marx and then to the work of the Frankfurt School. Now, the role of phi-
losophy as a discipline in Germany is rather incomparable to the role of 
the field in other nations. Secondly, one must add West Germany’s own 
peculiar history and the widespread and understandable contention that 
 See for instance Kant, I. ‘Critique of Pure Reason’  (Kritik Der Reinen Ver131 -
nunft’ )(1781) Cambridge University Press, 1997.
 The OED reports this definition of ‘critique’: “detailed analysis and assessment 132
of something, especially a literary, philosophical, or political theory”.
 Marx, K, ‘Capital’  (Das Kapital) Pluto Press, 2016. One may suggest that its 133
use throughout the 19th and 20th century make of it the longtime fashion word of 
the intellectual debate and almist any type of University-related venture.
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the world wars as well as the murder planned and exercised upon minori-
ties  need to be pointed out as having been examples of publicly commit-
ted crime. It is noteworthy, too, that the generations of the 2nd half of the 
20th century have not taken up an attitude of sweeping things under the 
carpet, or have them erased from official history. The student revolt that 
was heating up from 1960 onwards is not the only site of this rather princi-
pled attitude. On the other side, there were those intellectuals of the previ-
ous generation, who coming back from their exile in the US, were not 
tainted, as those who had a history overshadowed by the NS past, by the 
misery that had an obvious effect, a diminishing effect on whatever they 
could say now, especially in a field such as social theory.  
In the early Seventies, Habermas left Frankfurt and set himself up 
in the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, in the South-East of Munich, sur-
rounding himself with various young scholars,  thereby generalising the 134
effect of basic critical teaching. The intellectual atmosphere of West Ger-
many, starting from the end of the Sixties, had been very largely, if not he-
gemonically defined, not by the Frankfurt School alone, but by the exten-
sion of its influence throughout. Under these conditions, that a new current 
in the field of social sciences could have been initiated singlehandedly by 
the then almost unknown Niklas Luhmann, who proposed a radical change 
in perspective using the term ‘social systems theory’, needs to be under-
stood as an anomaly, and a courageous solo action. Although in the mid-
Sixties Luhmann and Habermas seemed to be on the same track concern-
ing some issues, it very soon became clear that Luhmann aspired to other 
avenues and was completely detached from the informal, but only the 
 Connerton, P. ‘The Tragedy of Enlightment: An Essay on the Frankfurt School’ 134
Cambridge University Press, 2010; p.X
more unforgiving claims to consensus that defined the Frankfurt School.  It 
is also true that Luhmann is not a political theorist. All he is interested in is 
the effective reality of society, its way of existing, not as a state of things, 
or an institution, but as an on-going process.  
 Despite the large neo-marxist consensus within theoretical so-
ciology, Luhmann succeeded in attracting some attention in sociological 
circles. Habermas invited him to contribute to a seminar at the University 
of Frankfurt. This was published in Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozial-
technologie: Was leistet Systemforschung?  (Theory of Society or So135 -
cial-technology: what can system research accomplish?) a book that pro-
jected Luhmann onto the intellectual scene of the time. In the book, 
Habermas spoke in 1971 of Luhmann accusing him of being the exponent 
of a politically unreflected, naked “social technology”.  
In fact, Luhmann's argumentation appeared and still appears to 
cast a doubt over the whole social-scientific discourse, whether rooted in 
Marxism as it was the case then, or because is is perceived as uncanny, 
or somehow suspicious, to relativise the sovereign role of politics, as Luh-
mann continuously does. One of the main reasons is that for Luhmann the 
idea of consensus, which carries down to Habermas’ theory of truth, ac-
cording to which the “truth condition of propositions is the potential assent 
of all others”, therefore “the universal-pragmatic meaning of truth (…) is 
determined by the demand of reaching a rational consensus” , has no 136
discernable relevance. While for Habermas, society is realised through 
Habermas, J. Luhmann, N. ‘Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. Was leis135 -
tet die Systemforschung?’ , Frankfurt a.M. 1971.
 Habermas, J. ‘Reflections on the linguistic foundations of sociology’: The 136
Christian Gauss Lectures (Princeton University, February-March 1971). In Ha-
bermas, ‘On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction’, B. Fultner (trans.). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2001. 1–103. p.86
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consensus, that is by means of people agreeing with each other (including 
very often silently, by not contradicting), for Luhmann, it is realised only 
through communication, or in other words through micro-happenings, a 
type of operations really, that are, however relevant to the extent to which 
each of it adds some difference (as tiny as it might be) to the consensus 
as it existed up to that moment. Habermas’ society is anthropocentric, fol-
lowing the traditional view, where people create and constitute society 
through the fact of coexisting with each other, and of creating society by 
means of their good-will and of the identity or the closeness of their views, 
as well as the dialogue that is the means in use to establish these condi-
tions. Society is therefore, in a sense, the totality of all opinions, all convic-
tions that exist and are represented by society's members. Luhmann is 
rather skeptical that society should be understood as the sum, or the 
product, of all convictions that are in circulation. In fact, consensus is for 
Luhmann the least important and most overstated notion. His view, in-
stead, is that society is the sum of operations, which have their own ‘life’ 
so to speak (although it is an often very short-term life), in the sense that 
communication often triggers other further communication. So Luhmann’s 
real interest is in understanding what society is actually made of - or even 
more accurately, how society proceeds in order to ‘make itself’ - this, mak-
ing oneself is after all the meaning of Luhmann's later chosen heading 
"social autopoiesis”. Although, in order to be perfectly accurate, It is not 
(only) "society" that "makes itself", but those far more limited and short-
lived instantiations of the social process that he calls social systems .    137
 Luhmann, N., ‘Social Systems’, Stanford University Press, 1995.137
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The belief that underlies Habermas’s work throughout his long pub-
lication history (more than half a century) is predicated on the need for a 
‘truth’. This fits in the (very widely shared) expectation that a theory of so-
ciety has first of all to deal with being, with ontology. Luhmann, although a 
keen reader of Heidegger as well as Husserl during his early years, is not 
primarily animated by a philosophical interest in "being". Luhmann is much 
more interested in making (i.e. poiesis) than being. This is clear already in 
his 1969 iconoclastic and successful book Legitimität durch 
Verfahren ,‘Legitimisation by procedure’ . In the meantime we can find 138
authors outside the circles of autopoietic social sciences, who have 
moved, often unwittingly, in the same or comparable directions. This is the 
case of the italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, whose notion of oiko-
nomia in Il Regno e La Gloria , one of the instalments of his opus mag139 -
num meantime completed Homo Sacer , asks precisely, though within a 140
logic of inquiry that is genealogical or archaeological rather than systemi-
cist or evolutionist, how operations (as opposed to:  truth claims, pro-
grams, doctrines, etc.) relate to being. Other perspectives on the same is-
sue can be found in his more recent Opus dei: A genealogy of duty, and, 
as well, in Agamben's properly legal-theoretical work, Il Sacramento del 
Linguaggio.  141
 Luhmann, N. ‘Legitimität durch Verfahren’ , Suhrkamp; Neuauflage edition 138
(1983);
 Agamben, G. ‘Il Regno e la Gloria. Per una Genealogia Teologica dell’Econo139 -
mia e del Governo’, Venezia, Neri Pozza, 2006.
 Agamben, G. ‘Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life’, Stanford Univer140 -
sity Press, 1998.
Agamben, G. ‘Il Sacramento Del Linguaggio: Archeologia del Giuramento’ Edi141 -
tori Laterza; 2 edition (2014).
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Yet, if we look even further backward, into the tradition which 
Agamben understands himself as pursuing, namely, Foucault’s concept of 
government or governamentality, in fact of discipline as such, we are con-
fronted with the problematisation of operations and performances and not 
with philosophical explanations, meanings, intentions, etc. Even Habermas 
is, to some extent, a case in point here. Ironically, in the 39 years following 
his critique of Luhmann, his own intellectual development brought him, in 
many ways, and not always admittedly, progressively closer to Luhmann’s 
proceduralism or operationalism. This is the case, for instance, of Theory 
of Communicative Action (1981 in German), and Between Facts and 
Norms (1992) .  142
Luhmann set himself the goal of finding a new way of describing 
modern society, based not upon human persons who pursue, enjoy, 
spend, etc. their lives, but upon what might well be called the social ma-
chinery they put into function in the pursuit of their relationships. This ap-
pears to be rather radical to those who hear it for the first time, and 
presents itself very much in contrast to the all-politicising agenda and 
ideas, surely not exclusively of the Frankfurt School, but of the most gen-
eral ways of looking at human life and society. In these conventional ways 
of looking at society, society is in advance considered as subjected to poli-
tics — to some power-holding agent or agencies, be they legitimately in 
this position or less so. To give an idea of how radical this may have 
seemed to the intellectuals of the time, one only needs to look into the ba-
sic positions in the field, what one might call the political topography or 
choreography. In a country with the immediate past that was the one of the 
 Habermas, J. ‘Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory 142
of Law and Democracy’, Polity Press; New Ed edition, (1997).
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German Federal Republic during the 1960s and 70s, a country which is at 
the same time second to none in matters of the philosophical inquiry into 
the sphere of the social, it was clear that the Marx-inspired conception of 
the Frankfurt School, and the barely entirely de-nazified right-wing thinking 
that had been (if only partly) that of Martin Heidegger, had been opposite 
extremes — even the opposite extremes.   But when Luhmann's social 143
systems theory had conquered some attention, many observers were sud-
denly doubting whether the key opposition was not rather between his 
work on the one hand, and Heidegger’s plus the critical theorists' on the 
other hand.   144
2.2 - A Modern, Autopoietic Society. 
 Looking at capitalism and at Marxism, they seem today like the two 
sides of a Rorschach inkblot test; opposite and equal in their opposition, 
with the right and left sides seeing different response tendencies and in-
terpretations. The most important difference was perhaps no longer 
between capital and labour, but between different ways of dealing, of cop-
ing with the new rhythms in which situations and horizons were rapidly 
transforming. So in a sense, the German student movement, still opposing 
(as e.g. at the unsuccessful 1848 revolution) revolutionaries and counter-
 Heidegger, M., ‘An Introduction to Metaphysics’, translated by Ralph Manheim 143
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987; 
See also Ferrari Di Pippo, A. ‘The Concept of Poiesis in Heidegger's An Introduc-
tion to Metaphysics’. In: Thinking Fundamentals, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows 
Conferences, Vol. 9: Vienna 2000.  
 On this see for instance  Thornill, C., (2002) ‘Systems Theory and Legal Theo144 -
ry: Luhmann, Heidegger and the False Ends of Metaphysics’. Radical Philosophy,
116( Novemb), pp. 7-20. 
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revolutionaries got it right only with respect to the "ideas", but not with re-
spect to the general situation, which  was neither revolutionary nor reac-
tionary, but en effect of ‘evolution’. 
For Luhmann, postmodernism, though critical of the promises and 
grand narratives of modernism, had itself come forward suggestions, even 
promises, that it could not maintain. To that extent, Luhmann argues, post-
modernity is just another way of saying ‘modernity’.  For postmodernists, 145
the modern is only a non-description of its own unity, a meta-narrative that 
has no bearing on an accurate representation of society. But there can be 
no representation of a society within the new type of society in which we 
are existing, that can be considered as final or necessary. The structure is 
too complex and bears within itself convoluted structures and con-
sequences; it is, Luhmann argues, a never-ending contingency and it can-
not be schematically enclosed under the title of ‘post-modernity’ or under 
any other title. Also and importantly, there can be not one appropriate ob-
servation, but only only as many representations as there are observers. 
Therefore, Luhmann uses the terms ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ sometimes 
interchangeably, not for reason of carelessness, but because he does not 
attribute to either of the two terms anything determinant as to the descrip-
tion of what matters in his view, which is complexity and contingency in the 
type of society that we know. 
 Luhmann does not make a secret of his view on Marxism as a de-
scription of contemporary society by referring to it as to an attempt of “rais-
ing of the dead” . This is not only a lighthearted mockery. Luhmann sees 146
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998.145
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998; p.146
5.
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in the terminology used by Marx and Marxists a theoretical and chronolo-
gical inadequacy in describing modernity through the critique of the capit-
alistic economic system. The term ‘alienation’, and furthermore the entire 
universe of idea of a quasi hierarchical structure dominated by Economy, 
"stronger", as it were, than Politics, are no longer up to date with what 
modern society has become.  
“Social autopoiesis”, Luhmann's later (post 1980)  term for the way 
in which he considers social systems to evolve, is a word that is obtained 
by combining two Greek words,  autos’, self and ‘poiesis’, production. This, 
then, means literally that it is society itself that makes itself and reproduces 
itself – that society continuously produces the elements of which it con-
sists. An autopoietic system reproduces each part that is part of its consti-
tution, through the elements of which it is constituted. The first formulation 
of is theory comes from the work of two Chilean biologists, Umberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela, who in 1972 coined the new term in order 
to explain the nature and the working of living systems, in particular of 
mono-cellular organisms, where the cell’s output becomes its new input, 
showing thus a circular production of life. Thus, their first topic is not about 
society at all, but serves the understanding of mono-cellural organisms 
within an environment.  If we apply this notion to society, then the result is 
a theory of modern society — and a rather complex theory to boot. The 
translation of ‘poiesis’ with ‘production’ is likewise, perhaps, not optimal, 
considering that economy, both of the liberal and the marxian type, always 
refer to their action of making commodities available in these terms. Would 
"fabrication’-" provide a. better translation? What sense does it make to 
say that society fabricates itself? On the one hand, this is quite an ineleg-
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ant word to associate with society or with jurisprudence, which would be 
not too harmful, considering that the tendency seems to be, that the days 
of elegant theories of law and society are long gone, (which will become 
even clearer when understanding the specific way of being of modernity); 
yet, on the other hand, the question is whether society is "a fabrication". Or 
whether this making-of-oneself-by-its-own-operations really deserves the 
far-fetched Greek (e.g. Aristotelian) term.  
At this point objections flock in already copiously. How can a mono-
cellular — hence a simple — living being compares as a model of a com-
plex society? But the point here is that of the — how should one put it? — 
childishness, perhaps, of believing that, because bodies are complex, 
cells, of which they are made, need  to be simple. This would suppose that 
there exists only one "scale", so to say, of complexity, which is simply not 
the case. Another objection would question the legitimacy of transposing a 
device for understanding  living beings to society. In fact, it may seem a 
somehow heavy-handed approach to reduce society to a mono-cellular 
organism — apart from the question whether it is only alive.  We will return 
to this fundamental objection to Autopoiesis theory, which Jean Clam has 
finely attempted to explain by distinguishing between Basal and derivative 
autopoiesis. Before this, though, it is necessary, in the hope to start and 
unravel the baffling and, sometimes, mistaken information on social 
autopoiesis (e.g. that it is a merely biological conception that is merely 
glued onto question about sociology) that is around, to take a step back in 
order to grapple with the background concepts and experiences that have 
inspired this theory. A we have already seen, Luhmann distanced himself 
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from the Old European sociological tradition since the beginning of his 
work in the Sixties.  
What does the lawyerly or sociological observer who, arming her-
self with social systems theory, looks at law and society? What is the ef-
fective change of horizon, direction, vantage point, etc., introduced by the 
theory? Why is it called "autopoietic"? if one starts with the second ques-
tion, which is the way I would choose, one needs to pay particular atten-
tion to take it literally. People who hear "autopoietic", used on behalf of so-
ciety, and who are full of unquestionable certainty that they know what 
"society" is — how could I not, after all, being myself part of it?! Galileo 
Galilei's interlocutors had been equally convinced to know what nature is, 
and for the same reason — often cannot resist the temptation of taking it 
as a mere metaphor. Simply because otherwise it would not fit into the 
world-view that underlies the notion that societies are organised as large 
multitudes into which people are born, and within which they spend their 
lives, under conditions that are ordered according to some independently 
existing (or at least projected) order, not any longer necessarily hierarchic-
al but it is of course necessarily political. Such a world-view excludes tak-
ing the notion of autopoietic society, literally, or seriously, why? Because 
the belief in these ordering categories is, precisely, not thought as being 
part of what is continuously produced by society itself. According to a 
longstanding model, society was the naturally given content mirroring itself 
in its pre-existing organising form (=the state, from a certain date onward).  
Autopoietic, society is only taken seriously, if it is understood that 
society is (a) a process, and (b) one that produces the elements that it 
consists of. There is not a form that society "finds" or "is confronted to" and 
which is there, outside of it. One can also summarise things by saying that 
society is a laboratory of processes and that there is no pre-existing plan, 
no goal of history, no aim of society, no design of God, but an open field of 
continuously happening events which are relevant for what further such 
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events will be about. There are people trying to find common goals and 
aims, related to transcendent or to immanent values. but what Luhmann 
finds the most specific feature of modern autopoietic society, is that society 
continues nonetheless, successfully, even in these circumstances.  
Clearly, we have to locate the part of the luhmannian message that 
is the most difficult one to accept for many, in this extension, to society, of 
the older model, as present for instance the pioneering work of German 
zoologist Jakob von Uexküll ("Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren 
und Menschen", 1934 [there is a rather recent  E. translation of this, "A 
Foray in the Worlds of Animals and Humans", unfortunately abandoning 
the word "Umwelt" in the title, which is decisive for later biological and then 
luhmannian social autopoiesis]), and later on in the works of Maturana, 
Varela, and their collaborators. By effectuating such an extension or trans-
position, by claiming that society is composed, not of rationally and freely 
self-created forms, but of systems, or more exactly system/environment 
differences or "membranes", does not Luhmann question the privilege of 
humankind, and of its notions of German Sinn (and English sin, which is 
as well beyond the horizon of the animal) ? Is Luhmann not disregarding 
the autonomy of man as a free being, as it is claimed by both theology and 
philosophy, by subjecting it to a social reality composed according to the 
strictures of self-making within an environment? In this PhD I cannot 
commit myself in a full discussion of these theoretically most decisive top-
ics; let me only add that Luhmann, who clearly has a sense of the contro-
versial character of his teaching on this point, is trying to cope with the ob-
jections by means of providing an at least partial self-defence by his doc-
trine of not one but two different procedures of sense-making, that of 
psychic systems or consciousnesses, and that of social systems. The sys-
tem./environment differentiation exists of course both here and there, but 
involves on the side of consciousnesses no exposure to an accusation of 
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political incorrectness (as it does on the side of social systems and com-
munications).        
That the theory of social autopoiesis poses problems of a specific 
type to the philosophical community, will under these circumstances not be 
overly surprising. And yet, of course the theoretical model it harbours has 
obvious connections to, as well as deliberate disconnections with, some of 
the discourses of modern philosophy: moreover, it is not untypical for pro-
fessional intellectuals to prefer to fly on the coat tails of more assuring or 
secure theories, and especially such that form part of the melting pot of 
traditions. In matters of society more than elsewhere, it takes courage to 
not promise existing right answer to modern society’s problems, to indicate 
more fundamentally new directions. In addition, Luhmann’s theory, its au-
topoietic claims as much as its terminology, is not easily accessible to the 
newcomer. Also  the limitedness of predictability and control that is part of 
its claims is in itself a challenge. Luhmann is not even apologetic about it. 
The gesture of his theory is in no way provocative; yet "radical", in a cer-
tain sense of the word, it clearly is . Hence it is difficult to find them a 147
place within the accepted philosophical tendencies and to encourage the 
enterprise of approaching a theory of such complexity. 
 2.3 - Describing Modern Society. 
Luhmann’s aim to describe modern society, as opposed to find a 
cure of its ills, is but one aspect of this epistemological approach to 
change. In one sense, in comparing his approach to other approaches to 
sociology, one can speak of a re-organisation, perhaps a re-foundation. 
 -Moeller H. G. ‘The Radical Luhmann’, Columbia University Press (2011);147
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The point is not that sociologists are frequently leftists, in political terms. 
One's political convictions are or should be, for sociologists as well as for 
other people, a wholly different issue. The point is that "social" has re-
ceived, by association, part of the meaning of "socialist", which is a term 
referring to a group of political doctrines. Luhmann used description as 
opposed to what most sociologists, in the tradition of Bourdieu or Haber-
mas or their followers wold have called critical analysis, says a popular ac-
cusations addressed to Luhmann. But this accusation, seen from a social 
system theory angle,  involves a rather uncritical take on what the refer-
ence to "critical" should do for the sociologist. This, together with other 
points seems to be among the reasons why the English-speaking world 
has closed, or si it seems, the parenthesis on Luhmann without having 
ever opened it, otherwise than cursorily, instead lingering in the more com-
forting morality tale of neo-marxism.  
Luhmann intends the theory of Autopoiesis as an alternative con-
ception of society in order to overcome the frustrations of a philosophical 
exercise of which modernity had already seen many examples. This 
means that those who approach the theory of sociological autopoiesis ex-
pecting to see the presence of philosophical problems relating to the prob-
lems of the philosophical tradition, or as an ontological or teleological 
characterisation of the reality of society, are bound to be disappointed. The 
philosophical point is that social systems theory is not about ‘being’ but 
about ‘making’, that is, its approach is not ‘ontological’ but ‘poietological’. 
Doing so, Luhmann takes up, however, strings from earlier moments in the 
history of the Social Sciences. Max Weber and Durkheim were not of the 
kind of some of their current successors, sociologists vying for a decently 
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left-looking humanist position on the political map of their days. Neither, in 
a certain sense, was Marx, often counted as the third "founding father" of 
the discipline. But the case of Weber is especially instructive.  It is obvious 
enough that Weber had indeed a deep, highly personal commitment as the 
central axis of his thinking: the two lectures given at the end of his life, 
Wissenschaft als Beruf  and Politik als Beruf  (Science/Politics as a 148 149
vocation) show the distinction he wanted to see drawn in the life of what 
he wished to become a modern nation such as post World War I Germany. 
It is very questionable whether his distinctions have been heartened by the 
practicians of the science he has founded. Today what can be found is a 
common quasi-science of “good government”, perhaps some code of polit-
ical correctness of what is sometimes called the political class. This is not 
to say that systems theorists cannot count themselves among 
"humanists", or have no good reason for having a political position. Luh-
mann’s frequent discussion partners von Foerster, Maturana e Varela are 
witnesses here — including in their opposition to Luhmann, as in the case 
of Maturana.  Maturana in fact  said  that human societies, involving 150
political bonds and communities are clearly not candidates for autopoiesis 
- which only shows however that Maturana in political matters is a conser-
vative thinker.  Still, this is not sufficient to close the argument. One can151 -
 Luhmann, N. ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’ Matthes & Seitz Berlin; Auflage: 1, 2017.148
 Luhmann, N., ‘Politik als Beruf’,  Anaconda Verlag, 2014.149
 Maturana, H R. Varela, F. J. (1980). ‘Autopoiesis and Cognition’. Dordrecht: 150
Reidel. Maturana, H. R.Varela, F. J. (1987). ‘The Tree of Knowledge’. Boston: 
Shambhala. 
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not simply act like Foucault did who, said “I am not a structuralist, and I 
confess, with the appropriate chagrin, that I am not an analytic philosoph-
er. Nobody is perfect”.   152
Seen the lack of fortune of Luhmann’s theory in the Anglo-Saxon 
world, there may be the temptation to postulate that autopoiesis needs to 
be understood within the context of German tradition which has nothing to 
do with an Anglo-Saxon perspective on society. Is there a basis for such 
assumption? Luhmann, who writes about social systems, including the 
legal system, has a civil law, even a Roman law law background. It is cer-
tainly legitimate to assume that this is prima facie opposed to the common 
law English tradition. What does really "German" mean? 
The history of philosophical thought after the French Revolution is a 
history which is more German than English or than any other. There is the 
American pragmatism, deeply impregnated of this thought, then the analyt-
ical philosophy, English style, very different, almost an enemy. All the rest 
is thought-dependent from Germany. The Eighteenth Century was French, 
with the philosophers of Enlightenment, and the Seventeenth Century 
somehow even more French, Descartes or the “Nation-less” such as 
Spinoza and, in a sense, Leibniz. What does this mean? It is a profound 
question. Perhaps certain types of “questionemments” spring more easily 
on German soil, just as truffles. Does this mean that truffles are intrinsic-
ally German? Very possibly not, and very possibly those philosophical 
questions cannot be “typically German” either. Still, the diplomacy of sym-
pathies speaks a different language, which needs to be taken seriously, as 
this sympathy has an influence on the philosophical discussion. 
 Foucault M. “Sexuality and Solitude” Lecture given at New York University 152
1980 Published in ‘Dits et Ecrits’, 1994, Gallimard. (in English in the text).
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Luhmann himself shows a clear consciousness of what might ap-
pear, and has appeared as questionable from outside observers of Ger-
man culture, one can say that he "factors in" the wide-spread anti-German 
affection. More importantly, he has early in his life as a social scientist left 
behind the German philosophical thought of Kant, Hegel, Heidegger as 
well as the typically German approaches to matters sociological. Right 
from the start, Luhmann unquestionably locates himself in the post World 
War II tradition of English-speaking Sociology. Also, on the level of primary 
empirical material, he approaches society not as represented first of all, let 
alone naturally, by German society; he was very much aware of a global-
ised society and in doing so he often speaks of legal issues that are of 
global interest such as Human Rights and of creation of the English legal 
system such as Equity . 153
 2.4 - Contingency and Justice. 
Certainly philosophers know and have dealt with contingency or re-
lated notions from Aristotle onwards, at the latest. Contingency as ob-
served by Luhmann in a postmodern discourse, though, seems to be 
some sort of King Midas gold of modernity. Luhmann's sociological use of 
this  classical philosophical notion that – together with, but even more 
prominently than, the notion of ‘possibility’ – constitutes the door through 
which modernity entered the tradition, transforming the use of philosophic-
al notions and of their archive. By saying this, I am not claiming that Luh-
mann's social-theoretical work, integrally based upon the notion of contin-
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Publi153 -
shed in Pbk. 2008; Se also  Luhmann, N. ‘Die Weltgesellschaft’, published in So-
ziologische Aufklärung, vol.I (1971).
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gency as it is, limits his own use to one configuration only. The sociology 
of modernity with its inherent dependency on contingent relations is one 
thing; the Luhmannian notion of Kontingenzformel, which relates to func-
tion systems coping with contingency on the basis of a formalised way of 
managing contingency, is slightly different. Luhmann is the first to confront 
the philosophical rationality and to challenge its pretence to exercise a 
theo-politically defined hegemony over the interpretation of the social be-
ing. If there is such a thing as a common-sensical essence of Luhmann's 
contingency-based theory of modern society, it might be formulated in a 
maxim such as "looking more and judging or criticising less". If most gen-
erally what happens in society happens between systems and their envir-
onments, then attempts to self-limitation, or more generally, to reduction of 
complexity, appear as being the obvious general direction that follows. 
Using again the legal system as a prime example, for my purposes, the 
element of contingency is represented by justice. Justice is a postulate. It 
is not "guaranteed" by the presence of a legal order or the internal opera-
tions of the system prima facie observing how the system works. repres-
ents the heterarchy and  circularity of the legal operations.  
If the basic orientation entrusts upon contingency the single one 
most distinctive feature of modern society, the modalities of governing/
steering/managing a function system pose problems of a different or at 
least more specific type. “When one is in the inside”, under the need of 
dealing with a specific situation, how does one proceed? Coming back to 
"Justice", it is well known that the Western legal philosophical tradition has 
for a long time been gloriously grandiloquent and confidently promising 
enough to say that its legal order is able to cater for the expectation of 
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making decisions that are "just". Legal modernity has broken with this op-
timism. Justice is not for professional lawyers, says Hans Kelsen, for in-
stance, in a famous article . Modern positivists dismiss the very notion 154
that the reference to justice could harbour anything helpful for the running 
of the legal order. This is the point at which Niklas Luhmann contradicts 
the luminaries of legal positivism — naturally without falling back to the an-
terior full trust in the realisability of Justice. But Luhmann's conception of 
function systems comes complete with a claim of involving an employment 
for the concept of justice right within the legal order. This employment is 
that of what he calls the contingency formula of the legal system. This 
needs to be distinguished, very clearly indeed, from the account of the ba-
sic positions and agencies in the systems theoretical explanation of mod-
ern society. Justice is for Luhmann not a sub-system of the legal system, 
and does of course not pertain to the system's environment. But neither is 
it located in the medium or the code of the legal system. Rather it holds 
the weakest of roles, and it answers to an aporetic situation modern soci-
ety knows exceedingly well: the absence of integrating finalities as could 
be found in pre-modern societies has led to a scarcity of means of selec-
tion and preferences, and most of all of their justification. There is in other 
words a blockage of decision-potential, caused by an overflow of un-mas-
terable contingency, and, resulting from it, a decline of the arsenal of 
means of establishing preferences, where everything tends to become 
equally probable and equally approvable. Derrida, a philosopher rather 
than a system thinker, has devoted to the issue a widely received newspa-
per article, not about law, if indeed about Europe, under the title "The other 
 Kelsen H. ‘What is justice?: Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of Science: 154
Collected Essays’ Berkely: University of California Press, 1957.
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Heading" . Even if Derrida writes about the "other heading", that notion 155
of a heading is instructive for the understanding of what Luhmann tries to 
achieve by means of the contingency formula Justice. The concrete para-
meters of legal decision-making, including factors related to repetition, if 
also to process, time, social life.  Luhmann tries to "formulate" the contin-
gency of legal decision-making limiting — though not discarding — the 
problem of a contingent justice, a justice that disappoints expectations; 
that justice needs to disappoint (some) expectations, goes without saying 
and is of the essence – but the notion of the contingency formula Justice 
proves that system theory view point is already navigating in another 
ocean than that of the philosophers who — following a famous claim going 
back to Plato, wish to accredit the belief that everything about the polis 
would be all right, if only them, the philosophers, were allowed to rule it as 
its Kings.  
In various ambits of human research, from art to science, there has 
always been the need to find new ways of describing changing times. This 
goes far further back than the birth of evolutionary thinking, but since far 
more than a century now evolution can no longer be eluded in the study of 
nature. That is a major discontinuity with respect to the Old European tra-
dition, and its largely a-temporal categories, appropriate to a simpler, God 
based or sovereignty based, type of society. Societies have become early 
recognition devices for evolutionary innovations. After a first, misguided 
and deservedly discredited individualist attempt of "social Darwinism" 
about a century ago, the Darwinian language is back in connection with 
social systems theory, its underlying ambition (the reduction of complexity) 
 Derrida, J., ‘The other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe (Studies in 155
Continental Thought’ Indiana University Press, 1992;
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being closely related to the issue of adaptation, which effectively consti-
tutes a is a decisive point in relation to Luhmann, and to the theory of 
autopoietic social systems. Adaptation as applied, not to the individual but 
to society. One of the great problems of collective ways of existence today 
is the (incidentally, barely luhmannian) one of connecting the individual 
and human kind — of overcoming the multiple double-binds, aporias and 
blockages that impair the connections of what is collectively preferred to 
an individual person’s decisions. It is difficult to imagine a sustainable 
world that would not succeed in solving these problems (which are in the 
last resort, problems of adaptation); however, and in a sense unsurpris-
ingly, there is little headway made.  
Adaptation, in a luhmannian angle, is the paradigmatic term for the 
relationship between social systems and their environments. According to 
the darwinian doctrine, successful adaptation can be only distinguished 
after the fact. How to adapt to a future evolution, cannot be known, it can 
only guessed, expected, and be a matter of betting. In fact, “System The-
ory treats variation and selection as ‘sub-dynamics of the complex 
system.’”  Imposing to commit or omit certain actions from others would 156
suppose a knowledge of future evolutions, but “[w]here autopoietic sys-
tems are involved, evolution can therefore not be understood as a mere 
meeting of particulars, where what already exists enables something to be 
added that could not have been done without this precondition.”  God's 157
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012, p.262 156
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universal knowledge including the knowledge of events yet to happen was 
an important branch of early modern theology, for instance in Gregory of 
Rimini and John of Ripa . Nothing of the sort is available to us today. 158
The problem for us, today, is the tendency to exaggerate, to misinterpret, 
expectations as knowledge. Only with respect to past evolution, a dis-
course of adaptation can unfold its — limited — explanatory virtues.  
Wishful thinking, based on or masked as moral discourse is is still 
around today, especially in the media, and the political and legal dis-
courses they cater for. The idea of a neat set of moral rules, be it as a 
supplement to the positivistic idea of the search for unity, has its 
strongest proponents among the advocates of a marriage of law and 
morals: “the endeavour to make morals and law coincide will be an im-
portant future goal.”  That ethics continue to play their role and  remain 159
deeply rooted in the functioning of psychic systems is, including from 
Luhmann's vantage point, not a controversial point. The theory of social 
autopoiesis does not suggest that where ethics-grounded thinking had 
been decisive, social systems based thinking should replace it. Rather, 
an unfolding of the understanding of social systems can allow to draw 
better distinctions between the best ways of distributing both.  160
As already explained, people are observers, nevertheless, they are 
observing systems, posited in the system’s environment. On the cognit-
ive level, social systems theory is predicated on the notion of observa-
 On this see for instance Elliott, M. W. ‘Providence Perceived: Divine Action 158
from a Human Point of View’, Walter de Gruyter GmBH & Co KG 2015, p. 123 
and ff.
 In the words of the American scholar early 20th century scholar Pound, R. 159
‘The Spirit of the Common Law’, HardPress Publishing, 2013.
 Cf. Luhmann, N. ‘Paradigm Lost: Über die ethische Reflexion der Moral’, 160
Frankfurt am Main 1990.
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tion, and on the strong and necessary emphasis on the claim that ob-
servers are themselves being observed - that there is no such thing as 
absolute knowledge — which would be the knowledge of an unobserved 
observer. Only when things become difficult, one has the occasion to in-
dicate explicitly the conditions under which one has regard or disregard. 
This means that there is an empirical limit in the area of morals and 
therefore it cannot possibly be defined as values or norms with a range 
of application. This has the uniqueness of increasing delays in relation to 
the attempts of defining the specific nature of morals (as opposed to law) 
of rules at level of norms and values. Therefore, this new conception of 
morals can be defined as self perceived . 161
Habermas famously diagnosed Luhmann's theoretical publications 
before 1970,  speaking of “Sozialtechnologie”.  Today, one needs to con162 -
textualise this attack. The Federal Republic was shaken by the opposition 
between the progressive, largely Marx-inspired (Western branch) student 
movement and the generation of their parents, heavily compromised by 
their earlier nazism (or nazi-"compatibility", barely less criticisable). Luh-
mann's work from the 1960s, , was, in 1970, a rare and early bird among 163
the potential objects of critical Frankfurt School criticism: for the first time, 
Habermas turned against a modern or indeed modernist target. Social sys-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Paradigm lost: Über die ethische Reflexion der Moral’ Suhr161 -
kamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1990;
Habermas, J., Luhmann, N, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie: 162
Was leistet die Systemforschung?, Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1970.
 These included: Luhmann, N., ‘Funktionen und Folgen formaler 163
Organisation’ (1964), Duncker & Humblot GmbH 2005; ‘Grundrechte als Institu-
tion’ (1965), Duncker & Humblot, 1974; ‘Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität’ Tü-
bingen, J.C.B. Mohr – Paul Siebeck ,(1968); ‘Vertrauen - ein Mechanismus der 
Reduktion sozialer Komplexität’ (1968), UTB GmbH 2014; ‘Legitimation durch 
Verfahren’(1969), Suhrkamp, 1983. 
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tem theory carried, in his view, the stigmata, not only of creating problems 
of its own — which is the case of every suggested mode of problem-solv-
ing — but of disturbing, by its neo-cybernetic or at least quasi-cybernetic 
suggestions, by its highlighting of the complexity/reduction of complexity 
paradigm, nothing less important than the young democracy of post-war 
Western Germany. What was at stake here is Habermas's (and many oth-
ers') progressive conviction that Philosophy, the Social Sciences (Marx, 
Durkheim, Weber), but most of all Politics (Western model), each of them 
understood according to the very same old-European tradition that had 
been brutally interrupted by Nazism, should be considered as the pillars of 
any new (Western) German public entity; the strong normative commit-
ment here goes without saying; Luhmann's clear sense that the FRG of 
the 1960s was as unlikely to obey the best opinions of the best opinion-
holders, and as likely to follow its own dispositions and propensities, as 
any other social organisation, as well.  
Luhmann started to develop his theory not as a philosophical exer-
cise, but as an alternative way of approaching the object society, a way 
intended to save sociology from the frustrations provided by some of its 
tradition(s) — from the frustration, first of all, of the democratically incurred 
end of democracy in Germany around 1930. Yet, at the same time — and 
this is part of what I would like to put forward here, as my thesis — there 
are some rather conspicuous encounters and parallels between certain 
claims and arguments, featuring in works that Niklas Luhmann has pub-
lished thirty or forty years ago, and contemporary, early 21st century evol-
utions, most especially of philosophical discourses, today that are, looking 
at their genealogy, a priori unrelated to systems theory in general, and to 
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Luhmann in particular. Roughly, I would like to draw attention to some of 
these encounters and parallels and describe the underlying problems with-
in the context of the evolution of the reception of Luhmann. Secondly, I 
would like to approach a recent contribution to the theory of social 
autopoiesis – the distinction between two types of social autopoiesis, basal 
and derivative, the finely tuned critique of Luhmann, which is found in the 
book Kontingenz, Paradox, Nur-Vollzug (2004) by French sociologist Jean 
Clam – a contribution which offers both a cutting-edge critique and a the-
oretically fruitful improvement of the theory.  
The most shared and most traditional criticism addressed to Luh-
mann is that he departs from the ‘eternal truth’, purportedly indispensable 
and, in any case, shared by mediatised common sense as much as by 
politicised social theory, that society is correctly conceived of as a collec-
tion of coexisting individuals or collectives. The first question here is that of 
the time-related character of claims as to politics and society. There is a 
vast philosophical prehistory to it — and a fascinating width of view-points, 
between the Greek-Sicilian pre-socratic philosopher Parmenides (early Vth 
century BC), who (or: the Goddess whose teaching Parmenides notes) 
tells us that that which is, is necessarily perfect and unchangeable, and 
the doctrine that "everything that happens, happens now" (Luhmann).  164
For the first, everything decisive has happened before, for the second, 
nothing decisive happened before, decisive is only that which is now in the 
making. Furthermore, pre-Luhmannian elaborations upon society and re-
lated topics have always, unwaveringly, rested their case on society’s 
members as representing the substance of the social.               
 Luhmann, N., ‘Schriften zur Pädagogik’, D. Lenzen (ed.), Frankfurt am Main, 164
Suhrkamp, 2004, p.149.
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Through the gate of these popular, common, and plausible-looking as-
sumptions, the entire traffic of ideologies and beliefs about the nature and 
potential to be attributed to mankind and individuality had entered right in-
side the social sciences, precluding more ambitious ways of understanding 
society. Since modernity rejected the notion of hierarchical structures 
based on theological assumptions, it is well-known that “man”, mostly the 
individual, took centre stage. But the individual was made by German 
Idealism into a Weltverhältnis, a unique world-relation,  whereas, if one 165
bases one's account upon the rationale of system and environment, it is 
impossible to conceive of society on the basis of such a all-deciding "hot-
line"-conversation between an idealised individual and a no less idealised 
universe, figuring as a microcosm and a macrocosm respectively.   166
In order to deliver what, he suggests, explaining society under the 
conditions of modern society entails, Luhmann redefines it in terms of self-
reproducing or self-producing units (which later on he will call systems). By 
doing so he commits himself to a two front situation. On the one hand, al-
though he is deeply uninterested in any enterprise of the sort "critique of 
ideology", he emancipates the effort of sociological sense-making from 
suggestions based on human nature, on religious (or secular) beliefs, of 
world pictures and world views. On the other hand, he suspects that the 
study of human behaviour is less helpful than it is often assumed. Why at 
all consider systems rather than people as constitutive elements of soci-
ety? It is important to look carefully at the specific problem Luhmann is fa-
cing here. He understands modern society, not as a court-room, a forum or 
Luhmann, N. ‘Ecological Communication‘, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989 p.165
212. 
 Luhmann, N., ‘Schriften zur Pädagogik’, D. Lenzen (ed.), Frankfurt am Main, 166
Suhrkamp, 2004; esp. pp. 159-208
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a mooting session, where opposing claims are fought out, but as an im-
mense accumulation of difficulties, deadlocks, and double-binds, piling up, 
together with the equally vast amount of ingenious enterprises of circum-
venting them, both of which are subject to an exponential growth that is 
increasingly difficult to manage or handle.  
Traditional theories, especially if they follow sophist Protagoras's 
maxim that it is the human being which must be understood as the meas-
ure of all things, cannot explain the ever increasing complexity that charac-
terises societal modernity, let alone even start to handle it. It is somehow 
tempting, in this connection, to introduce an element of Luhmann's bio-
graphy. Though well-versed in Roman law and, as well, in ancient philo-
sophy (cf. his frequent references to Aristotle, especially to the latter's 
Politics), the primary differential feature of his work is neither about wis-
dom (as it is the case of philosophers), nor about power (as it is the case 
of - modern - politicians), nor about life (again: philosophers, later to be 
replaced by more empirical sciences such as medicine or biology): It is, 
instead, about households,, their conditions of continuation, their gov-
ernance, their management, and it might well be that Luhmann's only time 
outside of the academic setting, as a functionary in the administration of 
one of the German Länder, has let its marks in this emerging preferential 
interest. Luhmann is a theorist of management, and his problems are de-
cision-related problems.  
This criticism is often levelled against his work, and to some extent, 
this plays even an important role in Habermas's criticism of Luhmann's 
supposed penchant for "social technology". Now there is no question that 
a manager's approach involves its own perspective. A manager is involved 
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in society in a different way than a politician. He sees it as a continuing en-
terprise, and his focus is less in governing society than in running society. 
But the question is rather about the reasons why "running", rather than 
governing society has become more and more important these days? 
Rather than criticising, rather or at least before condemning it, one has to 
understand this.  For starters, if you take deadlocks and decision problems 
seriously, then people’s convictions, opinions, identifications are no longer 
what is decisive. A crisis, for instance, is never produced by convictions, 
but always by consequences, by complexity.  
This is why Luhmann distinguishes between people as conscious 
systems and society as composed by communicating systems (economy, 
law, science, politics etc). He also teaches that conscious systems consti-
tute the environment of communicating systems – that human beings con-
stitute the environment of society. As shocking as this may sound, it needs 
to be understood that what autopoiesis centres upon is the ‘operation’, the 
performance itself of the system, and not the question of who imposes his 
will, even if the latter has, for time immemorial, determined the outlook on 
society (which, we might say, had given rise to a politically motivated out-
look). Systems theory gives a systematic preference to the "how"-question 
over the "what"-question, and to the "what"-question over the "who"-ques-
tion. The individual is still important for society, but now as part of its envir-
onment, or more exactly as a condition: because it allows communication 
(thereby: society) to take place. As a bearer of a proper name, the indi-
vidual functions, in a systems-theory perspective on society, as an ad-
dress.  167
 Luhmann, N. 'Die soziale Adresse und die Person  (ms. accessible through  167
https://www.degruyter.com/.../books/.../9783839401637-001.xml
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Going back to Luhmann and to his own formulation of this opera-
tionally conceived society, it is important to note in his latest discussion, 
the 1997 published Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, the step he sug-
gests is of short-circuiting operation and structure. Operation equals struc-
ture, which refers to a radical step, maybe one can say, to the effort of 
providing his sociological and social-theoretical results with a philosophic-
ally formulated conclusion. 
 ‘Empirical events’ and ‘compassing structures’ constitute the two 
extremes between which the theory of society as evolved, for the entire, 
relatively short time (in terms of the evolution of the sciences) of its exis-
tence). The claim that both are aspects of one identical reality looks, on a 
first gaze, as something that is not far from the proverbial squaring of the 
circle. As Luhmann explains: “Social systems practice a circular self-refer-
ential relation between operation and structure. They generate structures 
by their operations. Hence, for the operation there is never a beginning, 
because the system must always be able to reproduce its operations from 
its own products and also there is no end because every other operation is 
produced in view of further operations. Only an observer can ascertain a 
beginning and an end if he has a suitable rational construction of an earlier 
and a later state. The system has operated only if it has built up enough 
complexity to be able to describe itself in the time dimension. The idea of a 
before is a myth made in the system or in the story of the observer.”  168
This fast and somehow uncompromising style of Luhmann has con-
fronted many people, including close collaborators, with problems. Gun-
ther Teubner has, in 1988, in Hypercycle in Law and Organisation: the Re-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012, p.265.168
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lationship Between Self-observation, Self-constitution and Autopoiesis , 169
given a detailed analysis of autopoiesis, starting from the two Chilean bio-
logists Roberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, who had brought out the 
concept of autopoiesis applied to mono-cellular organisms. Teubner criti-
cises Luhmann’s inflexible application of the autopoiesis to social systems. 
He attempts to find a technique of ‘shifting’, of "gradualising", between 
non-autopoietic and autopoietic, between things and systems, between the 
ontological and the ‘poietical’, between being and operation, in order to es-
tablish a passage, a continuity between the mode of being of things and 
the mode of being of autopoietic systems.  Luhmann’s, counter-suggestion 
is “all or nothing”, of “inflexible rigidity”, that is, either systems are autopoi-
etic or they are not autopoietic, in the same way in which there is also a 
rigid difference between living and non-living matter. Teubner instead pro-
poses to use the term ‘hypercycle’ to indicate autopoiesis as a concept 
that focuses on gradually emerging realities.  
Teubner, on the other hand, argues that 1- social subsystems, bet-
ter known as function systems, start their operations and constitute their 
components by enriching them with degrees of self-reference; in so doing, 
they become gradually autonomous; and 2- only once the subsystem’s 
components have achieved the state of interlinking into a hypercycle, then 
and only then they start becoming autopoietic. It would be an exaggera-
tion, however, to say the least, to claim that Teubner was successful in 
convincing Luhmann. In Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, he insists that 
there is no question that a system is "half", or  "a little" autopoietic, any 
 Teubner, G. ‘Hypercycle in Law and Organisation: the Relationship Between 169
Self-observation, Self-constitution and Autopoiesis’, European Yearbook in the 
Sociology of Law (1988), pp. 43 and ff. 
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more than of a being that is “half” or “a little” alive, that the concept of 
autopoiesis itself requires this ‘uncompromising hardness’” , etc. Now 170
this is, no doubt, a fascinating topic for a controversy, not only — as one 
might be tempted to judge at first sight — as an academic dispute between 
two professorial conceptions, but also, decisively, as to the question of 
how to understand self-reference and autopoiesis.  I am turning to a more 
recent interpreter and critic of Luhmann, French sociologist (and psycho-
analyst) Jean Clam, whose distinction between autopoiesis basal and 
autopoiesis derivative might well function as a decisive enabling device. 
  In one of his two German-written contributions to sociological sys-
tems theory,  Clam shows how Luhmann has omitted to recognise and 171
integrate an important distinction, or rather: to take account of a game-
changing non-coincidence. The identity of basal and derivative autopoies-
is, which Luhmann, according to Clam, supposes continuously, if silently, 
overstates the case of systemic autopoiesis, that is to say, of the autopoi-
etic systems of society: law, economy, politics, science. Heeding this non-
coincidence, what becomes obvious is the fact that social and legal 
autopoiesis remains “improbable”, that there is nothing much in common 
between the autopoiesis of life according to Maturana, and social 
autopoiesis according to Luhmann. This is based on the observation that 
nothing “naturally” precludes the spectre of law’s becoming non-autopoiet-
ic again. In Luhmann’s own non-distinction of both types of autopoiesis 
Luhmann, N. ‘Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft’ Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp, 170
1997; p. 440. My translation.
 Clam, J. ‘Kontingenz, Paradox, Nur-Vollzug’, Konstanz (UVK) 2004. ["Nur-171
Vollzug"= mere execution]. See also Jean Clam, J. ’Was heisst, sich an Differenz 
statt and Identität orientieren? Zur De-ontologisierung’ in Philosophie und Sozial-
wissenschaft, UVK; Auflage: 1, (2002); What it means to take one’s orientation 
from difference rather than from identity.
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this much less robust status of the autopoiesis of the differentiated func-
tional systems of society, remains somehow obscured. What is it that Clam 
calls basal autopoiesis and derivative autopoiesis?  
Schematically, there is the following difference within the total realm 
of what Clam calls the inaugural structure of autopoiesis. In the case of 
basal autopoiesis, autopoiesis simply cannot be avoided as it constitutes a 
conditio sine qua non.  Biologically, life is autopoietic in the sense that the 
distinction between system and environment (a membrane, mostly) puts 
itself into place, and if it fails to do so, life does not happen, does simply 
not emerge, or ceases. But of communication, the same is true. Commu-
nication is, like life, basal autopoiesis. Communication happens, schemat-
ising Clam’s account, whenever two conscious systems, two “persons” in 
everyday language, dream to get “involved” with each other. For instance, 
they would like to understand each other. Whether or not they will have 
succeeded in “understanding” each other is for each of them (or indeed an 
external observer) to judge. But what does happen, necessarily, indis-
pensably, always, is this: they will have communicated. Like life, commu-
nication is therefore a case of basal autopoiesis. Basal autopoiesis is an 
autopoiesis in natura rerum. Its autopoietic character results directly from 
its operations. Communication takes place autopoietically, on the basis of 
an existing impossibility: in the case of communication, the impossibility of 
two consciousnesses to allow to engage with each other. Once again, 
whether or not they succeed in, e.g. becoming transparent to each other, 
is another matter; they might or not. Maybe also the problem is not posed 
in a way that allows to allow a clear answer. In short, people communicat-
ing may well not succeed in becoming transparent to each other. But, be 
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this as it might, by trying to, they produce communication. Clam speaks of 
basal autopoiesis as happening in the mode of ‘despite and therefore’. 
That is to say, it happens despite the fact that consciousnesses cannot 
fuse, or penetrate into each other, but it also happens ‘therefore’, namely 
because communication happens whenever this attempt is launched. In a 
more humanist idiom, we might also say: communication happens 
whenever we make an attempt of this sort, an attempt of speaking to each 
other .    172
Derivative autopoiesis is, on the contrary, not covered by such a 
conditio sine qua non character. As I have just shown, there is no life 
without biological autopoiesis, there is no communication without commu-
nicational autopoiesis. But what function system specific communications, 
what about law, economy, politics?  Has there ever been such a thing as 173
non-autopoietic economy, non-autopoietic politics, non-autopoietic law? 
The answer is: absolutely yes. It is clear that the largest part of Western 
legal history has been a history of non-autopoietic law. By far most epis-
odes of European legal history show a legal order that continues, even 
thrives without the necessity of this cyclical constitution that defines self-
reference and auto-poiesis als forms of reflexivity. In Clam's categories, 
therefore, legal autopoiesis is a case of merely derivative autopoiesis, be-
cause there is no inherent necessity that legal autopoiesis happens, as life 
or communication do. Based on a lot of institutional art and action, modern 
legal orders have developed the schematic question: “lawful/unlawful”. As 
Luhmann’sreaders will remember, according to Luhmann, any legal com-
 Clam, J. ‘Kontingenz, Paradox, Nur-Vollzug’, Konstanz (UVK) 2004, p. 149 and 172
ff.
 Clam, J. ‘Kontingenz, Paradox, Nur-Vollzug’, Konstanz (UVK) 2004, p.158. 173
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munication whatsoever is an answer or a contribution to the solution of this 
question: lawful?/unlawful?, about which any legal decision will ultimately 
decide. But nothing, apart from a finely tuned framework of legal proced-
ure, prevents law that fails to follow this outline, to still be law. In fact, most 
law we know – all law outside of modern society – is not autopoietic. 
Autopoietic law needs to be put into circuit artfully as it were. It is emin-
ently “avoidable”.  
By distinguishing a natural autopoietic level and an artificial one, 
Clam uncovers an oversight by Luhmann, who had not made this distinc-
tion.  Thereby Clam downgrades a certain misplaced and unjustifiable 174
optimism within the theory of autopoiesis and brings the autopoiesis of the 
functionally differentiated systems of society into a different, downgraded 
or ‘weakened’ level, adding, at the same time, a third voice to the Teubner-
Luhmann debate. 
When Hegel rethinks political history on new basis (between 1800 and 
1830) immediately two groups of thinkers were born (between 1830 and 
1870, with the centre in 1848, were the years of politics’ great historical 
moment, in Germany but not exclusively there, also in Italy, for instance). 
One group, the “right wing Hegelians” wanted to sum their conclusions on 
Hegelian knowledge in relation to historical reason as integrated in the po-
litical evolution and invented a conception of politics, whose centre is the 
theory of state. For them the State is the main thing. This theory goes from 
the XIX to the XX century up to Leo Strauss, who thinks he has found the 
 It should be noted, however, that Luhmann , without allowing the distinction 174
the same decisive standing as Clam, distinguishes biological psychic and social 
systems as featuring a "mode of operation and reproduction (life, consciousness, 
communication) that is autonomous by its own nature." [Ihr Operations- und Re-
produktionsmodus (Leben bzw. Bewußtsein bzw. Kommunikation) ist aus seiner 
Natur heraus autonom] Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Schriften zur Pädagogik, D. Lenzen 
(ed.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2004, p.53.  
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Prussian state as an ultimate figure of political history, in the figure of the 
US – here the authors of “post-history” have their roots. The others want to 
continue, and even push beyond itself the Hegelian gesture. These others 
are the left-wing Hegelians, the Linkshegelianer or Junghegelianer, Bruno 
Bauer and Karl Marx, and all the Marxists (but not the Nietzschen left wing 
with Gilles Deleuze and the situationists such as Guy Debord, for 
instance).   
With this in mind, the distinction made by Jean Clam of the two 
types of autopoiesis shows Luhmann in a light a new species of Recht-
shegelianer – this time not based on the concept of State, but on the con-
cept of autopoiesis, as an embodiment of reason in history. The old 
Hegelian right wing statists had made too many promises about the State. 
The new right wing Hegelians, the systemists, make too many promises 
about the autopoiesis. Certainly, the protagonist candidate of the left wing 
Hegelians, the proletariat, has been very far from proving its proofs. 
One point to make is that Luhmann’s conception of society admits 
only operations as building blocks. This is the case of everything that 
touches the underlying idea of the theory of social autopoiesis, or, in other 
words, the conception of society itself, made up by small “events” (or "op-
erations"). The operation is for Luhmann the atom of social autopoiesis. 
For sociologists, there is a caveat in order here. ‘Operation’ in Luhmann by 
no means equals ‘action’. For Luhmann, society is the result of operations, 
namely communications. Both action and operation make some type of a 
difference, but the difference a communication makes is a mere result, it is 
not at all necessarily that which had been intended by one or the other 
"party to the communication" (for instance in the case of a contract, the 
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one or the other party). Jean Clam takes full account of this lesson. His 
term ‘nur-Vollzug’ (‘mere-execution’) indicates that all the attention is 
placed exclusively in the performance. Clam speaks of mere-execution as 
an instantiation of post-ontology. Clam, who has also published a study on 
Heidegger and Luhmann, investigates the post-ontological, and by doing 
so, brings Luhmann’s social autopoiesis and certain philosophical stands 
of thought into a closer connection.   
 2.5 - What is a System? 
What does Luhmann intend with the term ‘system’?  The word is 
perhaps what is the most misleading feature of his entire social theory. 
This is especially true of the term's earlier history, especially its German 
philosophical history in and after Hegel.  There, the term had a totally 175
different set of meanings and contexts of use, it referred, first of all, to an 
ordered set of explanations, such as "system of philosophy", "system of 
science", etc., rather to any empirical reality. Neither had this been un-
known to Luhmann, who eventually would receive the Hegel-prize, but in 
his view, there were little alternatives, if what one is looking for is a term of 
the required width of application and of the required precision, especially a 
degree of abstraction that makes the relation system/environment mean-
ingful. The price to be paid is that, owing to its polysemy, it can easily war-
rant different understandings and consequently also lead to illusory convic-
tions. Within the paradigm change operated by Luhmann, one could even 
distinguish two equally paradigmatic ingredients, the social system, and 
 On this, see the useful site http://wiki.hegel-system.de/index.php?title=Recht175 -
shegelianismus providing the main sources especially of the "state"-oriented 
branch among Hegel's followers, through the writing of the Hegel-pupils Karl 
Eduard Erdmann und Karl Ludwig Michelet. (Last accessed 2 June 2018)
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the autopoietic system. In fact, this is the paradigm par excellence in this 
ambit, because it shows the essence of the shift in the paradigm of soci-
ology. Pulling out of the conception of society conceived as a group of hu-
man beings subject to the long reign of its sovereign authorities, society is 
now no longer a hierarchical architecture of power-relations, but the out-
come of the communications of social systems. Thus, the theory of social 
systems importantly refrains from claiming to offer "the whole truth". Hu-
man beings, who are conditions for the functioning of social systems, are 
also the site at which the other sense/meaning-processing agencies, con-
sciousnesses  fulfil their missions. In fact, Luhmann says that society is 
possible because of systems and not of people because he sees con-
sequentially, that what constitutes society is communication, not con-
sciousnesses. Yet, it is important not to forget that, if human beings are 
thrown out of the picture outright, in the sense that the emerging order of 
social systems no longer required to take them into account (otherwise 
than as an external conditio sine qua non, but of those, there are many), 
they are perfectly admitted as sites of consciousness. With consciousness/
consciousnesses, we are entering a different level, a different paradigm. 
There is no bridge reconnecting psychic systems and social systems. 
 Luhmann thus can be said to redefine modern society in terms of 
systems and events, but he does not claim that modern society rules over 
modern humans, persons or individuals. Society is the inclusive social sys-
tem and as such the product of communication, but it is only socially in-
clusive. In this sense not only Luhmann emancipated the effort of sociolo-
gical sense-making from any suggestions based on human nature, reli-
gious beliefs, or secular ideologies; he is also the thinker of simultaneous 
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series without an overarching ‘cause’. Nevertheless Luhmann considers 
human behaviour as the most powerful source of systemic behaviour. This 
has been put into doubt by King , who considers the study of human be176 -
haviour less helpful than it is often assumed. Not human behaviour, not 
"people", but systems are the constitutive elements of society. Sociological 
insight is increased, as it were, by the cunning decision of sidestepping 
traditional humanist theories which cannot explain the ever increasing 
complexity that characterises modernity.  
A distinction between ‘people as conscious systems – in short: hu-
man individuals - and society as communicating systems’, where con-
scious systems constitute the environment of communicating systems, 
now replaces their earlier identification. As shocking as this ‘outsourcing’ of 
humans outside society may sound, it needs to be understood that what 
autopoiesis centres upon is the ‘operation’, the performance itself of the 
system, and not who or what operates or performs. Therefore the individu-
al is important insofar as it allows communication to take place. Also, by 
being placed into the environment as an observer, it offers second order 
observation of the operations of the system, or, to put it more simply, a 
series of perspectives on what goes on within each social system. 
A human centred method has been the basis of every theory of so-
ciety that we find in the relevant epistemic tradition. From antiquity, with 
Protagoras’s idea that man is the measure of all things and with Plato’s 
Republic, where the polis is defined as a group of people, to early modern-
ity with Hobbes and Rousseau’s theories of “social contract”, to late mod-
ernity with Bentham’s utilitarism, Rawls’s consensus theory of fairness and 
 King, M. ‘Systems not People Make Society Happen’. Holcombe Publishing, 176
2009.
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Habermas’s consensus theory of communicative action. The one thing all 
these views have in common is to offer what needs to be called an anthro-
pocentric theory of society and tend to be epistemologically optimistic. 
Even Marshall McLuhan’s non-traditional media-sociological conception of 
the “global village” shares certain characters of anthropocentrism. With 
society’s complexity continuing to increase, to increase exponentially, a 
tendency to look at it and its problems from a view-point that is not under-
standing social reality as a mere stage setting for humankind, emerged. 
 The exclusion of human beings from society is partially a theoretic-
al escamotage, as certainly Luhmann does not underestimate the need of 
human beings in the workings of society, but gives people a role of the ob-
server of society’s communication, which could not happen other then 
through human beings. It is in fact communication that constitute society, 
not people in Luhmann’s revolutionary view. However, Luhmann was also 
under the need of coming up with compassing notion capable to capture 
what constitutes everyday matters of standard observation. Society, in 
other words, needed to be counter-opposed to visible social activity. This 
is what has given rise to the concept of interaction. Interaction is a simple 
“societal episode”; the decisive point is the simultaneous presence, or the 
presence ot each other, of those who participate in it. The choice of the 
term ‘episode’ involves the idea of time and shows already one of the dif-
ferences between the ideas of episode/interaction and society.  
The concept of interactions comes complete with the idea of finding 
its point of gravity in itself,  unrelated to a temporal dimension. Interactions 
are in this sense transitory, while societies continue, largely because they 
are agents of modification by giving rise to ways of dealing with them, as 
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previously mentioned. With the advent of modernity and the overcoming of 
the old European semantics, the widespread notion that the sphere of the 
social consisted entirely of "interaction"-type encounters according had 
lost its plausibility. Society, in modernity, does not ‘happen’, in specific es-
pecially significant interactions. Modern society is taking place at several 
levels at once. Of course, interactions still occur: the difference is that from 
the beginning of modernity onwards society evolves self-referentially.  177
Society therefore cannot be conceived as constituted by human beings, 
as, noted Luhmann, the weight of society does not coincide with the total-
ity of human beings, or with the occurrence of births and deaths.  As an 178
example, court cases, legislation and all the legal communication that in-
volves all aspects of the legal system have been continued for centuries, 
during which Judges, lawyers and legislators have lived, contributed and 
died, without, for this reason, interrupting the legal communication. And the 
same can be said of the political system and all other function systems. 
From a very different background, the medievalist historian Kantorowicz 
can here offer precious insights dealing with the “King’s two bodies”. Kings 
die, but the monarchy does not; Prime Ministers can succeed to each oth-
er, without the political system stopping from functioning. In other words, 
communication does not stop because human beings cease to be . 179
This non-coincidence of the individual and society, it was already 
said in the mid eighteen century, constitutes the main entry under "human 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Social Systems’, 1996, Stanford University Press, p. 407.177
 Luhmann, N. ‘Die Gesellschaft Der Gesellschaft’ in Moeller, H.G. ‘Luhmann 178
Explained. From Souls to System’, Chicago, Open Court, 2006, p. 231.
 Kantorowicz, E., ‘The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theolo179 -
gy’, Princeton University Press, 1997.
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individuality".  This issue will have a bearing in the change that will see 180
society reject hierarchy and stratification and instead taking the direction of 
what towards horizontal differentiation, ‘heterarchy’ to name it with a term 
developed, first in the context of cognitive structures linked to the human 
brain (Warren McCulloch, 1952) and, linked to it through the achievement 
and continuation of functional differentiation. In the differentiation between 
system and environment, the consciousness of the individual has only a 
place in the environment, as it is not part of society. Individual conscious-
ness is part of the ecological conditions and has the role of irritating the 
system by being structurally coupled with the autopoietic societal system. 
This coupling, which can happen by using language as a device,  is the 181
only direct link of the societal system with its outside, as no system can 
operate outside its own boundaries and can change its meaning in accord 
with historical changes. This irritation by individual consciousness creates 
the ‘order by noise’,  which leads to the emergence and evolution of a 182
social order.   183
 The already mentioned issue of consensus of values, functionally 
necessary under the moral normativity of the old-European society, and 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Die Gesellschaft Der Gesellschaft’ in Moeller, H.G. ‘Luhmann 180
Explained. From Souls to System’, Chicago, Open Court, 2006, p. 231.
  Language is, in Luhmann's view, not a system. This is why there is no super181 -
system involved in the structural coupling of consciousness and societal system, 
as correclty observed by. Habermas, J. ‘Theory of Communicative Action’, Polity 
Press Vol 1, 1986.
 This expression comes from an experiment in physics. If a number of plastic 182
cubes weighing enough to barely float, are put in a bucket full of water and the 
bucket is subjected to a series of external disturbances, or’ noise’, the cubes will, 
after a while, order themselves into regular clusters. On this See Foerster, H. von, 
Poerksen, B. ‘Understanding Systems, Conversations on Epistempology and 
Ethics’Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag, Heidelberg, 2002. p.91.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Globalisation or World Society: How to Conceive of Modern So183 -
ciety?’ International Review of Sociology, March 97, Vol. 7 Issue 1. pp.74-5.
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resting on categorisation and moral accounts of anything, created an all-
inclusive, normatively thinking society. Before Luhmann’s theory, the idea 
of consensus within politics or law had been the denomination of political 
credibility, and was formulated in terms of problems and projected onto the 
idea of society.  Parsons followed Durkheim and saw a solution in a con184 -
sensus of values, which increased generalisation as a reaction to an in-
creased differentiation.  Luhmann, instead, carefully avoids attributing to 185
consensus any role in constituting modern society. This is because 
through communication and self-referential operations society, as a sys-
tem, will produce its own identities, references and Eigenwerte  inde186 -
pendently from any experience or any other exposure to a specifically hu-
man dimension.  As a corollary to consensus is the issue of integration 187
and the quest as to whether it should have a necessary role in society. It is 
usually assumed that integration, as integration through consensus, is ne-
cessary to constitute society. As Luhmann considers society as constituted 
by communication it would derive that integration is superfluous as society 
can create through communication its own values independently from what 
individuals feel and experience.  
 Luhmann, N. ‘Die Weltgesellschaft’ In Soziologische Aufklärung 2, 1986, 184
GmbH Opladen Westdeutsche Verlag, pp.52-3.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Die Gesellschaft Der Gesellschaft’ as quoted in in Moeller, H.G. 185
‘Luhmann Explained From Souls to Systems’, Open Court Publishing 2006; 
’ p. 232.
 Moeller here translates the term as ‘own-value’. The term ‘eigenwerte’ came 186
firstly from the mathematician David Hilbert. It is general agreement that in Ger-
man, his terms, Eigenzustaende, Eigenfunktionen, Eigenwerte, are not nearly as 
visibly insistent on that “Eigen”-motive, which, as the effect of their impossible 
English translation, is usually left “raw” and untranslated in these terms, therefore 
‘eigenwerte’ should become ‘eigenvalue’ and not ‘own-value’.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Die Gesellschaft Der Gesellschaft’ in Moeller, H.G. ‘Luhmann 187
Explained. From Souls to System’, Chicago, Open Court, 2006, p. 233.
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3 - Justice in a Postmodern Climate: Luhmann’s Gift to the 
Legal System. 
3.1 - Modern Conceptions of Society. 
Marx’s critique of the capitalistic system still has arguably a promin-
ent place in sociology’s description of contemporary society and is still 
today a tempting and indeed a fitting instrument of the interpretation of so-
cial injustice, even with a number of anachronisms. . In fact,  Marx’s 188
construction of society, as it was conceived in the  19th Century cannot 
possibly reflect the complexity of contemporary society, and also is a the-
oretical obstacle as it simply represents traditional humanistic philosophic 
ideas and semantics unknowingly and against all efforts from the tradition 
of Old Europe . Luhmann equates Marx’s description of the capitalist 189
system with the ‘rising of the dead’, identifying it as a ‘muscular metaphys-
ics of materialism’ and insisting on the ‘humanistic malnourishment of 
Marxist terminology’.   190
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.188
5.
 Luhmann is not opposed to the fact that Marx is named as one of the founding 189
fathers of the Social Sciences (together with Durkheim and Weber  mainly), and 
in Luhmann, there is no “rejecting" Marx, but rather the Marxists of the world in 
which he lives, the 1960s to 1990s in Western Germany. There is no need for us 
today to commit the methodological error of mixing up Marx and the Marxists of a 
century later.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.190
5.
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Luhmann would not go along with a theory framework which he 
considers as largely obsolete, because of its “empirical referentiality”;  191
for instance, Luhmann points out that the notion of ‘alienation’, which, even 
if Marx gives it an almost exclusively socio-economic content, if seen soci-
ologically, rather than anthropologically, therefore  defying it “as the capital 
management of the industrial as well as the political economy” ; then it is 192
clear how the use of the term by Marx does not “take into consideration 
that materiel and people work in completely different ways” . It involves a 193
philosophical input that fits perfectly within the mono-centric structure of 
earlier, in fact, even pre-modern, Western society models. Marx ascribes 
to economy a central position, conceiving it as an over-constituting power 
for “all the rest” of society and therefore unable to account for any other 
moving parts, or functional systems, within society – a clear “misconcep-
tion of the relationship between function-systems”   194
Still, Luhmann’s social theory of exclusion, which, although it owes 
some of its input to Marx' writing and certainly throws its roots into the 
same hummus. Luhmann is not interested in orchestrating a discourse on 
society that invests itself into ideologies, whether to uphold or to reject 
them. This eminently practical decision allows him to sidestep the value-
architectures. The point for Luhmann is not that of the values endorsed, 
but of the consequences it triggers. Notwithstanding the critiques paid to 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.191
6.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.192
6.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.193
6.
 On this see Moeller, H. G. ‘Luhmann Explained. From Souls to Systems’, 194
Chicago, Open Court, 2006, p. 177 and ff.
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Marxism, Luhmann acknowledges that the importance of Marx’s work in 
the description of modern society is conspicuous, insofar as it caused “a 
shift of a knowledge previously justified through nature, to a social 
context” . Also it provided some of the theoretical preconditions for social 195
system theory, mostly by transforming the Kantian and Hegelian epistemo-
logical idealism and its constructivist elements into its particular brand of 
social constructionism , he says that it“reflects the logic of a social con196 -
struct” .  197
Niklas Luhmann considered Marx’s understanding of economy as 
an attempted construction of social reality. In fact, he sees Marx’s theory in 
the second half of the 20th Century to have become “so omnipresent (…) 
that it ceases to be a specifically economic phenomenon or a special in-
terest ideology” . Rather, as “every cognition is construction as 198
cognition” , it is a move away from the previous conceptions of society 199
as a series of processes, intimately related to elements of natural law, and 
founded upon an idea of society as a self-constructing, autopoietic system.  
Moreover, Luhmann finds questionable the “newer version that 
states that the phony [sic] objectivity of economic theory  really serves to 
cover up the try power relationship mediated by state and law” . Luh200 -
Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.8195
 On this see Rasch, W. “Luhmann’s Ontology” , Revue internationale de 196
philosophie. 2012/1 No 259, pages 85 - 104  
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.197
8
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.198
8
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.199
8
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.200
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mann, on the contrary, interprets modern society not as a project directed, 
through a series of ‘contradictions’, towards an ultimate unity, but as a dif-
ference; where the term ‘contradiction’ in Marx could indeed equate to the 
term ‘paradox’ in Luhmann. For instance, ‘[t]he founding problem of law 
(…) is not to find and identify the ultimate ground or reason which justifies 
its existence. The problem is how to suppress or to attenuate the paradox 
which an observer with logical inclinations or with a sufficient degree of 
dissatisfaction could see and articulate at any time. It remains possible to 
ask the third question: can we accept contradictory opinions as being both 
right and wrong? At least under modem conditions we cannot avoid the 
issue” . In terms of this non-unifying power (Gewalt), to say it with Walter 201
Benjamin “[t]here is no such right above right and wrong, no such super-
right. There is simply Gewalt” , alienation then, seen in sociological 202
terms as social injustice, would become a perhaps inevitable part of op-
position (in Luhmannian terms, a ‘meta-code’) inclusion/exclusion. This 
opposition or meta-code, or “difference, has serious effects, first, because 
it is provoked by the functional differentiation of world society, and second, 
because it hampers, if not prevents, the regional establishment of condi-
tions for functional differentiation.” . This means that “large sections of 203
the population (…) [are] denied inclusion in the legal system, so that the 
legal /illegal code of the legal system cannot be enforced, or can be en-
 Luhmann, N., ‘The Third Question: The Creation of Paradoxes in Law and Le201 -
gal History’, 15 Journal of Law and Society (1988), 153-166. P.154.
 Benjamin, W. ‘Zur Kritik der Gewalt’ in id.,Gesammelte Schriften 2.1 1977, pp 202
179-203. Also quoted by Giorgio Agamben: ““the possibility of a violence (Gewalt) 
that lies absolutely ‘outside’ (außerhalb) and ‘beyond’ (jenseits) the law.” Agam-
ben, G. ‘State of Exception’, trans. Kevin Attell, Chicago; London: Univ. Press 
Chicago, 2005, p. 53.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012, p. 97. 203
124
forced only to a very limited extent.”  The ongoing issue, especially with 204
traditional view is that “[t]he prevailing opinion in legal and social science 
describes the unity of the system as a value, representing the social and 
cultural autonomy of its task. The legal system then has to implement 
justice. This comes close to being tautological. In my opinion, the unity of a 
system is realised by its guiding distinction. The legal system then has to 
implement the distinction of legality and illegality. This comes close to be-
ing paradoxical, seeing unity as the unity of a difference. These are clearly 
competing theories. We will have to choose between beginning and end-
ing with unity or with difference. And there is no other final answer to the 
third question” . 205
We will now explore briefly some of the concepts and contributions 
that historically lay behind the idea of social exclusion, from the Enlight-
enment to Luhmann’s theory. Some of these have provided a inspirational 
background of ideas to Luhmann’s theory. Others are simply analysed for 
sake of completeness, but they all will contribute in showing that Luhmann 
has presented the ultimate theory able to describe social injustice and ex-
clusion in a globalised contemporary society. 
 Arguably, the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, had an impact on 
Luhmann’s system theory in terms of providing the question of unity within 
the difference of cognition and real object; “cognitively all reality must be 
constructed by means of distinctions and, as a result, remains construc-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012, p. 98.204
 Luhmann, N. ‘The Third Question: The Creative Use of Paradoxes in Law and 205
Legal History’ Journal of Law and Society, Vol.15, No.2 (Summer,1988), pp.
153-165. p.163. 
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tion” . Kant’s constructivist epistemology, which asserted that cognition is 206
possible only because it has no access to the being underlying external 
reality, is doubtlessly an ancestor of Luhmann’s idea of difference between 
system and environment. “Theory, insofar as it is intended to be systems 
theory, begins with a difference, the difference between system and envir-
onment; if the theory is intended to be something else, it must be based on 
a different difference. Therefore, such theory does not begin with a unity, a 
cosmology, a concept of the world or of being, or anything comparable. 
Instead, it begins with a difference. For at least 100 years or so, precurs-
ors of such a procedure have existed.”   207
        Luhmann mentions how the Greek diapherein (term also used by 
Derrida ), difference already existed, although the scope of the term was 208
limited in comparison to more contemporary use of it. For instance it was 
simply “one thing among others [where] theology as well as ontology 
worked with a concept of being. But, around 1900, such unitary concepts 
started to become questionable.”   De Saussure is also mentioned as a 209
conspicuous contributor to the evolution of the concept of difference: “it is 
this difference between words that keeps language going and controls 
what can be said next. Whether these differences exist in reality may well 
 Luhmann, N. 'The cognitive program of constructivism and a reality that re206 -
mains  
unknown’. p. 64-85 in: W. Krohn (Ed.), Selforganization. Portrait of a scientific 
revolution. p. 50.
 Luhmann, N. ‘System as Difference’ Organization, Vol 13, Issue 1, 2006 p.207
37-57. p.38.
 Derrida, J. ‘Différance’ translated by Alan Bass, Margins of Philosophy (Chica208 -
go: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp 3-27 https://web.stanford.edu/class/
history34q/readings/Derrida/Differance.html Last accessed 20 February 2018.
 Luhmann, N. ‘System as Difference’ Organization, Vol 13, Issue 1, 2006 p.37-209
57. p.39.
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remain an open question.”  At this point Luhmann skips to the Nineteenth 210
Century and to sociology, naming Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904)  and his 211
theory of imitation. Tarde’s work is important in Luhmann’s view as “con-
solidation of sociality [is] by means of imitation, that also did not begin with 
unity but with difference. If one imitates somebody else, this somebody 
else must exist in the first place. One cannot continuously imitate oneself 
(…) in any case difference is presupposed.”  The next citation is of 212
Gregory Bateson (1904-1980)  and his “classic formulation that informa213 -
tion is ‘a difference that makes a difference’ (…) Information is information 
only if it is not just an existing difference; it is information only if it instigates 
a change of state in the system. This is the case whenever the perception 
(or any other mode of input one might have in mind) of a difference cre-
ates a difference in the system.”  214
               Kant, nevertheless, was still searching for unity, for one specific 
reality, while modernity, as Luhmann demonstrated, is rather a complex 
multiplicity. When Immanuel Kant wrote his famous essay on ‘What is En-
 Luhmann, N. ‘System as Difference’ Organization, Vol 13, Issue 1, 2006 p.37-210
57. p.39.
 French sociologist and social psychologist, antagonist of Cesare Lombroso 211
and of Durkheim, by whose theories was overtaken in popularity. Tarde was re-
discovered in the 1960s. Tarde, G. ‘Les lois de l’imitation’ (1890) Online publish-
ing http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/tarde_gabriel/lois_imitation/
tarde_lois_imitation.pdf Last accessed 20 February 2018.
Luhmann, N. ‘System as Difference’ Organization, Vol 13, Issue 1, 2006 p.212
37-57. p.40.
 English anthropologist, social scientist and cyberneticist. See Bateson, G. 213
Steps to an Ecology of Mind. San Francisco, CA: Chandler, (1972).
 Luhmann, N. ‘System as Difference’ Organization, Vol 13, Issue 1, 2006 p.37-214
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lightenment?’  and his ‘Critique of Practical Reason’  he was embody215 216 -
ing in his writings the essence of modernity, the reflection on which had 
just started with the end of the era of Enlightenment; ”[t]he guardians who 
have kindly taken upon themselves the work of supervision will soon see 
to it that by far the largest part of mankind”  Kant therefore encourages 217
men to use their reason, rather than to accept to be told what to believe 
and what to obey without discussion. The idea of exclusion would not be 
acceptable for Kant not in virtue of the idea of equality, not in name of 
democracy, but for a reason of ethical nature – the autonomously self-le-
gislating individual will.  
The moral question in Kant is represented by the categorical imper-
ative, which has a threefold formulation. It states firstly: to act only on that 
maxim that one can consistently will to be acted upon universally, that is, 
by all agents in all circumstances. Secondly, it states that we should never 
act in such a way that we treat Humanity as a means only, but always as 
an end in itself. Thirdly, although not formulated in a way of an imperative, 
it states that “the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legis-
lates universal law”,  which could be rephrased as act so that through 218
maxims one could be a legislator of universal laws. In any case, every kind 
of duty can be derived from the categorical imperative; hence this is the 
 Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In ‘Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of 215
Morals And What Is Enlightenment?’ , Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 
(1959). Firstly published in 1784 in November 1784 in the  German periodical, 
Berlinische Monatschrift.
 Kant, I. ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ (1788) Cambridge University Press, 216
1997.
 Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In ‘Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of 217
Morals And What Is Enlightenment?’ , Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 
(1959). Firstly published in 1784 in November 1784 in the  German periodical, 
Berlinische Monatschrift. 
 Kant, I. ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals’, Cambridge, Cambridge 218
University Press, 1998.
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fundamental principle of morality. To act based on the categorical imperat-
ive, the question is whether the maxim for acting, and see whether this 
reason would be a law universally applicable to all other ‘rational agents’. If 
yes, then the question is whether this maxim is conceivable as a principle 
of universal legislation.  Kant’s idea of Social contract is not Hobbesian, 219
inasmuch as Kant does not see, contrarily to Hobbes,  the contract to be 
tout court of advantage to the people.  
For Kant a proper political system allows men to think for them-
selves, and includes “public insight into the nature of such matters had 
progressed and proved itself to the point where, by general consent (if not 
unanimously), a proposal could be submitted to the crown” . Further220 -
more, when it comes to law there is “[t]o test whether any particular meas-
ure can be agreed upon as a law for a people, we need only ask whether a 
people could well impose such a law upon itself. This might well be pos-
sible for a specified short period as a means of introducing a certain order, 
pending, as it were, a better solution. This would also mean that each cit-
izen, particularly the clergyman, would be given a free hand as a scholar 
to comment publicly, i.e. in his writings, on the inadequacies of current in-
stitutions.”   221
 For philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, “L’opération de l’injustice est toujours, en 219
quelque façon, une exclusion.” Nancy, J.L. Bailly, J. C., La comparition, Paris 
(Christian Bourgois), new edition 2007, 103. 
 Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In ‘Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of 220
Morals And What Is Enlightenment?’ , Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 
(1959). Firstly published in 1784 in November 1784 in the  German periodical, 
Berlinische Monatschrift. 
 Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In ‘Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of 221
Morals And What Is Enlightenment?’ , Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 
(1959). Firstly published in 1784 in November 1784 in the  German periodical, 
Berlinische Monatschrift. 
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3.2 - Modern Pre-systemic Theories of Justice. 
In order to introduce the social system theory perspective on 
justice, the concept of justice should be now analysed within modern legal 
theory, in many aspects, as it will be shown, and compared with Luh-
mann’s approach. Modern theories of justice, in fact, maintain an ethical 
dimension, maintain the idea of humanism, of human well-being, as Kant 
pointed out, in order to confer, in Dworkin’s words, ‘equal concern and re-
spect’  to all people. Moreover, the horizons of Kant and Dworkin,   as 222
well as those of Hobbes and Rousseau, are still earlier configurations, 
marked by the still undeveloped social systems of economy and science 
(and several others), which put law and state into a rather omnipotent pos-
ition.  
Kant was a sympathiser of the ideas of the French Revolution, 
which supported the idea that all men are equal in front of the law on the 
basis of men’s natural rights. Of course this does not mean that Luhmann 
does not agree to the notion that all men are equal in front of the law, 
simply the perspective of social system theory is not about equality and 
ethics, but of function, the ethical dimension does not come into the Luh-
mannian picture. For Kant, these rights were represented by human reas-
on as the basis for the legitimacy for equality. Still, Kant argued, on the 
basis of reason, there will be ‘few independent thinkers, even among the 
 Dworkin, R. ‘A matter of Principle’, Cambrigde/London: Harvard University 222
Press 1985. p. 190. See also Dall’Agnol, D. Dworkin’s Liberal Egalitarianism’ Kri-
terion Jan./June 2005, vol.46, n.o111, pp.55-59. 
130
self-appointed guardians of the multitude’ , and then, precisely because 223
‘Cesar non est supra grammaticos’  , the sovereign will attempt to op224 -
press their subjects. Kant sees the paradoxes of human affairs, where 
civic freedom, which allows for intellectual freedom, also creates barriers. 
While less civic freedom, allows for human reason expansion.  
Theories based on the notion of natural rights are opposed to social 
contract theories, but are not mutually incompatible, as sometimes the lat-
ter included natural rights elements in defining the boundaries of legitim-
acy. Social contract theories were trying to establish social arrangements 
based on the consent of the members of society. The Hobbesian idea of a 
collective depository of all available power, the overly powerful Leviathan, 
to which people surrender their freedom in exchange for protection, rep-
resented a tough but necessary form of justice.  Rousseau’s view of the 225
social contract illustrates the state as an expression of sociability rather 
than a despotic imposition, according liberties to their citizens in virtue of 
their natural rights.  In the Second Treatise on Civil Government, Locke 226
asserts that the state exists in order to protect people’s rights and the state 
itself is subject to those rights.  Over two hundred years later Rawls re227 -
surrected these theories of social contract but simply as a rhetorical 
 Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In ‘Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of 223
Morals And What Is Enlightenment?’ , Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 
(1959). Firstly published in 1784 in November 1784 in the  German periodical, 
Berlinische Monatschrift.
 Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In ‘Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of 224
Morals And What Is Enlightenment?’ , Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 
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 See Hobbes, T. ‘Leviathan’, Oxford, Oxford Paperbacks,1998.225
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device.  Rawls idea of justice had to do with fairness, meaning both 228
‘neutrality’, as independent of any bias or partiality, and ‘publicly reason-
able’.   229
Whether Kant’s categorical imperative had exerted an influence on 
Bentham, is open to debate. Bentham rejected both the idea of social con-
tract and of natural rights as he rejected the metaphysical speculations 
around God as the donor of those rights. Bentham developed a sort of test 
for judging social arrangements which had to do with maximising utility, 
therefore, the “greatest happiness for the greater number’.  This kind of 230
approach to justice of course attracts obvious criticism as not only terms 
such as ‘utility’ or ‘happiness’ are imprecise and do not give a measure of 
its application and of the results obtainable, but also it does not guarantee 
fairness in the treatment of people. A utilitarian approach of this kind is ex-
actly what Kant would have rejected. Justice cannot be simply a concep-
tion or another human telos. Justice cannot be contingent it is must be 
‘categorical’.  231
There was the urgent need of codification to counteract the lack of 
uniqueness in the law. Legal Positivists, such as Bentham and later Austin, 
contrary to Natural Law examined the nature of stable rule systems, by 
way of trying to generalise the common features of all centralised rule-
based systems. In doing so they tried to eliminate all assumptions related 
 See Rawls, J. ‘A Theory of Justice’, Oxford,Oxford University Press, 1971. 228
 See Rawls, J. ‘Political Liberalism’, New York, Columbia University Press,229
1993.
 See Bentham, J. ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Moral and Legislation’, J 230
H Burns and H L A Hart Eds, London Methuen, 1982.
 On this see Sandel, M. ‘Liberalism and the Limits of Justice’, Cambridge, 231
Cambridge University Press, 1982.
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to nature or to values which were associated with Natural Law and make 
clear what the basic terms of what was called law were.  
Bentham and Austin  defined law as a phenomenon of societies 232
with a sovereign, which could be represented by a specific person or by a 
group. These have supreme and absolute de facto power, which means 
that they are obeyed by all and do not have to obey anyone. Laws in this 
kind of society derive from the sovereign's commands, which are intended 
as general orders backed by sanctions. This theory identifies the existence 
of law with command and obedience and does not consider either whether 
the sovereign has a moral right to rule, nor whether his orders are merit-
orious, simply the sovereign guarantees the unity of the legal system as it 
represents all laws as having a single form.  
Later on, Kelsen, although retaining the ‘imperatival’ monism of 
Bentham and Austin, rejected its reductionism. Kelsen, in his Kantian 
views, saw the unity of law in the fact that it is a set of rules having the 
kind of unity that can be understood by a system of valid rules, with no 
more factual base than its “ought” sentences. In other words, unity is in the 
fact that all laws are links in one chain of authority up to the Grundnorm.  233
Although in line with  the refusal to assign any intelligible role to the God of 
monotheistic religions, and the subjugation of law to his moral diktat, which 
implies the rejection of a hierarchy, the Positivists were still very much in-
clined in seeing a hierarchical and stratified society and by trying to re-
solve the complexity of it by an in vain quest for unity. 
 See Austin, J. ‘The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the 232
Study of Jurisprudence,’ London Weidenfeld and Nicolson Eds. 1955.
 See Kelsen, H. ‘General Theory of Law and State’, trans. A. Wedberg, repr. 233
1961. New York: Russell and Russell, 1945. And Kelsen, H. ‘Pure Theory of Law’, 
trans. M. Knight. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
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The Positivists’ plea for codification, the need for a once-for-all law, 
forever identical to itself, presents a twofold paradox. Firstly, it opened the 
way to a never ending quarrel about derogation and new legislation and 
secondly, positivism proved that the law is perfectly open to manoeuvring 
law that is codified and draws its validity from its being codified, can be 
codified without end, again, and again, as many times as required.  So, 
instead of finally attaining stability and identity, by imposing positive law, 
contingency has been exacerbated, although no longer as the effect of 
some impossibility, but to the contrary, as the result of increased possibil-
ity.  This discussion on a desperate attempt to unify law is today applied 234
to the now overriding campaign of the international scene, globalisation. Its 
results are in some cases manifestly opposite its initial perspectives and 
promises. 
 3.3 - Humankind, Injustice, and Positivisation of Law. 
   Kant in his his opus posthumous and his Critique of Practical 
Reason  his idea of progress, and more fundamentally  in his notion of 235
universality the issues of inclusion and exclusion are very present indeed. 
In his What is Enlightenment?  clearly his protagonist is the 236
Menschengattung, the humankind, the human genus. From here the way 
to inclusion/exclusion cannot be far, all exclusion is abusive in his view, a 
 On this see Luhmann, N. ‘Rechtssoziologie’, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 234
1980, p. 190 ff.
 Kant, I. ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ (1788) Cambridge University Press, 235
1997;
 Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In ‘Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of 236
Morals And What Is Enlightenment?’ , Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 
(1959). Firstly published in 1784 in November 1784 in the  German periodical, 
Berlinische Monatschrift;
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despotic injustice. Not because of equality, or even democracy, but be-
cause of unjustifiability. 
         Different from Rawls, all the Ehrlich, Durkheim, Luhmann, Teubner, 
etc., are non-kantians. They are all orientated primarily not at the 
Menschengattung, but at society. There are no normative claims which 
have an origin more dignified that history, in their view (for Kant there is 
such a thing as the categorical imperative). But of course certain of them 
are socialists – this is via equality also a strong incentive for non-exclu-
sion. The common point between Ehrlich and Durkheim on the one hand 
and Luhmann and Teubner on the other is the time passed since – a cen-
tury. For instance the whole fragmentation chapter was  unthinkable at 
their time – it becomes thinkable only as an effect of  unification. 
If Kant was concerned with the Menschengattung, humankind, 
nowadays, in times of globalisation, perhaps a view addressed at society 
would be useful. There are diverse easily available contributions to the 
matter of 'globalisation', the great topic of the 1980s, and to the Luhmanni-
an re-conception of society as world society. For Luhmann  there is no 237
other society apart from world society. This self-governing political unit, in 
terms of the state or the municipal legal order are no longer the model of 
society. There is strictly speaking no such thing as English society or 
French society, or Uruguayan society or Paraguayan society (Luhmann's 
examples). What counts is not sovereignty but ‘attainability' - and the fact 
is that excepted certain particularly dangerous areas of diverse Latin 
American (but also Northern American) cities, where no one dares to enter 
today (probably this would include North Korea as well), the world can be 
Luhmann, N. ‘Die Weltgesellschaft’, published in Soziologische Aufklärung, 237
vol.I (1971).
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accessed universally. There is therefore not so much a process like "glob-
alisation" to be observed, rather there is a new way of thinking society that 
has become necessary - thinking society as a global object without limits 
on the globe, quite different as a way of thinking society from all preceding 
ones. Already, Eugen Ehrlich (1862-1922), one of the founders of the dis-
cipline of Legal Sociology probed what a strong orientation at society 
would mean for the study of law , and in this sense, parts of his intuitions 238
are still pertinent today. Fragmentation as a typical aspect of globalisation 
affects socio- legal discourses within society. 
             The basic idea is what could be called the anomaly of positive law. 
The question is: is it not fragmentation, as an irritating response to the 
program of globalisation, explainable in terms of a repetition of the self-
change potential unfettered in law as a response to its positivisation? Is it 
not in that sense a 20th/21st century replay  of a 18/19th century novel 
(“novel” in the sense of the literary form of an anomaly – something un-
thought-of, unexpected  appears at a moment of the story, as in German in 
French and Italian, we distinguish between novels in this sense on the one 
hand, and Romane, romans, romanzo on the other)? 
           Positive law appears historically, a long time ago, in the form of the 
plea for codification. Because of the need of stopping the on-going vari-
ation and lacking uniqueness in the law. Bentham teaches exactly that – 
largely in vain, but on the continent the same politics has had much suc-
cess. These people said, what we need is a once-for-all law, forever 
identical to itself. That’s the first part: the underlying intentions, but not the 
whole story. The second half, it is about the results engendered, are very 
 Erlich, E. ‘Recht und Leben: Gesammelte Schriften zur Rechtstatsachen238 -
forschung und zur Freirechtslehre’, Duncker & Humblot Gmbh, 1967.
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different: an infinite, never-ending arguing about derogation and new legis-
lation. Infinitely more of the same of what? Exactly of that against which 
positivisation had been prescribed as a cure! In the end, Luhmann   and 239
many other observers will have to note that the supposed-to-be contra-
ceptive of change – positivisation as the remedy that should protect law 
against every challenge to its being what it is, positivisation as the hope 
that after the publication of the code no further law will be necessary (at 
best minor more detailed sub-laws) - has resulted in an hitherto unseen 
birth explosion of difference in law, of change! Why? Because by positiv-
isation what has been proved is that the law is perfectly open to manoeuv-
ering! If you can codify once, you can codify again, and again, as often as 
you like! So instead of finally attaining stability and identity, we have at-
tained, by imposing positive law, contingency/manipulability/”possibility” to 
an unheard-of extent.  
                It could be very tempting to think of fragmentation in the same 
terms. In other words,  positivisation, or imposing a unity under the head-
ing of a once-for-all law has resulted in the irritating opening up to indefin-
ite law-changing activism. Globalisation imposes maximum mutual expos-
ure and ends up in fragmentation – more distance between parts of the 
globe than ever before!  Fragmentation is the irritating response to the uni-
formisation of ‘globalisation”, in the same way in which multiplication of 
change had been the irritating response to the uniformisation of positivisa-
tion. Both push difference to unheard-of levels of diversification – just in 
the opposite sense of where they claim to push them. In all spheres, a 
whole vocabulary, such as precisely diversification, or even more comic-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Rechtssoziologie’, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1980, p. 190 239
and ff.
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ally, ‘personification', sanctions the groundless difference that responds to 
the abolishment of grounded differences. An exactly as anomalous (mean-
ing: diametrically opposed to law) or paradoxical result. 
        Social exclusion is usually intended in terms of marginalisation of 
minorities, which feel or are placed by socio-political or legal circum-
stances away from the centre of society. These minorities are also usually 
identified as weaker groups, including women, elderly, children, immig-
rants and disabled. In Durkheimian terms, social integration is promoted 
by the division of labour according to one’s capacity, which leads to people 
depending on each other within a social structure, like for instance the 
family. In this way, according to Durkheim, a strongly integrated family has 
less possibility to fall into a loop of poverty and social exclusion. On the 
other hand, the more a group is weakened, the more each component can 
rely only on himself. Accordingly, a single mother finds herself without a 
strong social structure and starts withdrawing from the group. In other 
words, the breakdown of structures of society is due to self alienation .  240
3.4 - Stratification to Functional Differentiation. 
Durkheim provided some basis for the development of social sys-
tem theory which, it is claimed here, is the more appropriate way of de-
scribing modern society and its complexities. Social systems were firstly 
considered by Talcott Parsons with his theory of the evolutionary univer-
sals in society. He realised that social stratification in society (not neces-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol II, Stanford University press, 2012, p. 240
109.
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sarily in modern society) derived from differentiated social functions, 
somewhat similar to the division of labour of Durkheim. Parsons argued 
that the internal differentiation of society would start by differences arising 
between higher-status-groups (for example in lineage) and groups of lower 
standing, which would recognise the difference and accept to have less 
advantageous living conditions in terms of accommodation or subsistence. 
A second aspect of the insurgence of functional differentiation in society is 
related to political power (which is highly correlated to one of the four fea-
tures of society action system, namely, kinship ). This kind of differenti241 -
ation in society as evidenced by Parsons is still in vertical terms and 
shows therefore a hierarchical model, which is mainly pre-modern, never-
theless it is useful inasmuch as it shows the social ‘need’ for centralisation 
of responsibility towards the same structural outcome even within func-
tional differentiated groups.  
This theoretical structure of a stratified society presents an overar-
ching and unified social system. Society, as a result, has become an entity 
driven towards a balance of parts. The various societal constituents are 
interdependent and adjust to each other in order to satisfy the needs of the 
system. Parsons  understands, following Durkheim, integration as solidari-
ty, and as expressive of social (not necessarily legal) norms. Integration is 
one out of the four functions of social systems as Parsons understands 
them. Society is conceived as a social community that takes upon itself 
that integrative function. Parsons developed what he called the AGIL par-
adigm, which describes how to a system has to adapt to its environment to 
a certain degree in order to survive. This will consist therefore of ‘adapta-
 The other three being religion, language and technology. See Parsons, T. ‘An 241
Outline of The Social System’, (1961), Blackwell Publishing (2007), p, 421 and ff.
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tion’, ‘goal attainment’ ‘integration’ and ’latency pattern maintenance’. 
These are called by Parsons the system's ‘functional imperatives’. In terms 
of a societal system, the AGIL paradigm will manifests itself in four inter-
related subsystems, respectively A: behavioural system, G: personality 
system, I: society as societal organisation and L: cultural system . Within 242
this paradigm, ‘I’ is what is of interest here, society as organised subsys-
tem of action has people in organised positioned roles, which become dif-
ferentiated and associated with roles such as political, juridical, education-
al and occupational. In this way society becomes organised in interrelated 
functionally differentiated subsystems, such as economy, politics, law and 
so on. On this basis integration is the normative background of  the social 
formation of structures  whereas inclusion is, for Parsons, “an evolution243 -
ary mechanism located in the system of societal community”.  There are 244
four such mechanisms: adaptive upgrading, differentiation, inclusion and 
value generalisation, and the integration of normative structures within so-
ciety is entrusted upon the two latter.   245
A further variation of the Durkheim/Parsonsian themes is provided 
by Habermas, with his famous characterisation of the late 20th century 
 Parsons, T. ‘Das System moderner Gesellschaften’, München 1972, p.21and  242
ff.
 See Bora, A. ‘Einleitung 1: ‘Partizipation’ als politische Inklusionsformel’, 15-34 243
(17), in Christoph Gusy, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds.), ‘Inklusion und Partizipation: 
Politische Kommunikation im historischen Wandel’, Frankfurt am Main (Campus) 
2005.
 Parsons, T. ‘Das System moderner Gesellschaften’, München 1972, p.26 and 244
ff. My translation.
 See Bora, A. ‘Einleitung 1: ‘Partizipation’ als politische Inklusionsformel’, 15-34 245
(17), in Christoph Gusy, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds.), ‘Inklusion und Partizipation: 
Politische Kommunikation im historischen Wandel’, Frankfurt am Main (Campus) 
2005. 
140
“systemic” fate of the originally socially integrated lifeworld as colonisation 
of the lifeworld.  246
                All the examined thinkers have focused their interest either on the 
human being or on society considered as formed of human being. This 
automatically leads to a vision of integration or inclusion as the goal of so-
ciety and as a consequence exclusion becomes the manifestation of the 
failures of society. Moreover this conception is anchored to a teleological 
vision of society, where people are strictly connected with teleological be-
haviour within a hierachical society. All these sociologists and philosophers 
have missed out on one important observation about modern society. As 
already mentioned, modern society had rejected hierarchy in the moment 
it had rejected the Kantian summum bonum. The instant men have de-
cided that rules do not come from God but are self imposed, and based on 
one’s reason, a process of deconstruction of hierarchy had started. No 
more fixed position in society, no more stratification,  rather a ‘heter247 -
archy’, the rule of the other, which in a social system theory scenario, clari-
fies most of its difficulties. 
               Luhmann thought of society as a social system, in which all soci-
etal systems are in a heterarchical relationship, different from Parsons - 
who distributes all decision-power evenly between his agencies or system 
- Luhmann is careful to attribute to his functionally differentiated social sys-
tems each a specialised function-determined competence. These function-
 Kemmis, S. ‘System and lifeworld, and the conditions of learning in late 246
modernity‘, (1998), Curriculum Studies, 6:3, 269-305. p. 280. Habermas, J. ‘Theo-
ry of Communicative Action, Volume Two: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, Boston (Mass.), Beacon Press. 1985. 
 On this see Luhmann, N. ‘Globalisation or Global Society: How to Conceive of 247
Modern Society’, International Review of Sociology March 1997, Vol. 7 Issue 1, p. 
67.
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systems are therefore also called, by Luhmann, "autopoietic", self-produc-
ing rather than merely self-reproducing, as they continuously deal with the 
same type of issues and to that extent use the results or the output of their 
own operations as the input of their next operations, but rather autopoietic, 
which means that their output becomes their new input of operations. 
Luhmann’s systems are also structurally coupled with one another, which 
means that one system may ‘irritate’ another system and obtain a reaction 
within the ‘irritated’ system, which leads to a sort of change in the internal 
operations of that system. Luhmann noticed that the Aristotelian theory of 
goals in society does not apply to modern society any longer, because it 
cannot deliver any longer a correct description of contemporary society. 
Teleology is out. There are no goals left, there is only a one-system inter-
nal construction. One technique Luhmann uses to escape the issues of 
teleology, is not to accept that society is ultimately formed by human be-
ings (both Durkheim and Parsons still were sticking to this level of "human-
ism"). Human beings are, not excluded from Luhmann's theory of society, 
but transposed into the sphere, no longer of society, the compassing social 
system, but into that of the social system's environment - the existence of 
humans is thus one among the conditions for society to operate/exist.  
         For now, Luhmann points out, the existence of humans is one 
among the factors necessary in order to making society happen. This is in 
the sense of observations, which make a difference only when they are 
communicated, which use humans as conditions, in the same way in 
which they use also to communicate. The point being that it is not humans 
who make the choices, the choices are those of social systems. Although 
Luhmann excluded human beings from his theory of society, in his very 
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last years he did not seem to deny their existence any longer. It was a visit 
in the Brazilian Favelas and the observation of the conditions in which 
people lived there, which inspired him to write his theory of all inclusion.  248
They are confined in the environment, so the ‘included’ are not objects of 
the social system, but the problem is that they are there together with the 
‘excluded’ ones, the ‘others’, which should not even exist. The ‘others’, in 
Greek antiquity, were represented by the barbarians as distinct and op-
posed to the Hellenes.  
        This distinction is once again representative of the old conception of 
hierarchical world architecture, which was about oppositions, with a higher 
value assigned on one side which justifies a superior position in society. It 
was not a matter of antagonism but simply of defining a social order and 
defining what one was and could not be. It was accepted and not fought 
against. Pre-modern society started to show an increased complexity and 
tried to change these asymmetrical oppositions and has taken into account 
ethnicities and social status and did not exclude on this basis, but had the 
tendency include everyone by organising a hierarchy with all ranks, not 
only binary relations, such as oppositions. The inclusion would happen at 
family level and at this level also exclusion was decided if certain rules 
were not respected (child outside wedlock a prime example).  
Modern society presents a altogether more complex structure with 
no stratification , no hierarchy but, in Luhmann’s view with function sys249 -
 See Luhmann, N. ‘Jenseits und Barbarei’, in ‘Gesellschaftsstruktur und Se248 -
mantik. Studien zur Wissensociologie der modernen Gesellschaft’, vol 4, Frank-
furt am Main, Surkamp, 1999, p.138-50. 
 Unless this is seen as a mere byproduct of function systems. See Luhmann, 249
N. ‘Jenseits und Barbarei’, in ‘Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik. Studien zur 
Wissensociologie der modernen Gesellschaft’, vol 4, Frankfurt am Main, 
Surkamp, 1999, (p.138-50).
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tems.  A classification of modern society by asymmetrical oppositions is 
now in many respects meaningless. Contemporary world society cannot 
speak of ‘us and all the others’. There is no outside. Similarly, the family 250
loses its power of defining who is in and who is out (and here the 
Durkheimian idea discussed previously shows its fallacies), because it is 
expected to accept and support individual decisions rather than imposing 
them. A functionally differentiated society will tend to turn old exclusions 
into inclusion (joblessness, homelessness) or juvenile delinquency are 
dealt with by enacting policies and programs for reintegration in society). 
The tendency to include all, as in "human rights for all", "no one should go 
hungry", or "global market" is to have the barbarians, the ‘other’ disappear. 
The way function systems are organised supposes the inclusion of every-
one. Systems have not left any legitimate ‘good reasons’ to exclude any-
one. However, although logically all are included, there are different 
grades of inclusion based on the criteria of society’s own systemic repro-
duction. Modern society assumes that all human individuals participate in 
communication. Obviously in this scenario the asymmetric opposition does 
not fit. One could not define non-economic, non-scientific or non-legal 
communication as barbarian. The apparent necessity of a multicultural 
ideology is only produced by the failure to define society as social system, 
and by continuing to accept the notion that society is "constituted" by hu-
man beings. Barbarians and non-barbarians exist only among human be-
 See Luhmann, N. ‘Jenseits und Barbarei’, in ‘Gesellschaftsstruktur und Se250 -
mantik. Studien zur Wissensociologie der modernen Gesellschaft’, vol 4, Frank-
furt am Main, Surkamp, 1999, pp.141-2.
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ings. Systems are focused on their own operations and events only for 
their own function.   251
If the concept of a system is logically incompatible with the fact of 
social exclusion, Luhmann asks, how can it be possible to keep the con-
cept, if there are different grades of inclusion, because logically there can-
not be inclusion without exclusion? The answer is that, factually, social ex-
clusion exists on a massive scale and it is of no use blaming capitalism or 
indeed any other scapegoat. Luhmann devotes many pages to what he 
identifies as inappropriate ways of reacting to the presence of such exclu-
sions; he sees in the  “appeal-filing” or blaming attitude, a residue of the 
old and vital European inclination to be able to rely on a cosmological the-
ory of all-inclusion, a theory which is in fact inseparable from the condi-
tions prevailing during the pre-modern conception of a stratified society. In 
strict opposition to the segmentary differentiation of those earlier societies 
that were repeating one identical pattern, but also to the vertical, stratifica-
tional pattern typical of societies of pre-modern Europe, Luhmann assigns 
to modern society a function-led differentiation. Especially as to the opera-
tions of the function systems in a zone, such as Europe for instance, in or-
der to observe whether they operate coherently, we have to abstain from 
using normative theoretical models that will rule out or ‘invisibilise’, or sim-
ply divert his or her attention from considering the fact  that people who 
are factually excluded, be it partially, for instance from the education sys-
tem, later on, when the dynamics of repercussions described by Luh-
 See Luhmann, N. ‘Jenseits und Barbarei’, in ‘Gesellschaftsstruktur und Se251 -
mantik. Studien zur Wissensociologie der modernen Gesellschaft’, vol 4, Frank-
furt am Main, Surkamp, 1999, pp.142-3.
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mann’s late article  unfolds all its effects, and when exclusions lead to 252
ever more exclusions, totally. Modern society is greatly integrated indeed 
but, contrary to the optimistic interpretations of “integration”, according to 
the dimension of integration, integration tends to displace itself from posi-
tive integration toward negative integration. In a sense , therefore, what is 
integrated, is not society, but the growing areas of exclusion in the midst of 
which it is thriving. 
This idea of all-inclusion, the idea of a world without an ‘other’ and 
without an ‘outside’, was already present in Kant with his idea of the reduc-
tion of the external world to the unknowable thing in itself. Although Kant 
represents the attempt of realisation of the entelechia of European hu-
mankind , a society without exclusion is not quite here yet. One reason 253
that Luhmann identifies is to do with the old European semantics of culture 
and its reflexivity which had a bearing on the future of modern Europe in 
terms of grades of inclusion. The neo-humanist idea that culture and free-
dom are connected is no longer related to the self realisation of each indi-
vidual; what we are facing today, is rather an en-masse phenomenon of 
acceptance of pre-confectioned decisions and ideas. This is however not 
typical of contemporary society, it goes back to much more remote stages 
of European civilisation and the long history of conceptions such as com-
munitas or ius gentium, which modern society is still recycling and trying to 
apply them to the current situation calling them with the more modern 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Jenseits und Barbarei’, in ‘Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik. 252
Studien zur Wissensociologie der modernen Gesellschaft’, vol 4, Frankfurt am 
Main, Surkamp, 1999, pp.142-3.
 Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In ‘Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of 253
Morals And What Is Enlightenment?’ , Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 
(1959). Firstly published in 1784 in November 1784 in the  German periodical, 
Berlinische Monatschrift.
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sounding names of ‘community’ or ‘human rights’. But if this is the case, 
then there is no escape and inclusion/exclusion will represent the par-
adigm of the future, and already of the present.   The quest for justice 254
indeed remains open, but justice does not come for free, even though 
Luhmann’s work on justice can be considered a real ‘gift’ he gave the legal 
system.   255
3.5 - Justice as Gift. 
The interest in gifts, potlatch, etc., is absent from systems theory. 
As everyone knows, social anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) had 
studied the gift from the viewpoint of its oscillating nature between interest 
and gratuitousness.  As equally known, Mauss has been the last of a 256
long list of targets for the philosopher Jacques Derrida as a critique of the 
Human Sciences. In his discussions of the gift   Derrida, opposite to 257
Mauss, identifies the gift in its pure gratuitousness, emancipated of all in-
terest, calculus, economy, exchange – in the example of Abraham’s gift 
when he sacrifices his son Isaac.  
 Not only gift is not a systems theory term, but it is in a sense quite at 
the opposite of it. Systems are dealing with their environments and a gift to 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Jenseits und Barbarei’, in ‘Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik. 254
Studien zur Wissensociologie der modernen Gesellschaft’, vol 4, Frankfurt am 
Main, Surkamp, 1999, p.144 and ff..
 See Luhmann, N. ‘Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft’, Suhrkamp, 5th Ed. 1997, 255
p. 470 and ff. See also Luhmann, N. ‘Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft’, 
Suhrkamp, 4th Ed. 1990, p.393 and ff.
 Mauss, M. ‘Essai sur le don’ (1923-1924), http://anthropomada.com/bibliotheque/256
Marcel-MAUSS-Essai-sur-le-don.pdf (Last accessed 3rd May 2018)
 Derrida, J.’Given Time: Counterfeit Money’ (1991), University of Chicago 257
Press; New edition edition,1994;
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or from one’s environment would be quite meaningless. There is of course 
a long-standing exposure of Western society, throughout pre-modern 
times, to the logic of the gift. Religiously bound natural lawyers have con-
strued Justice as a gift of God. For modernity, on the contrary, the gift is no 
longer an object that can be institutionally relied on. For the more radical 
legal positivists it is precisely its character of a gift that makes Justice as 
such incompatible with the requirements of a modern legal order. Kelsen 
expels Justice altogether out of the law. For Luhmann, on the contrary, 
Justice has its place in law. But how and in which quality? Luhmann’s an-
swer to this question is summarised in the rather enigmatic, if not also 
complicated and original expression ‘contingency formula of the legal sys-
tem’. 
 To remind us of the basics, Natural law theories construct the law in 
dependence to justice. Law and justice, indeed law and politics, were not 
separate. Yet this doctrine had encountered an antagonist: positivism. 
Modern law was defined as ‘positive law’ as opposed to natural law.  At the 
price of making law subject to decisions (with all the odium of arbitrari-
ness), positivism at least could guarantee one thing of great importance for 
modern legal systems: law could be changed, and change was part of its 
routines. Positivist legal theory, while its understanding of law was often 
wedded to unity and hierarchy, nonetheless encountered the notion of ‘dis-
tinction’. This notion plays the leading role in systems legal theory. Luh-
mann’s thought of modern law as autopoietic social system is something 
like a third boxer entering a match going on since a long time. In such 
cases, everyone tries to say that number three is really either like number 
one or like number two. Luhmann took revenge on this view by suggesting 
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the theory that Justice is the ‘contingency formula of the legal system’ .  258
           That was a double blow - against the natural lawyers for whom 
Justice is the sovereign value of law (law ‘s ‘consistency formula’), and 
against the positivists, for whom Justice is outside the law. In that sense, if 
the contingency formula Justice can be interpreted as Luhmann’s gift to 
the legal system, more fundamentally still it is his gift to legal theory, yet 
here not in the sense the English word ‘gift’, but rather in the sense of the 
German word Gift, which means ‘poison’. A certain theoretical model of 
law, both immobile and aporetical, frozen in its helplessness, which gives 
legal theory the aspect of a cold war between naturalist and positivist pos-
tulates, is - this is my thesis - discontinued at the very point at which Luh-
mann comes up with the notion of contingency formula.      
           What does Luhmann mean with this definition of Justice? First, he 
means: ‘contingency’. Electricity involves a touching of two poles. Contin-
gency, which actually means the touching of two poles or whatever ob-
jects, appears as a general theory, or at least the generic category, of that 
which electricity is the most spectacular illustration of. ‘Contingent’ has 
also acquired diverse meanings otherwise related to ‘casual’, from the latin 
cadere, to fall, and casus, the case, from which a large group of further 
terms including both ‘casually’ and ‘casualty’. In English, also, we find the 
use of contingency is as in ‘contingent on something’, as prices that are 
contingent on offer. None of this applies to Luhmann, as he uses the term 
‘contingency’ in the German way, which is in a sense closer to philology. 
The German ‘Kontingenz remains faithful to its philosophical meaning, 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub258 -
lished in Pbk. 2008, p.211 and ff.
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which is the double meaning of ‘absence of impossibility’ and ‘absence of 
necessity’. Usually the reference is either to one or to the other.  
         For Foucault, the absence of impossibility is what occupies the 
centre of attention: ‘history is contingent’ means in a Foucaultian perspect-
ive that the archive shows all that has been possible, all the historic fea-
tures that have been possible rather than impossible. Jacques Lacan’s 
idea of contingency, where it relates to the subject in connection to struc-
tural change and to its overdetermination by structure and impossibility, is 
another example . But generally, in most of the pre-systemic uses (that 259
is, philosophical, cultural, media-vernacular) of the terms ‘contingent’, ‘con-
tingency’, it is not the possibilistic but the ‘necessitistic modalisation’, not 
the negation of impossibility but the negation of necessity that determines 
the term – not so much the fact that something is shown to be not im-
possible, but the fact that something, being under no necessity, escapes 
any rule. It is important to keep these things in mind in dealing with Luh-
mann on contingency. The danger is that Luhmann’s pairing of ‘contin-
gency’ with ‘formula’ could suggest that he is talking of a mechanism for 
exceptional, perhaps particularly ‘hard cases’, as opposed to average or 
normal cases, which he is not, differently from other legal theorists. For 
him what counts is every case, any case. Yet the hardest aspect in the 
case of the contingency formula is not the intrinsic problem of contingency, 
but the relationship, more exactly the tension between ‘contingency’ and 
‘formula’. They seem almost to contradict one another, which is fitting here 
 Lacan, J. ‘The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI: The Four Fundamental 259
Concepts of Psychoanalysis’, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan, 
(New York: Penguin, 1994), 207. See also Eyers, T. ‘The ‘Signifier-In-Relation’, 
‘The Signifier-In-Isolation, and the concept of the ‘Real’ in Lacan’, Parrhesia, No 
14, 2012 56-70. 
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since the concept of the contingency formula makes sense only if one re-
cognises that there is contingency and there is no remedy against this. 
The first step to take consists in saying, in spite of all I have repor-
ted so far about the term’s conceptual structure, that contingency does not 
need to be perceived in negative terms. Foucault explains contingency as 
emergence utilising Nietzsche’s use of Entstehung , interpreting society 260
as a series of collisions instead of a series of causes. True, the reference 
to contingency decomposes universals (as already for Occam), but on the 
other hand, as we have already seen, whatever emerges in history, 
emerges contingently. Contingency is the very stuff history is made of. Al-
though Foucault was not concerned with society, his view of contingency is 
by no means far from Luhmann’s, even if Luhmann sees in contingency, 
i.e. the absence of necessity and impossibility, not only a necessary in-
gredient of modern society, but also a determinant and productive func-
tional pre-requisite of each of the functional systems, and generally an in-
escapable aspect of the complexity of modernity, for instance when heter-
archy is affirmed against hierarchy. 
Moreover, if for Foucault there is no theory of power, as there is no 
equilibrium, no inherent logic, or stability at work in it,  functionally differ261 -
entiated modern society includes this same postulate among its require-
ments, replacing transcending goals with the internal construction of 
autopoietic systems. The autopoietic theory of law describes the relation-
ship of justice and power by rejecting the classical approach that sees 
 Foucault, M. ‘Nietzsche, la Genealogie, l’Histoire’, in Hommage a Jean Hyp260 -
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justice as a form of exchange between equally powerful parties, and offers 
itself as solution to the problems modernity finds itself confronted with - 
problems of erosion of power or control, of the growing absence of a social 
agency for necessity, ‘notwendigkeit’, of a power that would combine ‘irres-
istible force’ or ‘overruling power’ with legitimacy. It underwrites the sacri-
fice of ideal, society-wide ends, but it offers itself as a means for dealing 
with complexity, choice, risk and disappointment management - multiplicit-
ies of trajectories and goals replacing the one, society-unique necessity. 
The contingency formula is not a representative sample of Luh-
mann’s theory of autopoietic systems. It is not even a representative ex-
pression of the autopoietic theory of the legal system. It is essentially a 
Folgeproblem, a problem that follows once the autopoietic theory of the 
legal system is effectively enacted. If justice is the contingency formula of 
the legal system, it is by no means the only contingency formula Luhmann 
finds at work in modern society.  Each of the functional systems  - eco-
nomy, politics, religion, media, education, science, etc. - includes such a 
“program of programs” . Justice is the contingency formula of the legal 262
system, but ‘legitimacy’ is the contingency formula of the political system, 
‘limitationality’ (the idea that certain truth-claims are excluded if certain 
other truth-claims are accepted) is the contingency formula of the science 
system, scarcity is the contingency formula of the economic system, learn-
ing ability is the contingency formula of the education system, the idea of a 
God is the contingency formula of the religion system.  What do these 
‘formulas’ do? They replace in the system other central terms such as 
‘value’ or ‘principle’, which are too solid and inflexible. These central terms 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub262 -
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were appropriate as long as these agencies were not systems but hier-
archies, or orders. Something changes when hierarchies are replaced with 
systems – when for instance the legal “order” stops to be an order and be-
comes simply an agency, which we call a system. Systems cannot any 
longer rely on the values and principles on which everyone agrees casu-
ally, as within a family. The society-compassing maxims are no longer up 
to the task - common values and principles today are those the tabloid 
press relies on. The contingency formula takes into account the fact that 
these are not good enough to be ultimately in charge with governance of 
functional systems.  
The problem is that while the guiding values or principles of a family 
can be simply stated, written on a list, repeated, learned by heart, etc., 
contingency formulas cannot! They can only be seen, named, identified by 
an external observer. Either you use the   contingency formula – then you 
cannot see what it is that you use – this is the case of the system itself. Or 
you see it, you observe it, as a second order observer, for instance as a 
legal theorist. But then you have no power of acting. The system, like any 
observer, cannot see what it cannot see,  Luhmann writes – which of 263
course means that it cannot see what it can see either, as the difference 
between what she or he can see and what she or he cannot see escapes 
the observer. But what cannot be seen by the observer, can be seen by 
the observer’s observer. The second order or external observer provides, 
Luhmann writes, the functional system as first order observer with an op-
erational object and with learning possibilities for the object. Only a second 
order observer can see someone (for instance the legal system) ‘learn’. 
 Luhmann, ‘Ecological Communication’, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989, p.24.263
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The second observer thus introduces a contingent dimension of what is 
just or unjust. This does not mean that there are no criteria; it means only 
that instead of absolute values, we get only relational ‘perspectives’.      264
              Let us admit: there is no doubt that it would be easier with the 
natural law notion of Justice as the source of the unity of the legal order, 
and alternatively that it would as well be easier with the positivist sugges-
tion of expelling the reference to Justice from the legal order. Yet, against 
the first suggestion, stare decisis severely limits, if not annihilates, the im-
pact of the reference to Justice for contemporary legal orders;  and 265
against the second suggestion it is easy to show that something in the 
legal order functions always like the reference to Justice. This is a matter 
of empirical diagnose; in that sense the notion of justice in law is empirical. 
            The quest for the unity of the legal order is generally known to be 
the most characteristic feature of positivism. Naturally, though, unity is not 
an Austinian invention. Perhaps the idea of unity is even older than God, 
thinking that the idea of a chain of being is even a prehistorical idea, but 
with the advent of atheism of philosophical Illuminism and the embracing 
of heterarchy over hierarchy in modernity, unity became a renewed belief, 
and, in the case of legal system, it became a self belief. Luhmann instead, 
sees the legal system not as unity but as difference. He sees the claim to 
unity as a self-idealisation of the legal order – as the legal order’s ques-
tionable claim to succeed in establishing unity everywhere it encounters 
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difference. Kelsen’s negation of justice,  Rawls’s reconstruction of 266
Justice,  Dworkin’s notion of distributive justice as the “envy test” , all 267 268
fail - according to Luhmann - to offer a way to unity. The law strives for 
unity, that’s its internal ‘dogma’, after all courts decide in the name of the 
law,  that is to say in the name of a unity, not of a difference. Yet the legal 
system deals with differences, and solves them by means of ever-new dif-
ferences. Every legal decision differentiates what is just of what is unjust. 
Positivists, seeing that they could not find a satisfactory solution for the re-
lationship between law and justice, resigned themselves to the idea that 
justice should belong to the realm of ethics. Luhmann finds unacceptable 
that issues of justice should be discussed on a different level from legal 
ones, while arguing, at the same time, together with the positivists, that it 
is not possible to find a place for ethics in the legal system.  As morals 269
dominate the historical dogmatic view on freedom and equality in the 
realms of law as well as of politics, Luhmann sees a paradox which must 
be unfolded if ethics needs to be kept separate from issues of justice. This 
paradox inhabits the notion of freedom itself. Luhmann’s argument is the 
following: freedom needs possibility and chance, which in turn negate ne-
cessity; yet, at the same time, freedom is necessity! Equality, on the other 
hand, fails to provide a criterion to decide what is equal and what is un-
equal. The solution proposed by Luhmann is to operate a distinction 
between freedom as exclusion of external limitation and equality as the 
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exclusion of inequality. A distinction of the sort shows another face of free-
dom and equality and becomes a matter for legal regulation and for the 
courts, as opposed to a matter for the individual and ethics.  270
                 Validity is given by the local references within the legal system, 
which are part of the system’s relationship with itself without affecting the 
content of the system. Justice itself is not strictly related to the issue of 
validity, which nevertheless is relevant for the system, but perhaps it is re-
lated to the self-observation and self-description of the system. In what 
Luhmann calls 'the old-Europe tradition', the idea of justice is associated 
with the idea of 'norm', which in turn is associated to an idea of a legally 
ordered life of the whole of society, one of the forms which the dogma of 
one compassing system can take. Justice as a contingency formula is it-
self also one of these recursive operations. It, too, is defined as a “criterion 
for selection” , only, it cannot be added alongside other such criteria, 271
usually described as the codes of the system, because of the specificity of 
its recursive aspect, and because it is not a code. Rather, what the contin-
gency formula does is exposing code-based decision-making to external 
observation. What happens in the legal system is made explainable to an 
observer – and this without self-idealisation, without taking a common oath 
on common values, on common principles. The contingency formula 
Justice provides the system with a standard that is no longer an idealisa-
tion. It is, rather, a mere default rule – thus allowing a higher visibility of 
injustice. Justice does not transform indeterminable complexity into de-
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terminable complexity, and does not give a rule for orientation of the sys-
tem or a criterion for decision-making. Instead, the importance of the con-
tingency formula, although it cannot satisfy any desire for certainty or 
promise to do so, lies in the fact that it organises meaning specifically for 
each social system. Justice as the contingency formula of the legal system 
has the duty of providing normative expectations in the face of results, 
even and especially where they contradict or disappoint such expecta-
tions. “Justice is a contingency formula” means: 1- that Justice is not a 
consistency formula – say: not a program that is correct with respect to 
some timeless guarantee, and, 2- that Justice is not a matter of contin-
gency alone, but of “formula”, that is to say, a matter of form (although this 
form is distinguished by its adaptive and learning capacity, its plasticity, it 
is empty neither of information nor of risk).  
 That the whole project of a contingency formula Justice looks ‘frus-
trating’ to some and, honestly speaking, probably to every lawyer at first 
looks, is rooted in the faith in a certain image of Justice, in the expectation 
that Justice in the form of consistency of judgment must exist and must 
and indeed can be guaranteed. This is a faith, which we all (or some, or 
most of us) have, or wish to have, or claim the right to have, or wish to be 
seen as having (or any combination thereof). The question of a differently, 
more modestly conceived – disappointment-sensitive Justice, that under-
lies Luhmann’s contingency formula Justice, becomes plausible (as op-
posed to: excessively disappointing in its own turn), only once the faith in 
consistent Justice is obliterated by doubts and acknowledged as a thor-
oughly secular, decidedly  post-theological versions of divine justice. Luh-
mann tries a step out of the bipolar structure of overstatement and under-
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statement of Justice, out of the bipolarity between unrealisable high hopes 
or claims and their everyday factual implosion. In a complex, contingent, 
yet structured world, the need and constraint to select is inescapable,  272
even if the expectations that allow to do so belong, as expectations of ex-
pectations, to situations of double contingency. If contingency, for Luh-
mann, is the necessity of taking risks and be disappointed, functionally dif-
ferentiated systems at least offer possibilities to react to disappointment. 
These can be changed and integrated with the objective reality, or main-
tained and carried on in protest.  In the case of the legal system, which 273
deals with norms, (and remembering that one of Luhmann’s definitions of 
Justice is as a “disappointment ridden norm”), which are supposed to have 
a unconditional validity, whether its expectations are fulfilled or unfulfilled, 
sees a tension between ‘ought’ and  ‘is’ and between ‘truth’ and ‘law’. But, 
Luhmann continues, this differentiation is not a priori; instead it comes with 
evolution. The recursive operations of the legal system - of any autopoietic 
system - are based on repetition. This repetition, in Deleuzian terms, is not 
something necessary, something which cannot be replaced. Consequently, 
this is also the case of evolution. 
Generally, and beyond the scope of the earlier legal-positivist 
stance against moralisation, the autopoietic critique of morals is that they 
narrow the scope of appropriate ways of cognition and, thus, of action. So, 
if we can forget the moral element of justice and look at it only from a sys-
tem theory point of view, we may see, with an eye on some of the devel-
opments of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, especially his reading of 
 Luhmann, N. ‘A Sociological Theory of Law’, London, Routledge & kegan Paul, 272
1985. p.25.
 Luhmann, N. ‘A sociological Theory of Law’, 1985, London Routledge, p.25.273
158
Kierkegaard,  that the two unreflected ways of reacting to disappointment 
that Luhmann describes, coincide in their insufficiency. We can go on con-
testing, protesting infinitely as does the biblical Job, or we can resign 
ourselves infinitely as does Abraham. In the first case, we shall find 
ourselves in the position of the natural law theorist who will ever re-assert 
the moral aspect of justice; in the second case we will be in the position of 
a positivist who gives himself away, forgets about anything apart from 
God’s direct calling - and in the end needs to be stopped manu militari by 
God’s angel from murdering his own son. The popularity of these two fig-
ures from the Old Testament shows already how overwhelming is the ap-
peal for both overstatement and understatement. The two biblical heroes 
illustrate yet again what is so clear from the general aversive reaction to 
the autopoietic account of the legal system. The consistency aspect of 
Justice holds on to us by all its forces, still today. Media and subjects will 
be able to speak out against a particular miscarriage of justice, at a given 
occasion; yet, they will do so in the name of the promise of a consistent 
Justice controlled by some perfection-guaranteeing master, which is a 
highly unreal name and a hopelessly overstated promise. The problem the 
legal order has in determining how it can refer to Justice at all (in the ab-
sence of any consistent reply to that question!) enjoys no sympathy. 
A cybernetic approach instead would underline that the increase of 
possibility and choices is the key to development. Heinz von Foerster’s 
suggestion that it is necessary to decide in such a way that the number of 
decisions thus demanding to be made,  quite counter-intuitive in itself, 274
 Foerster, H. von, ‘Ethics and Second Order Cybernetics’, 1991. In Foerster, H. 274
von, ‘Understanding Understandings: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition’, 
2002, Springer-Verlag, New York.
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could be interpreted simply in terms of choices, and therefore in the case 
of Justice it is rather the point of (a) making for a Judge the right choice, 
but  (b) also to have a wide variety of choices. But is the fact of having this 
obligation of the right choice in the domain of ethics? This is comparable to 
the concept of “good self-organisation” that we have already rejected. So if 
there is, as Luhmann says, no place for ethics in law and if a system can-
not have a good or bad self-organisation, then the point of making the right 
choice is not a problem of the legal system. The legal system can only ob-
serve its own operations and the contingency formula can aid in this by 
giving parameters within which the choices can, not should, be made. At 
the same time von Foerster’s suggestion could be interpreted but also in 
terms of showing the system’s internal complexity and therefore its possib-
ility. After all, as Teubner has in fact stated, there is a need for “adequate 
complexity”  within the legal system, it is an unavoidable complexity de275 -
riving from the need of treating different cases differently, and which goes 
beyond Luhmann’s own definition of Justice as “adequate complexity of 
consistent decision making”.  276
As discussed, social system theory distinguishes itself from the tra-
ditional theories of the manifold accounts of the legal order. Majority legal 
theories put the legal order under a finality of justice, while several minority 
groups of legal theorists suppose that there is no goal, only a internal sys-
tem construction, an expression of other forces (like in Marx and economic 
theory of law) that takes on a mere legal appearance (where people speak 
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of law there is in fact only economy, by self-delusion). This is different from 
one autopoietic theory, which shuns such an easy cure by mere displace-
ment. But looking closely, Marxism also does not offer a position of which 
the finality is of any help. The imperative of changing the world would be to 
“subvert the endemic injustice of the legal order by means of modifying the 
legal-order-external conditions of the legal order”. Moreover, natural law 
theory describes justice as deductive, to be inferred from the nature either 
of man or of humanity of creation. While, on the other side, in Positivism, 
justice takes the role of a point of view, which constitutes the rationality of 
the professional discourse or the legal reasoning of the legal system. What 
is opposed by Luhmann’s system theory is the notion that there is no 
space for justice in any other place than in the legal system. Not outside, 
but only inside the system; inside, but not in a trascendentally ensured 
way. A place, the legal system, itself understood as a “goal”, not as its 
function, where everything else follows; is nothing more or else than a 
factor for the continuity of the exercise of the legal order. This position is 
like a function for Luhmann. What remains to be done for legal theory is to 
avoid that the proceduralised question stops, or that the legal order loses 
its ability to cope, which is predicated on an appropriately reduced and ab-
stracted notion of Gerechtigkeit.  
If the legal order no longer has space for goals, Justice obviously 
can no longer be considered its goal. Perhaps justice can be interpreted 
as something like the "intention" of the legal order, assuming counter-fac-
tually that the legal order is a person or behaves like one. If Justice is an 
intention, this means that it can succeed but it can also fail. It can be com-
pared against the dichotomy between virtue and vice. One must strive to 
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achieve virtue in ones choices, but often one fails and falls into vice. One 
will try again and very likely at some point will fail again. In the secular 
world the same situation occurs in everyday life, see for instance the “last 
cigarette” of Italian novelist's Italo Svevo’s Zeno Cosini, the protagonist of 
La coscienza di Zeno , as an example. In these cases there is an at277 -
tempt of reaching some form of perfection, which inevitably at some point 
will not be attained. But it is precisely this failing that shows righteousness. 
It would seem that all things are subject to a sort of cycle, a high and a 
low, our body’s rhythm (inhale, exhale, systole, diastole) or as we have in 
music (tension and relaxation). Perhaps vaguely similarly, there is a sort 
justice/ injustice cycle, but without any regularity, in which precisely instead 
of expecting or pretending to attain perfection, virtue, or exclusivity, we 
should see in the cycle itself, which sometimes displays failure, the right-
eousness of Justice.  
Luhmann starts alone, really alone, a new direction.  Luhmann in 278
his idea of contingency formula starts himself to take some distance from 
his own doctrine, in the sense of start looking for the successor of the con-
sistency formula. This consistency formula can be called in one word 
“power” in the Aristotelic sense of Dynamis. Once society recognises itself 
in its own autopoietic image, how can it continue without a small portion of 
aspirations that tend to the arché, which can be located in creation or, at 
least, Divine Providence? In the name of what to speak or to decide? 
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When there is no longer any way to decide or to speak in name of consist-
ency? That there is a formula for contingency looks like an oxymoron. 
So, if the legal system does not have justice as a goal, the objection 
could be that justice should then be a system in its own right. After all there 
are different accounts or aspects of justice, such as legal justice, moral 
justice and political justice. First of all, though, none of these make sense 
within the Luhmannian account. In analysing the legal system, Luhmann 
refers to juridical justice alone. This is what he refers to as Gerechtigkeit in 
the sense of the Kontingenzformel Gerechtigkeit. Importantly, for the non-
German reader, Luhmann, speaking of the Kontingenzformel 
Gerechtigkeit, speaks unambiguously and only of Justice in the sense of 
the aspiration that inhabits the legal order, (the realm indicated by the al-
legory iustitia - the lady with scales and blindfold); he does not speak of 
Justice in an institutional sense, that is to say, he does not speak, when he 
uses the notion of a contingency formula Justice, of Justice in the sense in 
which the word refers to an agency, to an institutional system, ultimately to 
a synonym for “legal system”.  
As the notion is thus not about Justiz, not about an agency, not 
about a system, all it does is offer a device to conceive of the conditions 
under which Judges can be enabled to do their work competently in the 
admitted absence of consistency.  The fact that we are not dealing with 279
Justice in the sense of the well-known institution is clear from the observa-
tion that the German language has a separate word for it, not 
Gerechtigkeit but Justiz (for instance there is a Justizministerium; but 
“Gerechtigkeitsministerium” would not even be a joke). Of course, in other 
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contexts, Luhmann talks about Justice in the sense of Justiz as well but 
not as a contingency formula. The fact is that the notion of a contingency 
formula Justice is – rather atypically, for Luhmann, let us face it – de-
veloped in order to take care of an ultimately aspirational rather than insti-
tutional topic (perhaps however what he suggests under the heading of 
Kontingenzformel Gerechtigkeit can be best described as the institutional-
isation of  an aspiration. 
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4 - Justice and the Legal System: The Situation Be-
fore and After “Kontingenzformel”. 
 4.1 - What is the Function of Law? 
 Luhmanns' work on society and its function systems continuously 
refers to  science, as he is dipping his own models into a referential back-
ground constituted, among others, by cybernetics and mathematical mod-
els, some of the terminology he adopts in relation to social system theory 
are of an unmistakably scientific (and, more often than not, hard-sciences 
related) flavour. ‘Function’, ‘code’, ‘coding, and ‘programming’ belong typ-
ically to this group of his vocabulary. These terms, referred to each of the 
social systems, are used for a precise reason; they “exclude asking, in 
particular, psychological and anthropological questions” . The reason 280
why it appears as advisable if not desirable to by-pass this type of ques-
tions, Luhmann explains, is not that such questions are intrinsically wrong. 
Rather, he says, in an apparently Popperian turn, that “general statements 
about humankind, consciousness and person are difficult to test”.  Luh281 -
mann presents this in contrast to his argument that, if one considers soci-
ety as a whole, one can take it to exist “through ongoing communication 
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(…) which can be observed empirically” . Luhmann does not intend here 282
to say that each single statement should be, or stands in need of being, 
verified. What is more important is that all statements can be generalised, 
even abstracted, and applied throughout all social systems; however, what 
is most decisive for Luhmann at this level, is that the self-constitution of 
social reality is not a matter of so many existing human beings that co-ex-
ist, but of the far greater number of simultaneously on-going communica-
tion processes, as these processes, not those beings, are able to provide 
information that is both relevant and subject to further decisions. 
 On this basis, if we refer to the legal system, we can ask the ques-
tion: what is the function of law? ‘Functions’ in a social systems are basic-
ally “reference problems”  which are described in more “abstracted terms 283
than [a social system, here] the law itself does” . This allows to unfold 284
the self-referential cycle, escaping its least informative (identitary) state, 
and to orchestrate the legal problem by allowing it to expand “into distinct-
ive identities”.  At the same time, the fact of enriching the social dimen285 -
sion by a time dimension thereby giving rise to expectations. In a social-
systemic perspective, expectations are not features of a consciousness, 
i.e. a person; rather, they are “the temporal aspect of the meaning of 
communication” . This is clearly in contrast to the traditional views of the 286
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older sociology of law, which — from Jeremy Bentham  to Roscoe 287
Pound  and further to Talcott Parsons  and others  — describe the 288 289 290
function of law as “social control or integration”,  that is to say as a func291 -
tion that features, ecumenically, so to say, both on the psychical and the 
social level. The consequences when considering the problem of law in a 
temporal dimension, are of course mainly social ones; they concern the 
question whether expectations can be rendered stable, or predictable and 
secure over time, as each communication has an impact, or sets the basis 
for the next one; and in so doing constantly establishes the state of the 
system ; in other words it establishes what is legal and what is illegal and 292
avoids arbitrariness. The legal system of course is not only about commu-
nication, it also involves “behavioural patterns", such as are "registered by 
law" and normatively "referred to law”.  All this is strictly related to deal293 -
ing with expectations and disappointment of such expectations, which is 
another way of describing contingency in law, law's function of (contin-
gently) "dealing with" contingency, which is an integral part or layer of the 
 Jeremy Bentham privileged in fact an individual perspective on law. See for 287
instance Draper, T. ‘An Introduction to Jeremy Bentham’s Theory of Punishment’ 
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 5 (2002).
 Pound, R. ‘Social Control Through Law’ (new Haven 1942)288
 Parsons, T. ‘The Law and Social Control’ In William M. Evan Ed. Law and So289 -
ciology (New York 1962). 
 For a full list see note 3 in Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford Univer290 -
sity Press, USA; 1st Published in Pbk. 2008, p.143.
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function of law. But the first need to clarify the function of law, concerns its 
coding and programming. 
 The function of law traditionally was intended as “achieving the se-
curity of expectations”  to say it with Jeremy Bentham. Security has for 294
long been supposed to provide “the disappointment preventing 
principle” , where, if life is made of expectations and hopes, the security 295
of law should guarantee the “maintenance of all these hopes” . In social 296
systems theory, the function of law is to deal with communication over 
time, and this primarily in order to achieve “the stabilisation of normative 
expectations” . While there exist different formulations, these are really 297
just synonymous expressions of one identical function of law.  If there 298
were to be several functions, this would lead to “problems of incomplete 
overlap and [to] an unclear demarcation of law” . In order to refer to this 299
one function, or functional definition of law, Luhmann chooses the concept 
norm, more exactly “the concept of the normative mode of 
expectations”.  This concept is seen in a binary form, the distinction 300
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between expectation and disappointment.  Disappointment of expecta301 -
tions can be accepted or rejected, and that means respectively a cognitive 
or a normative process of such expectations.  
 It is interesting to observe that Luhmann himself points out in his 
description of the legal system and of its normative function how much its 
emerging has to do with the Western or European development towards 
modernity. While, as a sociologist, Luhmann is typically not among those 
fascinated or driven by questions of cultural genealogy, he wishes not to 
leave a doubt that was has happened in normative history, has in fact 
happened in Europe, not elsewhere, for instance in Asia. Luhmann claims 
that it is because of the longstanding presence of a strong legal culture; if 
instead, we would be considering technological developments, literacy and 
demographics, then Asia, specifically, Luhmann claims, China in the period 
between the 1200 and the 1300, would have seemed the best equipped 
and Europe the least well equipped region.  Instead, what has happened 302
is that Europe, starting with the Roman jurisconsults and, half a millennium 
later, the Byzantium-made Corpus Iuris or body of law, has resulted in a 
conspicuously successful attempt at establishing a legal culture, whose 
singular and indeed unique character and complexity still amazes schol-
ars. In Italy, with the cities and counties based on laws of self-regulation, 
law was permeating any aspect of city life and relations among its citizens, 
while England developed, since the medieval centuries, and partly in con-
scious opposition to Roman law, a separate municipal legal order or com-
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub301 -
lished in Pbk. 2008, p.149.
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub302 -
lished in Pbk. 2008, p.172. See also Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, 
Stanford University Press, 1998, p.35 and ff.
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mon law (or rather, a bi-component normative system, consisting of law 
and equity). Both of these models, and the countries following them based 
their exchanges and life on law, tested and developed ways of managing 
expectations and consequentially ways of dealing with rule and exception, 
with improbabilities, with conflict-solving through tribunals, from simple in-
dividual ones to more complex and all-encompassing ones, charged with 
duties that extended far beyond the limits of normal conditions, including 
e.g. war. It was in so doing that they developed a social order . This so303 -
cial order was, courtesy to this kind of legally prepared background, ready 
to bear the brunt of more and more social complexity and able to serve as 
the context in which the paradigmatic shift to modernity could find its  con-
ditions.  304
 Now the mention of these historical findings constituted a narrative; 
they are not part of an explanation of socio-historic processes in systemic 
terms. Law as a system can display an autopoietic behaviour only on the 
basis of its function. In order to see how the law can reproduce itself two 
further concepts are needed. 
 4.2 - Coding and Programming. 
 The idea of a ‘command’ coming from a powerful and legitimate le-
gislator, as still to be found in Bentham’s view of the law, requires answers 
to the old question of the validity of law. These are questions which never 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub303 -
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receive an adequate answer other than a paradox - no matter whether one 
tries using the means of a Grundnorm, or a religious principle, as. Previ-
ously discussed . There cannot be (to put it with Walter Benjamin) any305 -
thing like a “super-right". All there can be found, is only Gewalt” . There306 -
fore, in a social system theory view of law, at least in any view that goes 
beyond Talcott Parsons’ ‘structural-functional analysis’  - as Parsons is 307
still part of those who talk of a “higher order unit”  - the basic step is that 308
of swapping the term ‘command' for the term ‘coding’.  This is the way 309
the question of the source of validity of law can be avoided. 
 When first approaching the theory of Autopoiesis, one is met with 
the concept of the binary code, and the proviso that, far from a single one 
for all, what exists is one such binary code for each of modern society's 
function systems. These codes are quite simply explained, apparently too 
simply, as they tend to remain - perhaps precisely for this reason - obscure 
to many, including some systems theorists. For instance, if one starts from 
the assumption - as Luhmann does - that the study of modern society is 
not an ontological study of being persons, but a poietological study of on-
going events or happenings, or processes in the making, it is obvious that 
the notion of a function takes up, not only an importance without preced-
 See infra chapter 3.305
 In a sense of vis and potestas, not exactly as violence, as explained by Luh306 -
mann, N. ‘The Third Question: The Creative Use of Paradoxes in Law and Legal 
History’ Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer, 1988), pp. 153-165 
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ent, but also a wholly novel shape. The notion of a function is not new in 
itself; for instance, a whole and highly influent school of historical inquiry 
into the earliest historical (sometimes called "fringe-historical") strata of 
proto-indo-european cultures, has been based upon the knot of three con-
stitutive functions, a sacerdotal/sovereign function, a warrior-function, and 
a productive and reproductive, fecundity-related function.  The function-310
concept of modern systemic sociology can of course not rely on anything 
like the pre-existing "castes" (in the widest sense) that underlie the indo-
european three-function structure. The priests, chieftains, judges of the 
first, the warriors of the second, the peasants of the third function of indo-
european societies, all belong to a specific social body. In modern, func-
tionally differentiated society, each function system is identified by an indi-
vidual's "membership" in one of these bodies, but by the incessant action 
of an underlying binary code. This is because functions are here embodied 
in systems rather than social bodies, and a system (in the sense the word 
carries in social systems theory and in modern systemic approaches gen-
erally) is not to be found on the level of items, substances, entities, etc., 
but on that of operations. The difference shows especially when one com-
pares the way in which pre-modern functional bodies and modern func-
tional systems develop their borders. While in the case of a function-re-
lated social body, inside and outside are separated the boundary of mem-
bership, in the case of a functional system, it is by means of the continu-
ous reference to a specific binary code, in its constitutive recursive opera-
tions, that operates the self-distinction or self-definition. Each function-sys-
 See the work of French comparative philologist and historian Georges 310
Dumézil (1898-1986), esp. his Archaic Roman Religion, Baltimore (Johns Hop-
kins) 1996.
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tem involves the functioning of such a code. For the legal system, the bin-
ary code that allows continuous recursive decision-making is legal/illegal; 
the science system, the binary code is true/false; for the political system, it 
is government/opposition; for the economic system, it is payment/non-
payment, to name some of the chief examples.  They are described as a 311
sort of on-off switch within the system . Nevertheless, it is not at all that 312
simple. Luhmann tries to bypass the need for a higher set of norms , and 313
notices that modern society has gone beyond “relying on the abstraction 
that super imposed the b i furcat ion between fu l f i lment and 
disappointment” , that would be simply represented by the distinction 314
legal/illegal - which is by no means an invention of social system theory, 
but it is nevertheless, a relatively “recent achievement” . In fact, this dis315 -
tinction is on the one hand, logically, what the legal system is based on; on 
the other hand, historically, it is a consequence of a recent evolution of so-
ciety .  316
 This "switch"-related nature of the function-systems he describes, 
finding them at work in modern society, imposes upon Luhmann's theory-
writing its own particular style of presentation, perhaps a "post-
ontological". Luhmann presents old and new arguments aiming at render-
ing, analysing, dissolving the paradox of law. For instance, if in antiquity 
 See for instance: Moeller, G. ‘Luhmann Explained: From Souls to Systems’, 311
Open Court, Chicago, 2006, p.29.
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(and up to the Renaissance), European societies described themselves as 
hierarchical, peasant or urban societies, observed in a centre-periphery 
way could be seen as having some kind of ‘unity’ and ‘order’ (but also ‘dis-
order’), but when this so called - and indeed for immemorial times, so un-
derstood - ‘natural order’ started to disintegrate after the Middle Ages on-
wards,  law still was considered as Divine Law (or as Natural Law). 317
Luhmann explains that this was as important move, destined to hide the 
systemic paradox of law behind an overarching narrative. In positive law, 
in modern society, this is more difficult to do, so there can be innovative - 
yet, still pre-systemic - attempts for the law to get out of the paradox, 
which, mainly, were attempts to either abstain from investing in law (or 
practising law), or alternatively, to find a distinction that “dissolves the 
paradox”  of law. So, instead of re-asserting the inevitable distinction 318
between right and wrong (which comes complete with the moral dimension 
that they inseparably include) the law is about legal and illegal. The move 
shows that, whether knowingly or intentionally, or not, the threshold to pos-
itive law so in this way this move is, even exclusively, about positive law. 
From there it is not difficult to find the way to the quickly widening contra-
diction between morality and legality and the ensuing “morally-required 
disobedience to the law” .   319
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 Luhmann also reminds us of how in Roman law, classical as well as 
medieval, there often existed a third option, such as, between legal and 
illegal, either the common good, or the maintenance of political 
authority.  This is as much as to say that both legal and illegal are ac320 -
ceptable. If legal is acceptable, and illegal is acceptable as well, then their 
opposition is acceptable; in other words, we are dealing with the accept-
ance of the binary code applied to itself. Nevertheless, in law tertium non 
datur; a judge - or a legislator - cannot avoid determining which side is ac-
ceptable and which one is not in each case. A functioning system has to 
“reformulate its own binarity as excluding third values” . This means that 321
it has to reject the codes of other systems (political, economical, and so 
forth) and “accept [or, more exactly, to function continually in] its own code 
unconditionally”. 
 Another gimmick is the result-oriented practice of the law both in 
Court and in the law-making exercise), so it is about decisions, not theory. 
Even so all those tricks aiming at avoiding or hiding the paradox do not 
really achieve anything; “the future remains unobservable”  and the 322
paradox has not gone away, a self-referential mode install very much 
present; in fact “the validity of a programme depends on its own execution. 
The execution of the programme becomes the condition of the execution 
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of the programme”  but this program gives us nothing as to the future, 323
therefore nothing about the continuing validity of the law. There is still the 
need of something in power to determine this. It seems to indicate that the 
attempt of hiding the paradox has failed. If we cannot see the future, we 
need to adjust the law after each result if it is not satisfactory and so “the 
legal system grows by what can be called, using a linguistic term, hyper-
correction”  What all this means, to put it in terms of system theory, is 324
that the system cannot observe itself, or, better still, “operatively, the unity 
of the system is continually being reproduced but one cannot observe it 
within the system”  ; the strict binary coding of the law  needs a second 325 326
order observer, as it is unable to observe itself, but this “does not exclude 
operations on the first order level, such as non-reflective legal or illegal 
claims”  327
 All this means is simply that the binary code alone does not help the 
legal system’s operations inasmuch as, as previously illustrated, any legal 
decision on whether an issue is legal or illegal cannot be  taken “on one of 
the two value levels without having regard to the other” ; in any legal 328
case there must be the examination of both, and finally the refusal of one 
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of the two values. Here lies the unfolding of the paradox where the two 
opposite values constitute the system with “one distinction that has two 
sides which (…) can be relevant at the same time but cannot be used at 
the same time” . The idea of programming comes to help in this in329 -
stance, as it allows the introduction of “other values”  which could not be 330
accepted at code level. 
 The programming Luhmann claims is apt to help the legal system in 
“linking self-reference and external reference”  is ‘conditional program331 -
ming’, that is one or a series of statements of the same model that is found 
in any computer programming language  and which starts with a ‘if’ fol332 -
lowed by a condition (which can be either a function or an assigned value) 
and if that condition is satisfied, ‘then’ there is an outcome; if the condition 
is not satisfied an ‘else’ statement follows instead. These conditional 
statements can be nested, and the program continues - both in a computer 
program, as well as in a social system - until one condition is met or satis-
fied. These conditional statements also go under the name of ’loop’ in 
computer programming, as they continue to produce operations ab infin-
itum or until a condition is no longer met and then the program ends. This 
is perhaps the best example of what a recursive system is; it is nothing 
else but the recurring of an operation (or of multiple operations), which has 
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the option of back up operations in order to continue to exist; when a con-
dition is no longer met, the system ceases to exist.  
 Conditional statements are of course not a recent invention. In Ro-
man Law there was something quite similar, as processes started with ‘si 
paret’ , and albeit not in a modern and systemic worldview, the condition 333
allowed for creating a way not discerning between differences and devi-
ations from the expected. Luhmann mentions also the existence of condi-
tional statements in ancient divinatory and juridical texts in Mesopot-
amia , but by no means only there. In fact, in ancient populations, after 334
writing developed, often “omens revealed a conditional future, best de-
scribed as a judicial decision of the Gods” .  335
 In any case, conditional statements are an achievement of social 
evolution, inasmuch as they show an evolved way of thinking that links 
knowledge, norms, and regulations, creating a structure “in the realm of 
the possible”  in a world that is not only rapidly expanding but it is be336 -
coming more and more complex. The sequence of “if’ statements have 
been used to guarantee a sort of ‘order’ a long time before there was an 
understanding of logic; “this form of conditional programme survived all 
further differentiations in society through a change of context” .  337
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 Therefore, in reference to the binary code legal - illegal, the condi-
tional program does something rather simple: it gives the conditions on 
which the code can exist, on which the issue at hand is actually legal or 
illegal and - here is the innovation - the condition refers to past decisions 
(or laws), to past facts, statutes. Otherwise formulated, it assesses in the 
present the validity of laws made in the past. The difference with the code 
alone is, as previously mentioned, that the code could not be seen in a 
temporal context, at least not if unambiguous instructions in future de-
cisional situations are needed, while it can be on the basis of conditional 
programming. Even so, however, applying the conditional programming to 
the legal system does not do away with the problem of expectations, which 
“are turned into the form of norms in precisely those cases when they are 
not met” . The problem of disappointed expectation is discussed by an338 -
other complex concept, or perhaps rather than a concept, a whole sub-
theory within the theory of Autopoiesis, which is what Luhmann calls the 
Kontingenzformel. 
  
 4.3 - The Contingency Formula: Contingency in autopoiesis 
and elsewhere. 
Beyond the opposition of theories which portray “Justice”, no matter 
whether it is in terms of a promise of natural or divine provenance, or with-
in the framework of legal positivism, which refutes the idea of an external 
authority however embodied (yet does so at the price of insulating a realm 
of positive, or “laid down" law, thereby making itself dependent upon di-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Law as a Social System’, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 199.338
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verse, often in many different ways costly measures of separating inside 
and outside), Luhmann's autopoietic re-conception of the social system 
law has, at least during the ultimate decades of the Twentieth Century, re-
volutionised this field by emphasising the self of the legal system - the in-
ternal operations the continuity of which alone allows the reproduction of 
sustainable law under modern conditions. A tritagonist, or third wrestler, a 
entering the ring after a battle going on since time immemorial (for the one, 
natural law), and right from the beginning of modernity (for the other, posit-
ive law), the autopoietic notion of law emerges ‘relativising’ the former op-
positions, thus allowing the common features of both adversaries appear. 
Whoever looks at the current situation in legal theory in this light will not be 
surprised about a certain general attitude, which seems to assume quite 
naturally that number three is really so much "like" either number one or 
number two, that it can and should be assimilated to it. Luhmann, in fact, 
has been called a sui generis positivist;  yet, although Positivism, at the 339
price of making law subject to decisions - notwithstanding the odium of ar-
bitrariness that such a position was and is fated to provoke - at least could 
guarantee one thing of great importance for modern legal systems, spe-
cifically that law could be changed (and the enabling of change has been 
part of its main contribution, as a matter of legal-historical fact). This un-
derstanding of law was wedded to unity and indeed, with the possible ex-
ception of the theory of H L A Hart, to hierarchy. It is true that Positivism 
implicitly postulated a notion of ‘separation’ that involves many a common 
feature with that of 'distinction' - which plays such an important role in sys-
tem legal theory - and further common elements. It is, in the last instance, 
 King, M. Thornill, C. ‘Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law’ London 339
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the impossibility, postulated already by the early Luhmann, of establishing 
a coincidence between the concept of purpose (which, from Bentham to 
Hart, has arguably been the “drive” in the positivist enterprise) and the ra-
tionality of systems , which transformed all attempts of reaching or dis340 -
covering a “convergency” between the theories of legal autopoiesis and 
legal positivism into ultimately hopeless enterprises.  
In its latest developments, the evolution of Luhmann’s theory of the 
legal system in particular had taken a turn letting it diverge from its appar-
ent earlier proximity to a basically positivist conception, by suggesting that 
Justice is the ‘Kontingenzformel of the legal system’. The concept of 
Kontingenzformel first appeared in Die Funktion der Religion in 1977 to 
define the idea of one God . Each of the functional systems, economy, 341
politics, religion, media, education, science and law - and the list is not 
complete - includes a conceptual artifact singled out to ‘represent’ a func-
tional system’s employment – an ‘employment’ which, it should be made 
clear right away, is by no means to be identified neither as a function nor 
as a binary code, as it leaves carefully open what is the meaning of the 
system in question if looked at from the viewpoint of society as a whole.  342
Scarcity was identified as the Kontingenzformel for the economic sys-
tem , "Limitationalität" (the idea that certain truth-claims are excluded if 343
certain other truth-claims are accepted) was recognised as the Kontingen-
 On this see Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I Stanford University press, 340
2012 p 336 and ff.
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zformel of the Science system , ‘legitimacy’, as the Kontingenzformel of 344
the political system and, in the same way, Gerechtigkeit, justice, was nom-
inated as the Kontingenzformel of the legal system. This concept of 
Kontingenzformel is somewhat unique and gives new parameters through 
which to look at the theory of social autopoiesis. It obviously equals parting 
ways with a huge part of long-accepted positivist legal theory. 
Kontingenzformel is, in fact, not at all something like a representat-
ive sample of Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems. Even less it is a 
representative expression of the legal system. It merely provides an an-
swer to what is essentially a Folgeproblem, a problem that does not fail to 
show up once the autopoietic theory of a differentiated functional system, 
the legal system for instance, is effectively enacted. It is important to note 
that Luhmann himself only in 1995 dedicates, in Das Recht der Gesell-
schaft,  an entire chapter to Justice defined as the Kontingenzformel of 345
the Legal system. Nonetheless, its importance has been greatly over-
looked by autopoietic theorists until the past few years. Of all ingredients 
of Luhmann’s work, this one seems to have needed most time to reach the 
attention of scholars. The first relevant discussions date from a decade 
and less. In this paper I would like to test some of those interpretations of 
Luhmann’s Kontingenzformel.  Doing so, I shall try to follow Heinz von Fo-
erster’s advice to always decide in favour of the solution that gives access 
to the greater number of choices. 
To start with, it is necessary to look at what Luhmann is factually 
trying to point to when he uses the term “contingency” - which actually 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft’, Frankfurt am Main 344
Suhrkamp, 1990 p. 396.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Das Recht der Gesellschaft’ Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp, 345
1993.
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means the touching of two poles or indeed two objects whatsoever, as e.g. 
in electricity. Since its first steep career in medieval philosophy, the term 
has acquired diverse newer meanings. As it can sometimes be observed 
in such cases, not all of these enrichments are also contributions to the 
clarity of the concept. For instance, there is a tendency of using “contin-
gent” to express what would otherwise be covered by a term like “casual”, 
in itself a complicated and fertile root, which has given birth both to ‘casu-
ally’ and ‘casualty’. In English, also, we find contingency used as in ‘con-
tingent on something’, as in prices that are contingent on offer.  None of 
this applies to the use of the term ‘contingency’ in Luhmann or, for that 
matter, in German, where ‘Kontingenz’ has only the philosophical mean-
ing. This philosophical meaning is the double meaning of ‘absence of im-
possibility’ and ‘absence of necessity’, which together form the term’s ca-
nonic definition (even if, usually, the intended reference is either to one or 
to the other).  
In order to avoid misunderstandings in working with Luhmann’s 
texts it is essential that the meaning of contingency, especially as absence 
of necessity, be borne in mind at all times. If this is ignored, the pairing of 
‘contingency’ with ‘formula’ will tend to suggest that Luhmann is talking of 
a mechanism for exceptional, perhaps particularly “hard cases”, as op-
posed to average or normal cases. But Luhmann does not specifically dif-
ferentiate hard cases form others. Yet the aspect most difficult to grasp is 
not the intrinsic problem of contingency, but what should be understood as 
the tension between ‘contingency’ and ‘formula’. Since contingency is an 
ingredient of all situations Luhmann describes and since, against this in-
gredient, no remedy, no efficient ‘formula’ exists – nothing that would, as it 
183
were, “take away the curse of contingency”, one would think that a contin-
gency formula is precisely what Luhmann does not offer.  
Needless to say, Luhmann uses the concept in a different sense. By 
formula, he does not mean a device of successfully accomplishing an op-
eration, but rather something much less ambitious, a mere shorthand for 
system-specific orientation. Secondly, Kontingenzformel, in relation to Jus-
tice, needs to be looked at specifically. Although the Kontingenzformel has 
the same attributes within any system, Justice - this is my thesis - has a 
peculiarity of its own as it offers a replacement solution to the divide of 
natural law theories and positivist postulates. For Natural law, Justice is 
the supreme value of law, the sole site and guarantee of the law’s consis-
tency. For legal positivism Justice is, at best, merely an external conditio 
sine qua non, and at worst a conundrum, something it recommends to 
abandon to Ethics and sort it away from law. If, on the other hand, the 
Kontingenzformel Justice enshrines decisive and specific autopoietic 
lessons about the legal system, then it might make more sense to see in it 
the most concise expression of the complexity of society’s law, rather than 
an example of the structural device governing functionally differentiated 
systems in general. 
4.4 - The Contingency Formula: Underlaying the Autopoietic 
Intention. 
At any rate, this double-sided aspect of the Kontingenzformel, as a 
‘symptom’ or an expression on the one hand, and as a ‘device’ on the oth-
er hand, might be what is ultimately at stake in a conspicuous tendency 
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among legal scholars to get hold of what they see as the underlying prob-
lem. In fact, both tendencies are represented. Following the ‘expressionist’ 
reading, Gunther Teubner extends the expressive range of the notion of 
Kontingenzformel further by varying and enriching it with that of a “tran-
scendence formula”.  Taking the opposite direction, closer to an ‘instru346 -
mentalist’ interpretation, Richard Nobles and David Schiff dedicate several 
pages of their ‘Sociology of Jurisprudence’ , to the outline of what they 347
call the “Formula for Variety”.  It might well be that some responsibility of 348
this blurred reception is owing to the English version of Das Recht der 
Gesellschaft, published in 2004 under the title ‘Law as a Social System’ , 349
where Kontingenzformel was translated as “Formula for Contingency”. It is 
certainly a challenge to translate complex foreign philosophical neologisms 
in a way which may ultimately affect both the initial meaning and the in-
augural intention that had presided over its emergence. Nevertheless, as it 
is always the case of complex translation issues, solutions allow for more 
or less understanding. An exploration of these options and consequences 
seems thus essential at this point.   
A literal translation of the German Kontingenzformel would produce 
‘contingency formula’. In Law as a Social System it is translated, as al-
ready mentioned, by “Formula for Contingency” (capitals in the original) – 
 Teubner, G. ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula 346
of Law’ 2009, Modern Law Review, Vol. 72, pp. 1-23
 Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 347
2006.
 Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 348
2006, p.112.
 Oxford University Press, 2004 and 2008. Looking at the much more complex –349
also more ‘tendentious’ - German title of the work, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, 
the English title Law as a Social System appears as somehow “normalising’.
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a minor change in letters, but a major change in meaning. According to the 
various definitions of ‘for’ listed in the Oxford English Dictionary, “Formula 
for contingency” could mean, among other things: “formula in favour of 
contingency”, “formula affecting contingency”, “formula to the benefit of 
contingency”, “formula having the function of contingency”. Most decisive-
ly, adding ‘for’ introduces finality. Finality is not what Luhmann had in mind. 
It is clear from his theory of social systems that modern society ‘relativises’ 
the society-embracing significance of ends and goals. If, however, it is the 
case that modern society, according at least to Luhmann’s autopoietic ac-
count, no longer defines itself by reference to its goals, then it becomes 
even more difficult to see to which end Kontingenzformel has been trans-
lated as “formula for contingency”.   350
Not only does the adjunction of ‘for’ change the meaning of Luh-
mann’s neologism, it also alters what ‘contingency’ means in the context. 
Contingency is generally for Luhmann an inescapable aspect of a system, 
its predicament and, like the complexity of its operations, not something to 
be cured, eliminated or controlled by the application of a “formula”. The 
idea of a contingency candidate to a treatment characteristically collides 
with the underlying construction of autopoietic social systems. There are of 
course good reasons to use the schemes of instrumentality and finality in 
explaining the legal system. They not only echo positivist theories; a large 
part of autopoietic theory-moves are equally dependent upon them. Posi-
tivists crave a finality of norms and rules in order to avoid the pitfall of arbi-
 On this see Luhmann, N. ‘Das Recht der Gesellschaft’ Frankfurt am Main 350
Suhrkamp, 1993.
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trariness.  Yet Luhmann defines Kontingenzformel as self-reference “in 351
the form of a (disappointment-ridden) norm”.   352
Historically, the main challenge for the legal positivists was, and is, 
the problem of legitimating norms, after dismissing legal-order-transcend-
ing sources of legitimacy. The so-called separation thesis provides only a 
negative side-aspect. Legality must be distinguished from morality in order 
to exclude arbitrariness, escape contingency and allow for consistency. 
Luhmann takes the positivist exclusion of morality from law as a matter of 
course. Yet, at the same time, he imposes an entirely different part upon 
contingency. Leaving aside the loss of legal memory, which critics locate in 
the positivistic separation of legality and morality,  Luhmann excludes 353
morality not from the legal system alone, but from his entire autopoietic 
vision of modern society. There is no justification available or necessary– 
and the only source for legitimacy is routine. Secondly, Luhmann is inter-
ested in describing how society works, in an autopoietic manner, not in the 
working of ethics in society. The Positivists, on the other hand, had ex-
cluded morality, which for them was an uncomfortable element that coun-
teracted their need and search for consistency and unity in law. 
The claim that some aspects of positivism, such as the descriptive 
method, the examination of the legal system’s exclusive rights to law and 
the rejection of ethics in law, could be similar in method to the early Luh-
 On this see Conklin, W. E. ‘The invisible Origin of Legal Positivism: A Re-read351 -
ing of a Tradition’ Springer, 2001 pp.69 and ff.
 “Selbstreferenz in der Form einer (enttäuschungsanfälligen) Norm”. Cf. Luh352 -
mann, N. ‘Das Recht der Gesellschaft’ Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp, 1993 p.218; 
Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Published 
in Pbk. 2008 ,p 214. 
 Conklin, W. E. ‘The invisible Origin of Legal Positivism: A Re-reading of a Tra353 -
dition’ Springer, 2001 p.66.
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mann is as such perfectly acceptable. Luhmann effectively presents law as 
‘facts’ produced by legal communications based on previous communica-
tions, which continue to operate autopoietically based on the knowledge of 
the factual world in the making,  and thus without any moral judgment on 354
law. Positive law is therefore described as the law of the autopoietic sys-
tem law, and legal positivism could be said the appropriate self-description 
of the legal order analysed by Luhmann. Also, between Hart’s secondary 
rules, Kelsen’s Grundnorm, and Luhmann’s own second order observa-
tion, the commonalities are obvious. All these conceptions are rooted in a 
thought figure that is based on added strata or routine, supplementing 
primary rules (Hart), the norms of the Rechtsordnung (Kelsen), or first or-
der observation (Luhmann). Mind that an important difference consists in 
the fact that Hart and Kelsen attribute a superior shaping power or norm-
ativity to their supplemental routines. Luhmann’s second order observation 
limits itself to allowing the observation of e.g. a legal system, which itself is 
in the process of distinguishing between what is law and what it is not law.  
When Luhmann starts discussing the Kontingenzformel 
Gerechtigkeit, he shows the aspect of his theory where the similarities with 
legal positivism end. As mentioned, Luhmann‘s approach of contingency is 
fundamental and compassing. According to Luhmann, in spite of all that 
has been said about the term’s conceptual structure, contingency does not 
need to be perceived in negative terms. He is not alone in suggesting this. 
Foucault explains contingency as émergence utilising Nietzsche’s use of 
Luhmann, N. ‘A Sociological Theory of Law’, London, Routledge & kegan Paul, 354
1985 p.131.
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Entstehung  and accordingly interpreting society as a series of collisions 355
instead of a series of causes. Contingency decomposes universals (as 
already for Occam) and provides the distinctive feature of historicity: it in-
deed provides the very essence of history.  Although Foucault was not 356
concerned with society, his view of contingency is by no means far from 
Luhmann’s, even if Luhmann sees in contingency not only a distinctive 
achievement of modern society, but also a determinant and productive 
functional pre-requisite of each of the functional systems. 
It is for these reasons that Kontingenzformel should effectively be 
translated as “contingency formula”: in order, that is, to avoid having tele-
ology enter the equation. The concept of a contingency formula as a “pro-
gram of programs”  replaces in the system other central terms such as 357
‘value’ or ‘principle’, which are too inflexible to prevail in modern society. 
These central terms were appropriate as long as these agencies were not 
systems but hierarchies or orders. The advent of modernity consists in the 
emergence of systems and their tendency to replace hierarchies. What 
happens when a hierarchy is replaced with a system? What happens 
when the legal “order” stops to be an order and ”recycles” itself as a sys-
tem? Systems cannot any longer rely on values and principles on which 
everyone agrees casually, without thinking about it, as within a family. And 
the society-compassing maxims are now those communicated by the me-
 Cf. Nietzsche F.  ‘Genealogy of Morals’, Dover Publications Inc. (2003);  Fou355 -
cault, M. ‘Lectures on the Will to Know: 1970-1971 and Oedipal Knowledge 
(Michel Foucault: Lectures at the Collège de France’, AIAA; ed. edition (2013).
 Arnold Toynbee’s definition of history as “one damn accident after another” is 356
an example here. See Toynbee, A. J. ‘A Study of History’, Oxford Paperback 
1988. p. 267. 
Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub357 -
lished in Pbk. 2008;, p.212
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dia (that is to say, have their own systemic reference). The contingency 
formula takes into account the fact that the age of spontaneously gener-
ated values ultimately in charge with governance of functional systems is 
over.  
This applies to the modus operandi of the legal system’s contin-
gency formula as well. Considering that again for Foucault there is no the-
ory of power, as there is no equilibrium, no inherent logic, or stability at 
work in it,  functionally differentiated modern society includes this same 358
postulate among its requirements, replacing transcending goals with the 
internal construction of autopoietic systems. The autopoietic theory of law 
describes the relationship of Justice and power by rejecting the classical 
approach that sees Justice as a form of exchange between equally power-
ful parties, and offers itself as solution to the problems modernity finds it-
self confronted with, problems of erosion of power or control, of the in-
creasingly painful absence of a social agency that would combine ‘irresist-
ible force’ and ‘overruling power’ with legitimacy. It underwrites the sacri-
fice of ideal, society-wide ends, but it offers itself as a means for dealing 
with complexity, choice, risk and disappointment management networks 
and multiplicities of trajectories replacing the one, society-unique neces-
sity. 
The difficulty in handling a contingency formula ultimately consists 
in the fact that, while the guiding values or principles of a family can be 
simply stated, written on a list, repeated, learned by heart, etc., contin-
gency formulas cannot! They can be seen and identified only by an ex-
 Dreyfus, H. Rabinow, P. Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and 358
Hermeneutics, Brighton: Harvester, 1982, pp. 187-8.
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ternal observer. Therefore, either one uses the   contingency formula – 
then accepting the “blindness” involved in this use, as there is no external 
reference or horizon - or one observes it, as a second order observer, a 
legal theorist for instance, yet, in this case, one has no power of acting. 
The system, as an observer, cannot see what it cannot see,  Luhmann 359
writes – which of course means that it cannot see what it can see either, 
as the difference between what can and what cannot be seen, escapes 
him. But what cannot be seen by the observer, can be seen by the ob-
server’s observer. The second order or external observer provides, Luh-
mann writes, the functional system, as first order observer, with an opera-
tional object and discovers possibilities. Only a second order observer can 
see someone (for instance the legal system) ‘learn’. The second observer 
introduces a contingent dimension of what is just and unjust. This does not 
mean that there are no criteria; it means only that, instead of absolute val-
ues, what is elaborated within this distinction of observer positions, are 
only relational ‘perspectives’.      360
While validity is given by the local references within the legal sys-
tem, which are part of the system’s relationship with itself without affecting 
the content of the system, Justice itself is not strictly related to the issue of 
validity, which nevertheless is relevant for the system, but to the system’s 
self observation and self description. In what Luhmann calls 'the old-
Europe tradition', the idea of Justice is associated with the idea of  'norm', 
which in turn is associated to an idea of a legally ordered life of the whole 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Ecological Communication’, 1989, Polity Press, Cambridge , p.359
24.
Luhmann, N. ‘Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft’ Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp, 360
1997.pp 866 and ff. 
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of society, the dogma of one compassing “system” (not in Luhmann’s 
sense). Justice as a contingency formula is itself also one of these recurs-
ive operations. It, too, is defined as a “criterion for selection”;  only, it 361
cannot be added alongside other such criteria, usually described as the 
codes of the system, because of the specificity of its recursive aspect, and 
because it is not a code. Rather, what the contingency formula does is ex-
pose code-based programming or decision-making to external observa-
tion. What happens in the legal system is made explainable to an observer 
– and this without self-idealisation, without taking a common oath on 
common values or principles. 
 In a complex, contingent, yet structured world, the need and con-
straint to select is inescapable,  even if the expectations that allow to do 362
so belong, as expectations of expectations, to situations of double contin-
gency. If contingency, for Luhmann, is the necessity of taking risks and be 
disappointed, functionally differentiated systems at least offer possibilities 
to react to disappointment. These can be changed and integrated with the 
objective reality, or maintained and carried on in protest.  In the case of 363
the legal system, which deals with norms - which are supposed to have 
unconditional validity, whether the expectations of the system are fulfilled 
or unfulfilled - Justice as a “disappointment ridden norm”, sees a tension 
between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ as well as between ‘truth’ and ‘law’. The recursive 
operations of the legal system - of any autopoietic system - are based on 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub361 -
lished in Pbk. 2008 p.216.
 Luhmann, N. ‘A Sociological Theory of Law’, London, Routledge & kegan 362
Paul, 1985; p.25.
 Luhmann, N. ‘A Sociological Theory of Law’, London, Routledge & kegan 363
Paul, 1985; p.25.
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evolution and repetition, thus on contingency. “The solid is grounded upon 
the flowing”, as Luhmann often explains, paraphrasing - but also turning 
upside-down - an earlier suggestion by Edgar Morin (“L’ouvert s’appuie sur 
le fermé”).   364
   4.5  - Justice - the suggestions of Autopoiesis and the legacy of 
positivism. 
Nobles and Schiff have taken the interpretation of Kontingenzformel 
as “Formula for Contingency” a step further. They substitute “contingency” 
with “variety”, thereby transforming Kontingenzformel into a means of 
choosing under the condition of a given variety of possibilities. This allevi-
ates Luhmann’s original concept of the (unwanted? dangerous?) contin-
gency.  Nobles and Schiff say in fact that “Justice can (…) provide a for-
mula for variety”.  Elsewhere, they call Justice a “potential for variety”.  365 366
Therefore the idea of possibility seems to have a great importance for 
Nobles’ and Schiff’s interpretation of this aspect of Luhmann’s theory. 
In a view to further elucidate the idea of possibility in Luhmann, a 
look at other modern theories of possibility and contingency may be of 
help. As we have seen, ‘contingency’ is used, within the autopoietic ac-
count, as a reference to the fact that everything might happen, or, in other 
words, to the absence of impossibility. This absence of impossibility is 
Morin, E. ‘La Methode’, 1980 Vol. 1 and 2. Paris: Seuil., In Luhmann, N. ‘A So364 -
ciological Theory of Law’, London, Routledge & kegan Paul, 1985;
 Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 365
2006,  p.121 
Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 366
2006,  p.117.
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what occupies centre-stage for discourse analysis as well: ‘history is con-
tingent’ means in a Foucaultian perspective that history is treated as the 
sum total, and the archive as the inventory, of all those events and config-
urations which, by the fact of their sheer happening, have proven their 
non-impossibility.   Jacques Lacan’s idea of contingency moves very 367
much along the same lines: it relates to the event in connection to struc-
tural change and to the subject’s overdetermination by structure and im-
possibility. Jacques-Alain Miller summarises it thus: “What is of the order 
of the event, properly speaking, is what cannot happen: everything that is 
outside the circle of the possible. This is the exact sense that Lacan gave 
to contingency.”  Different from Foucault and Lacan, most of the pre-368
autopoietic uses of ‘contingent’, ‘contingency’– whether philosophical, cul-
tural or media-vernacular - are determined by an emphasis laid upon ‘ne-
cessitistic modalisation’ rather than upon ‘possibilistic modalisation’; in 
other words, what determines the term contingency in most of its tradition-
al uses is the accent laid on its meaning “in-spite-of-necessity”, and not on 
its meaning “in-spite-of-impossibility”.  
Luhmann makes a step beyond this frequent use of the concept. 
What a large fraction of Luhmann’s efforts try to account for is the ability of 
the functionally differentiated systems upon which society has entrusted, 
as it were, its current affairs, to accomplish their task, at least well enough 
to effectively continue their operations, an ability that is surprising (or, as 
Luhmann says again and again, “improbable”) enough, given that each 
and every event that falls into the functionally determined realm of com-
 Dreyfus, H. Rabinow, P. Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and 367
Hermeneutics, Brighton: Harvester, 1982;
 Miller, J. A.  “Introduction à l’érotique du temps”, Revue La Cause freudienne 368
n°56, Paris : (Navarin/Seuil) 2004), p. 63-85.
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petence of a system must be dealt with, without any possibility for the sys-
tem to reject any event that presents itself (if it falls into this realm). For 
Luhmann, therefore, the ‘point’ about contingency is, in our context at 
least, the fact that functionally differentiated systems cannot escape the 
mission of having to deal, each within its boundary, with any possible and 
imaginable event whatsoever, if it ‘crops up’. There is, at their level, no in-
built relieving device, no safe-guard, selection rule or filtering mechanism 
that would enable the functionally differentiated system to deal only with 
certain types of events of their functional range, but not with others. The 
onslaught of the contingent has to be borne out – and its complexity re-
duced - by the functional systems themselves. ‘Contingency’ expresses in 
this sense the negation of ‘rule’, any self-imposed necessity. It serves to 
emphasise that there is no such thing as a pre-existing finite realm of pos-
sibilities.  
One might now surmise that, if theorists choose, as their own focus 
of interest, variety rather than contingency, and thus replace the idea of an 
absence of control by the idea of a choice, that is to say of the presence of 
a control, however limited, the epistemic paradigm will be different. And 
this is indeed what happens. It has been said already that what Luhmann 
is striving to emphasise by his notion of a contingency formula, is to ac-
knowledge that contingency cannot be limited, domesticated, civilised, by 
any rule. In contrast, it is clear that the notion of a “Formula for Variety” is 
able to do, precisely, and in a sense exclusively, this: endowing a given 
pattern, predefined and destined to recursive self-repetition, with an addi-
tional residual exposure to something heterogeneous or divergent. The 
small step from contingency formula to “Formula for Variety” leads one to 
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talk, no longer of a problem constitutive of the unity of the legal system, 
constitutive, that is, precisely of the legal system’s identity and its business 
as usual, but instead, to speak merely of ‘exceptions' that occasionally 
happen to arise within the legal system’s ‘business as usual’ in the form of 
so many deviances, anomalies, or discontinuities in the flow of legal com-
munications, discontinuities which are however tolerable providing they 
remain one-off affairs.   369
Without entering into the question of the respective merits of both 
conceptions, I would only like to point clearly to their divergence and, in-
deed, incompatibility. As already discussed, the idea that appears from 
Luhmann’s theory is that Kontingenzformel does not apply only to excep-
tional cases but to all cases, as contingency clearly refers to the legal sys-
tem’s dealing with each and every single case. Luhmann diagnoses that a 
consistency of Justice – the fact that law is believed to “operate routinely 
and predictably” - is not at reach of the legal order. This is why he needs to 
replace the consistency formula with his notion of contingency formula.  370
It cannot be emphasised enough, therefore, to what extent the ‘variety’-
approach modifies, certainly the underlying concept of Justice, but also the 
theoretical setting as such.  For instance, there is no need to insist upon 371
Luhmann’s emphasis on the whole conceptual region represented by the 
cyberneticist idea of eigenvalue, which permeates autopoietic theory. Ei-
genvalue is for Luhmann, however, conceived as a merely emerging pat-
Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 369
2006, p.122.
 On Justice as a form of consistency, see Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of 370
Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006, p.115
 See, however, Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Pub371 -
lishing, Oxford, 2006, p.114.
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tern - there are no content-related directives to be taken from it. Within its 
interpretation as a “Formula for Variety”, Justice is, on the contrary, related 
to the claim that it is in its quality of an eigenvalue that Justice will result in 
stability and consistency.  But according to Luhmann this consistency is, 372
precisely, out of reach of what the legal system can come up with, and 
moreover, it is what the references to notions such as eigenvalue, eigen-
behaviour, and other notions of recursivity-generated stability, are sup-
posed to replace.  Luhmann applied these terms to autopoietic social 373
systems, whose observations he saw as maintained by successive cognit-
ive operations. Consequentially, a self-organised system which is able to 
achieve constant internal structures (eigenvalues) and a constant differen-
tiation from its environment, is said to present eigenbehaviour. Such sys-
tems are defined as organisationally closed, as their stability is due to the 
internal structures, which in turn is seen to guarantee their existence.  It 374
is in this respect that neo-cybernetic epistemology is directly opposed to 
‘objects’ related to a linear epistemology (without exposure to an 
observer).  
Justice as Kontingenzformel is said by Luhmann to be a “disap-
pointment-ridden norm”,  yet a norm nevertheless, not a value, rather a 375
 Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 372
2006, p.115.
 The prefix eigen, as in eigenvalue and eigenbehaviour (originally Eigenwerte 373
and Eigenzustände) was firstly used by the German mathematician David Hilbert. 
The term eigen, (sometimes translated as ‘self-‘) is mostly left un-translated in 
English. 
 Pask , G. ‘Different Kinds of Cybernetics’, In ‘New Perspectives on Cybernet374 -
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scheme for the search of values.  Eigenvalues, on the other hand, are, 376
as the term itself explains, actually ‘values’ which are directly and in this 
sense ‘un-disappointably’ linked to the operations of the system. Justice as 
a Kontingenzformel is not an operation of the system, as it has already 
been explained. If, on the other hand, Justice were defined as an eigen-
value, one would of course expect from Justice consistency, equilibrium 
and predictability, to the point of considering anything that is unjust as “not 
really law”.   377
By saying that eigenvalue is a “quality of Justice” , the variety-378
formula theorists of Justice insist on its stable aspect. There is a double 
claim: on the one hand, the process of treating like cases alike is the 
source of this stability, while on the other hand, it is the factor that allows 
the law “to generate variety”.  It is difficult to see why the interpretation of 379
Justice as the continuing application of the rule of ‘treating like cases alike’ 
and its underlying reasoning should be anything apart from a full guaran-
tee of self-consistency (which Luhmann rules out) and indeed apart from a 
re-assertion, in a new form, of the idea of finality, which is at work in the 
notion of a “formula for variety” as such. But this means also that, when 
compared to the concept of contingency formula and the project underly-
ing it, the “formula for variety” as well as the related “potential for variety” 
suggests, in more political terms, a reference to the classical virtues or 
 Teubner, G. ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula 376
of Law’ 2009, Modern Law Review, Vol. 72, pp. 1-23,  p.8.
Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 377
2006, p.120.
 Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 378
2006, p.115.
 Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 379
2006, p.125.
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promises of plurality, diversity and choice, and to the liberal argumentary 
that uses these promises or virtues to justify Justice’s behaviour as con-
sistent. It goes without saying that all these references are known to con-
stitute the representative aspect of legal positivism, especially in its 
Hartian version. 
In ‘Das Recht der Gesellschaft’, Luhmann talks of the way in which, 
historically, Justice has been understood, throughout pre-modern times, in 
terms of reciprocity, where its values could be “adjusted” in such a way 
that they would constitute a sort of unity in the system within the system. If, 
in modernity, a positivist approach to the problem of the perception of 
Justice consists in the effort of obtaining unity by the fact of treating equal 
cases equally, and unequal cases unequally, what autopoietic theory 
shows instead, is that, what the most characteristic feature of modernity is 
a steady increase in new law and legislation, which re-opens the possibil-
ity, on the one hand, for equal cases to be treated unequally and for un-
equal cases to be treated equally, due to temporal discrepancies, and 
secondly, to prevent this feature from being perceived, either as a failure of 
the attempt of establishing unity, or indeed as injustice.  380
Certainly the system wants to be “just” , still, being irremediably 381
exposed to contingency, and because Justice, as a norm, cannot any 
longer be considered in modernity a mirror of social harmony and unity, 
Luhmann points out that unjust legal systems do exist.  Denying it would 382
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub380 -
lished in Pbk. 2008, p. 222.
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub381 -
lished in Pbk. 2008, p.213
Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub382 -
lished in Pbk. 2008,  p.214
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mean not having noticed that with autopoiesis the dichotomy between nat-
ural law theories and positivist theories is overcome, it would mean also 
that the only way to describe the system is to posit its operations outside 
the system, overcoming in this way paradoxes, but not overcoming tradi-
tion.  383
That the “Formula for Variety” can claim to constitute a more ap-
proachable competitor of Luhmann’s Kontingenzformel is very likely in-
deed. What this, however, shows, first of all, is the elective affinity in which 
this concept stands with respect to the positivist idea of relating ultimately 
to the unity of the legal system understood as the site of its identity (while 
Luhmann, ultimately, finds not unity but difference).  This is perfectly 384
consistent with the idea of finality and variety of choice embedded in the 
variety-guided interpretation, where Justice is presented, for instance, as 
“a form of consistency”.  By substituting ‘contingency’ with ‘variety’ the 385
path of research in the ambit of autopoietic theory of Justice joins the 
maze of positivistic paradoxes and disappointed attempts at finding unity 
in law. One difference, however, remains and should not be overlooked. 
The legal positivists, who have never been able to find a dimension for 
Justice within law, had it relegated somewhere into that ‘outside’ of the 
law, to which the understanding of the legal system has never ceased to 
be vitally attached since the successful introduction of the separation of 
law and morality, that is to say, in the realm of ethics. Instead, the idea of 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Pub383 -
lished in Pbk. 2008, p.227
 Luhmann, N. ‘Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft’ Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp, 384
1988, p. 165.
 Nobles, R. Schiff, D. ‘A Sociology of Jurisprudence’, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 385
2006, p.115.
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Justice as a Formula for Variety, which brings with it a system theory ap-
proach, explicitly insists on having Justice placed inside the legal system.  
With its intermediate standing between old positivistic and new 
autopoietic approaches to law, the variety-theory of Justice successfully 
combines some of the more convincing arguments from each of the two 
sides. Yet, there are limits to this attempt. Example: if a finalistic aspect is 
reintroduced, the compatibility with the main trajectory of Luhmann’s 
thought is jeopardised, because a moralistic aspect is, then, introduced, as 
well, as thinking in finalities cannot avoid involving moral judgments.  386
And finally, there is the following major difference: Luhmann, otherwise 
than Hart, Kelsen, or Austin, fails to provide the law-expelled morality with 
an “outside-of-the-law”, as a legitimate ground for its exercise.  
 The contingency formula Justice, instead, provides the system with a 
standard that is no longer either a goal or an idealisation. It is, rather, a 
mere default rule, and it generates a higher visibility of injustice. Justice 
does not transform indeterminable complexity into determinable complex-
ity, and does not give a rule for orientation of the system or a criterion for 
decision-making. Instead, the importance of the contingency formula, al-
though it cannot satisfy any desire for certainty, lies in the fact that it or-
ganises meaning specifically for each social system. Justice as the contin-
gency formula of the legal system has the duty of providing normative ex-
pectations in the face of results, even and especially where they contradict 
or disappoint such expectations. “Justice is a contingency formula” means: 
1- that Justice is not a consistency formula – say: not a program that cor-
responds to a perfection or a guarantee, and, 2- that Justice is not a mat-
 King, M. Schütz, A. ‘The Ambitious Modesty of Niklas Luhmann’ 1994 Journal 386
of Law and Society, Vol.21, No.3, p. 275.
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ter of contingency alone, but of “formula”, that is to say, a matter of form, 
the form in which a specific functional system deals with it (although this 
form is distinguished by its adaptive and learning capacity, its plasticity, it 
is neither devoid of information nor of risk).  
    4.6 - Philosophical virtualities. 
 Every decision about what is legal and illegal in the system is an 
actualisation of the legal system’s Kontingenzformel. It is in a sense itself 
the risk inherent in each and every decision of the system. Still, the contin-
gency formula does not supply a rule of orientation on how to decide. In 
fact, looking at precedents does not give judges a direction on how to 
judge new cases. This is so because judges, considered as observers, do 
not have knowledge of what is just, but only of what is unjust. There are 
numerous studies, including those which led to legal reports of socio-cul-
tural levels of injustice in society in relation to gender, race, social exclu-
sion and culture, which show that there is no positive idea of Justice, even 
if there is a huge amount of preparedness to denounce injustice wherever 
it can be seen, witnessing an overwhelming expectation of Justice. 
As a rule, decisions of judges are therefore exposed to criticism. 
What the Kontingenzformel Justice thus should provide judges with, is a 
tool with which to observe decision-making. In fact, in the legal system, as 
well as in all functional systems, what the Kontingenzformel refers to is the 
extent of the exposure of the limited legal system to that which, in its day-
to-day efforts, constitutes the objective of its action. Everything that is in 
the process of being accomplished within the system, that is, the descrip-
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tion of the totality of active undertakings of society (Spinoza’s Natura 
Naturans,  translated and applied to modern society), falls under the sys387 -
tem code in Luhmann’s perspective, so in the legal system the contin-
gency referred to extends to all that can be seen in society. It is described 
as either legal or illegal.  
  Teubner clarifies the notion of “contingency formula” by adding the 
expressions “prohibition of negation”, “incontestability” (which give rise to 
never ending contingencies) and “social process of self-observation of 
law’s unity”  via its own programs. In a seminal article of 2008, Teubner 388
interprets the exposure of decision-making to irritation as “unjust”. The 
quest for Justice is in terms of a “blind spot” between law and society. 
Since Justice seems now outside the philosophical discourse, the possible 
issue lies in a reformulation of a feasible perception of Justice that fits the 
current, polycontextural conditions.  Teubner’s claim is that Justice is 389
“self-subversive”: whilst being the self-description of law, it undermines it-
self at every instance and instant of decision-making by creating ever-new 
injustices. 
 Polycontexturality and society’s fragmentation, two extreme expres-
sions of the complexity of modern society, are the culprits in this scenario. 
In the case of a polycontextural society, the relational perspectives ob-
tained through second order observation become mutually exclusive with 
the consequence of being in some case also mutually damaging, making 
 Spinoza, B. ‘Ethics’ I P2 9 School. Trans: Edwin Curley. London: Penguin, 387
1996.
 Teubner, G. ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula 388
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 Teubner, G. ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula 389
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their reconciliation under a universal understanding of Justice impossible. 
Considering the fragmentation of society, Teubner points out that society 
ends up with a fragmented concept of Justice; yet, this gives rise to a new 
possibility, that is of a division of Justice in various coexisting “spheres” 
without a common “meta-principle”, and of which the one to look at in the 
context of the legal system is ‘juridical Justice’ – that is to say, Justice to 
the extent to which is presides the Legal system, leaving aside other as-
pects of Justice, such as social or political. In other words, Teubner shows 
how this path leads to abandon once for all the idea of a unity in favour of 
Luhmannian ‘difference’.   390
 Yet, Juridical Justice takes for Teubner the aspect of what he con-
ceives, equally taking his distances from Luhmann, as a ‘transcendence 
formula’, a formula that is no longer viewed as immanent to the law, but as 
transcending its boundaries. This means that Justice can respond to the 
requirements of the outside world, which the legal system’s closure as well 
as the fundamental distinction between system and environment would 
usually make unthinkable and contradictory. However, it is here that 
Justice in this interpretation should overcome its own self-referential limits. 
In fact, Justice is expected to operate through legal judgments, acts and 
practices, within its limits, and it is here that law faces its closure, the 
primary responsible of injustice. This is different from considering in-
justices as mere irritations of the system like in the case of Nobles’ and 
Schiff’s interpretation of injustice. Mainly because in the case of the “Tran-
scendence Formula” there is an ‘escape’ of Justice from the boundaries of 
the legal system in order to consider and take in the demands of the envir-
 Teubner, G. ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula 390
of Law’ 2009, Modern Law Review, Vol. 72, pp. 1-23,. p. 5
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onment. Moreover, this is a way of embracing all cases as Luhmann in-
tends - rather than limiting oneself to only those which fit the bill of an 
idealised Justice.  
 In what way does Justice fulfil its transcendence? Against law’s un-
quelled desire for certainty, Justice shows what Teubner calls its “internal 
subversive force”, and rebels against law’s fundamental failures by disrupt-
ing the recursive operations of the system. In other words, the transcend-
ence formula Justice reacts against the positivist infatuations with stability, 
order, unity and self-continuation. After rendering law “self-transcendent”, 
Justice makes law become once again immanent in order to continue its 
operations, although in this way the injustice also continues, as the con-
straints of the systems cannot be done away with. This, Teubner explains, 
results in a new positivisation of law, new injustices, and a new protest 
from the environment, creating this way a returning process of transcend-
ence and immanence, of creation and destruction of Justice, in other 
words a re-affirmation of law’s “necessary contingency”.   391
 This transcendence of juridical Justice has nothing to do with a lot 
that can be found in the tradition of the concept of transcendence – reli-
gious for instance. By superimposing Derrida’s deconstruction theory, 
Teubner pushes the idea of Justice beyond the limits imposed by Luhmann 
and expects Justice’s transcendence finally to be “beyond any 
meaning”.  In other words, due to the fundamental distinction between 392
system and environment, the system can see only within the boundaries of 
law, which means that the outside protests for Justice asking to be con-
 Teubner, G. ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula 391
of Law’ 2009, Modern Law Review, Vol. 72, pp. 1-23, pp.12-13.
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sidered will need to re-enter the system thereby causing the all too well 
known “blind spot”. Here Derrida goes instead beyond this distinction and 
into a rationalist interpretation of Justice. Certainly, Derrida opens new 
paths in the discussions upon Justice by reasserting that Justice is beyond 
a consistency formula and even beyond a contingency formula. Yet, if cor-
rectly understood in these its own terms, is it then not as well beyond any 
horizon in which an autopoietic discussion might make sense? 
 By introducing Derrida’s concept of transcendence into a discourse 
of Kontingenzformel, Teubner, remembering the cybernetic idea of acting 
in order to increase the number of choices for further actions, opens wide 
the theoretical discourse on Justice to non-autopoietic theories which can 
provide us with further insights into the law and Justice relationship. 
Clearly, this relationship is under multiple disciplining constraints; con-
straints of rule-making devoid of any power of any kind, natural or super-
natural, and produced only by the inherent poverty of law’s tools; con-
straints of decision-making, which is always only between two parties; fi-
nally, cognitive constraints of rational justification, where the dichotomy 
between the system internal requirements of normative consistency and 
the external ecological demands, from which Justice cannot escape, even 
as a contingency formula.  These constraints, Teubner continues, can be 393
ignored, but only at one’s own risk, reducing those theories of Justice to 
mere philosophical attempts.  394
 Teubner, G. ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula 393
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In recent years Teubner has intertwined Derrida’s philosophy with 
Luhmann’s sociological theory on more than one occasion.   Certainly 395
Derrida and Luhmann have a common understanding of the inherent in-
stability in the traditional hierarchies of knowledge. The promises of ration-
al legal discourses and routines of legal decisions are seen by both Luh-
mann and Derrida as irrational and unpredictable, leading inevitably to 
contradictions, irregularities and paradoxes (aporias). Moreover, they both 
agree in taking these inconsistencies and antinomies not as hindering 
elements to the quest for, in this case, Justice, but as a starting point for 
their own autopoietic and deconstructive theories and respective tech-
niques.  
Derrida’s approach to what could be called the initial or foundational 
paradox of law, the problem of determining what is legal and what is illeg-
al, is unfolded through three aporias, which are nothing but three faces of 
the same aporia in the relationship between law and Justice.  The first 396
aporia Derrida describes is about the problem of freedom of decision in 
order to exercise Justice. A judge is forced by law to follow a code and 
cannot therefore exercise a free choice. This aspect of force inherent in 
Law, says Derrida, is what makes Justice impossible. A second aporia 
refers to the ‘undecidability’ of Judges’ decisions. The process of being 
faced with undecidable decisions is a duty-bound experience, which, 
again, must take into account rules and law. Without this process there 
 SeeTeubner, G. ‘Economics of Gift - Positivity of Justice: The Mutual Paranoia 395
of Jacques Derrida and Niklas Luhmann’ Theory, Culture and Society 18, 2001, 
29-47; See also Teubner, G. ‘ The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction 
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would not be free decisions, but, since a decision has to follow a rule, has 
to be considered, according to Derrida’s reasoning, not just. Because of 
this, Justice is never in the present, only in a not very well defined future 
and, therefore, non-existent. Although, Derrida adds, this “is not to say that 
they are in themselves unjust, in the sense of ‘illegal’. They are neither 
legal nor illegal in their founding moment”.  A third aporia relates to the 397
fact that, although Justice is in the future, the necessity of decisions is al-
ways imminent and it is this need of urgency that makes Justice without a 
horizon of expectation. Derrida’s Justice is “possible only as 
impossible”.    398
Luhmann views instead the legal-illegal paradox as “a unity of 
something that must be function as different.”  Luhmann’s position has 399
been widely explained earlier and this should clarify also that the Derridian 
idea of the impossibility of Justice is not totally incompatible with Luh-
mann’s view, although, when delving into the concept of contingency for-
mula, Derrida’s impossibility is in many respects not equivalent to Luh-
mann’s contingency. Apart from the concepts used, what makes Luhmann 
and Derrida diverge greatly is their belonging to very different fields and 
most of all the fact that while the one represents the continuation of philo-
sophical discourse, the other is the promoter of a new sociological one and 
of course it makes a great deal of difference for legal theory which of the 
two is chosen and continued.  
 Derrida, Jacques (1990) 'Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority’ 397
Cardozo Law Review 11: 919-1046. p.943.
 Royle, N. ‘Deconstructions: a User's Guide’, Palgrave Macmillan 2000, p. 300.398
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4.7 - Beyond bipolarity? 
It is clear from our analysis that the “Formula for Variety” and the 
“Transcendence Formula” draw Luhmann’s final contributions to law into 
different and opposing directions, the former choosing a more accessible 
interpretation of Luhmann’s overly demanding conception of Justice, pre-
ferring to remain on the well-known ground of that part of Luhmann’s the-
ory that still has its roots in a meta-theory of legal positivism, whilst never-
theless contributing important supplementary perspectives. Nevertheless, 
because of the problems illustrated earlier, especially in connection to the 
finality-bound approach, this interpretation seems to remain in a terrain of 
an empirically controlled present, and in a sense shuns the more inventive 
initiatives of Luhmann’s later contributions.  
Opposite to it, the “Transcendence Formula” adds the never-ending 
and endlessly unfolding paradox of an impossible yet inescapable Justice. 
The paradox of law that cannot stop trying to produce Justice, but, due to 
its non-intentional side effects, produces even more injustice, is taken at 
an extreme point. What comes to fruition is a transcendental structure, 
which is un-touchable and un-foldable by the usual known theoretical re-
medial methods and means. Because of this, Teubner’s deconstruction of 
law moves close to a new type of legal theology, in which Derrida’ decon-
structive figures can be discovered as functioning like a species of ‘revela-
tion’. It would seem that Teubner is doing a theoretical discourse in which 
he continues a philosophical interpretation of Justice and borrows from 
Derrida’s ‘revelation’. At the same time he is, in a sense, going towards the 
old logic of the operating of the law, a sort of old referential ‘transfer’ on 
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behalf of jurists in which he seems to want to find some sort of rational 
stability. What results from this exercise is that Teubner’s stance is some-
what suspended between a juridical and a philosophical discourse. There 
is no doubting about the fact that the author is aware of his position and 
perhaps chose to take here a calculated risk for the sake of leaving the re-
cognised and accepted ground in order to find an alternative to too well 
known understatements and overstatements of Justice, but also in order to 
explore the theoretical possibilities beyond the limits of autopoiesis. 
Amidst these two opposed interpretations, remains Luhmann ori-
ginal Kontingenzformel, whose significance is perhaps not yet fully real-
ised or unearthed. The question of a disappointment-sensitive Justice, 
which underlies Luhmann’s Kontingenzformel Justice, becomes plausible, 
as opposed to: excessively disappointing in its own turn, only once the 
faith in consistent Justice is obliterated by doubts and acknowledged as a 
secular post-theological versions of divine Justice. Luhmann tries a step 
out of the bipolar structure of overstatement and understatement of 
Justice. The system-theoretical approach distinguishes itself from the 
manifold traditional theories and accounts of the legal order, on both sides. 
The majority of legal theories put the legal order under a finality of Justice, 
while several legal theoretical sects suppose that there is no goal, only a 
internal system construction, an expression of other forces (like in Marx 
and economic theory of law) that takes on a mere appearance (where 
people speak of law, there is in fact only economy, by self-delusion). This 
displacement strategy is insufficient. Luhmann’s most decisive claim is the 
notion that there is no space for Justice in any other place than in the legal 
system. Not outside, but only inside the system; inside, but not in a tran-
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scendentally ensured way. The legal system is a place, itself understood 
as a ‘goal’, not as its function, where everything else follows; merely an 
occasion for the continuity of the exercise of the legal order. How can legal 
theory prevent this proceduralised question from stopping, or the legal or-
der from losing its ability to cope, which is predicated on the appropriately 
reduced and abstracted notion of Gerechtigkeit which Luhmann tries to 
provide. A number of earlier tendencies toward modernisation, among 
which Cassirer’s Substanzbegriff to Funktionbegriff, take an important 
place and have put Luhmann, first of all, into a functionalist pattern.  In 400
the meantime, the idea that law is not a unity but a difference, a distinction, 
has left the functionalist horizon far behind. The question of how society 
works is still an open question, as the idea of “function” of society.  With401 -
in this idea of difference as opposed to unity is the central figure of the 
paradox. In the very moment in which a solution to a problem seems to be 
found as the only good and solid possible solution, the paradox already 
starts, as in the very moment of solving the world’s problem the solutions 
changes the world – and stops to be the solution. Every truth-claim, every 
solution, every good answer will thus be irremediably subverted, confuted, 
reformulated. Hence there is a recognition and at the same time a need for 
a routine, a circular practice of re-doing everything anew, and again and 
again, due to the mortality of all discoveries, claims, decisions, and this 
includes, of course, juridical decisions.  
Still, with overwhelming appeal for both overstatement and under-
statement of Justice, we see that the consistency aspect of Justice holds 
 Cassirer, E. ‘Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die 400
Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik’, Berlin (Bruno Cassirer) 1910.
 Luhmann,N. 'The Third Question: The Creative Use of Paradox in Law and 401
Legal. History' (1988) 15 J. of Law and Society 153-165.
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on to us by all its forces, still today. Media and subjects will be able to 
speak out against a particular miscarriage of Justice, at a given occasion; 
yet, they will do so in the name of the promise of a consistent Justice con-
trolled by some perfection-guaranteeing master, which is a highly unreal 
name and a hopelessly overstated promise. The problem the legal order 
has in determining how it can refer to Justice at all - in the absence of any 
consistent reply to that question - enjoys no sympathy. Heinz von Foer-
ster’s suggestion that it is necessary to “act in a way to increase the num-
ber of choices”  appears as diametrically opposed to what the duty of 402
judges is generally considered to be. Luhmann has reiterated that there is 
no place for ethics in law, and therefore the point of making the right 
choice is not a problem of the legal system. This is when the Kontingenz-
formel fulfils its role by giving parameters within which the choices can, not 
should, be made. In fact, although the content, the references of the jur-
idical problems change and must change or must be recalculated at any 
given time, those who have to make the decisions remain anchored ines-
capably to the ‘formula’. 
 Foerster, H. von, ‘Ethics and Second Order Cybernetics’, 1991. In Foerster,H. 402
Von, ‘Undertanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition’, 
Springer, 2003;
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5 - Modernity, Postmodernity, and Contingency: 
Why the Law Needs a Contingency Formula. 
 5.1 - Modernity: a structural break. 
 The terms ‘modern’ and ‘modernity’ are not very easy to define. 
They may mean different things in different contexts. If looked at it in his-
torical terms, its beginning is set after the Middle Ages in a European con-
text , in a "post-traditional and post-medieval historical period” . Soci403 404 -
ologically, it has been defined as “set of attitudes towards the world, the 
idea of the world as open to transformation, by human intervention”  , 405
and no longer under the spell of a religion wielding, whether admittedly or 
unadmittedly, political powers. The end of the society-compassing over-
lordship of especially the Christian and the Judaic religious traditions has 
not only direct implications for the evolution of social thought; it is as such 
postulated and understood by a representative variety of writers, that 
spans from Descartes to Husserl, but is also seen by a religious philo-
sopher such as Emil Fackenheim, and Descartes with his ‘Methodic 
Doubt’, where men’s subjective judgment supplanted God’s guarantee of 
 Context characterised by colonisation, capitalism, urbanisation, industrialisa403 -
tion, birth of the nation-state, to mention but a few characteristics. See for ins-
tance Yamins, D. ‘The Rise of Europe in The High Middle Ages: Reactions to Ur-
ban Economic Modernity 1050 - 1300’,  https://web.stanford.edu/~yamins/
uploads/2/4/9/2/24920889/rise_of_urban_europe.pdf (Last accessed 5 June 
2018).
 Heidegger, M. 'The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays', 404
translated by William Lovitt, 115–54, Harper Colophon Books (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1977. pp.66-67.
 Giddens, A. ‘Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Moderni405 -
ty’. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998, p.94.
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the truth . So, in other words, modernity is indeed an epochal shift, a 406
“radical break” , involving secularisation, a general rejection of a tradi407 -
tional order, and the rise of individualism . This “epochal shift” occurred 408
after the middle ages and continued to occur over the centuries and al-
ways “with the help of a differentiation from the past” . In any given mo409 -
ment of the unfolding of modernity, what is modern, what society calls 
“modern”, is relative to a “temporal dimension” .  410
 Although Giddens rejects the idea of functional differentiation , he 411
still sees modernity “in a time-space-distantiation” , and continues ex412 -
plaining that ‘In conditions of modernity, the level of time-space-distanti-
ation is much greater than in even the most developed of agrarian civilisa-
tions”.  What happens in modernity is that these “ties between time and 413
 See for instance Husserl, E. 'Méditations cartésiennes. Introduction á la phé406 -
noménologie', translated by Gabrielle Peiffer and Emmanuel Lévinas. Biblio-
thèque Société Francaise de Philosophie. Paris: A. Colin. 1931. See also Fa-
ckenheim, E. L. Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation. Canada, 1957 pp.272-2. 
Descartes, R. (1641). 'Meditations on First Philosophy'. In Cottingham, et al. 
(eds.), 1984.
 Latour, B. ‘We Have Never Been Modern’. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni407 -
versity Press. 1993, p.124.
 Foucault, M. ‘The Order of Things’. New York: Pantheon, 1970. p. 128.408
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p.409
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space are decreasing [and] becoming contingent” . Luhmann agrees on 414
the temporal element, by claiming that “when society calls itself modern, it 
identifies itself with the help from a differentiation from the past. It identifies 
itself in a temporal dimension” . Luhmann does add that the problem is 415
not so much the break with tradition, as it is modernity is “a constant cre-
ation of otherness” . In other words, the need of “a higher level of identity 416
of the non-identical”  is the problem in modernity, as contingency is more 417
and more evidently the primary characteristic of modern society, and a 
pivotal problem analysed in Luhmann’s later years.  
 Modernity is a consequence of what Luhmann calls a “structural 
break”  and the “evolution of ideas” . Both are dependent on the rela418 419 -
tionship of society with its environment, and both bring about uncertainty, 
contingency, philosophy, and relativism . This means simply that se420 -
mantics change, societal situations change, big structural societal changes 
happen, and have an impact to the extent of “sweep[ing] us away from  all 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, 414
pp.5-6.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 415
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 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I Stanford University press, 2012 p 331.418
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See all chapter on Evolution.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012 p 331-420
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types of previous social order in quite unprecedented fashion” . All un421 -
certainty and relativism have an impact on society, but these are not “situ-
ational evidence”  unless they exist to the exclusion of alternatives.    422
 These cases, the sporadic uncertain changes, “do not impose the 
acceptance of more complex communication”  So, for instance, the im423 -
pact that industrialisation had on people in the nineteenth century causing 
extreme poverty is a situational fact. The point for Luhmann is that what 
happened with industrialisation (and many other structural changes in so-
ciety) is “a fact that could not be disputed” . The question of industrialisa424 -
tion as a prime example of modernity, is also illustrated by Norbert Wiener, 
who takes a similar stance, underlining the ineluctability of it, as a “phase 
which was of greater mechanical than moral significance” . Although he 425
points out that “there was an exploitation of the labour of children and wo-
men to an extent, and of a brutality scarcely conceivable at the present 
time” , Wiener also argues that the disastrous consequences of the in426 -
dustrial revolution “were not so much due to any moral obtuseness or 
iniquity. (…), as to certain technical features, which were inherent in the 
 Giddens, A. ’The Consequences of Modernity’, Polity Press, 1991, p. 4.421
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012 p 331.422
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012 p 331.423
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012 p 331.424
 Wiener, R. ‘The Human Use of Human Beings’, Da Capo Press, 1954, P.141.425
 Wiener, R.  ‘The Human Use of Human Beings’, Da Capo Press, 1954, P.141.426
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(…) means of industrialization” . Luhmann brings more examples, such 427
as the American War of Independence, or the Lisbon Earthquake. Situ-
ations that have in common that they cannot be controlled, yet still depend 
on two things: social structures and system differentiation . In other 428
words, predominantly, society remains the same on the face of it, there are 
still class differences, the state is organised the same way, but the innova-
tions introduced create a sort of “reality index”  to which each must sub429 -
ject himself, or succumb, like in the case of the factory workers the early 
Eighteen Century. This remains true at any point in modern times and 
shows what the change from societal stratification to societal functional 
differentiation looks like. Especially when this evolution, this structure 
change, is fast, “adequate self-observation and self-description are difficult 
if not impossible” . So the consequence is that any discontinuity is not 430
marked; what is called State, remains such, even if other attributes, such 
as “constitutional” or “modern” are applied to it. 
 At the same time Luhmann believes that the Industrial revolution or 
the French Revolution have nothing to do with “the breakdown of what 
 It is worth mentioning that Marx's most fundamental theorem about capitalism 427
teaches that those who attribute to particularly evil capitalists the cruelty of hu-
mankind split into the two of owners and the proletariat, are misled by a wrong 
theory. It's the "means of production" and who owns them, which are at stake 
here - in Wiener's words: "certain technical features which were inherent in indus-
trialisation;" so, as analysts of the historical situations actual content, Luhmann, 
Wiener, and Marx follow largely the same sober doctrine. See Wiener, R.  ‘The 
Human Use of Human Beings’, Da Capo Press, 1954, P.141-2.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012 p 332.428
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I, Stanford University press, 2012 p 332.429
 Luhmann, N. ’Theory of Society’, vol IStanford University press, 2012 p.332.430
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German historian Otto Brunner referred to as old-European semantics” ; 431
instead, this breakdown “became inevitable when society changed its 
primary form of differentiation, when it shifted from the very elaborate or-
der of hierarchical stratification, conceived of as ‘the order’, to functional 
differentiation” . Brunner, in fact, saw those old-European semantics as 432
basic concepts ingrained in a “concrete order”  Previously societies were 433
defined according to social strata, wealth, and placed in an unmovable so-
cial structure. In this structure, the highest authority was a sort of undis-
puted single observer “for describing, producing ontology” . This world of 434
“being or not being”, the world of ontological metaphysics is the world lost 
to modernity, and it is lost when, according to Luhmann, European society 
realised that this old order had disappeared and had been replaced by the 
new semantics of modernity, while, at the same time, it still was part of the 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as second-order Observing’.New Literary Histo431 -
ry, Vol.24, No.4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and Cultu-
ralChange (Autumn,1993), pp.763-782.  p.779.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as second-order Observing’.New Literary Histo432 -
ry, Vol.24, No.4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and Cultu-
ralChange (Autumn,1993), pp.763-782.  p.779.
 “Konkretes Ordnungsdenken” - a term Brunner took from Carl Schmitt. On this 433
see Brunner, O. Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Aus-
tria, trans. Howard Kaminsky and James Van Horn Melton (Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 1992. p. xiii.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as second-order Observing’.New Literary Histo434 -
ry, Vol.24, No.4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and Cultu-
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European cultural heritage.   All the new dual semantics  that emerged 435 436
- state and society, individual and collectivity, community and society - 
were left unexplained and uninterpreted, and created a new ‘other’.  437
Then new problems appeared, such as ‘the social question’ imperialism, 
and society was still unable to observe itself in the modern sense . In 438
other words, old pre-modern societies did have a limited way of self-de-
scription, where, keeping distinct semantics, each saw itself as the centre 
of the world, in its own cosmology.  This old European view of the world 439
in Europe, with a “religious control of inconsistencies” , and of interpreta440 -
tion of the world more generally, is what can be described as ontology. It 
was an “ontological mode of observation” . This shift from ontology to 441
functional differentiation, from a world where everything is put in a subor-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as second-order Observing’.New Literary Histo435 -
ry, Vol.24, No.4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and Cultu-
ralChange (Autumn,1993), pp.763-782.  p.778-9.
 On this see for instance Koselleck, R. ‘Futures Past: On the Semantics of His436 -
torical Time. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought’, Columbia Uni-
versity Press; New Ed edition (13 Aug. 2004) p. 155 and ff.
 Koselleck, R. ‘Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Studies in 437
Contemporary German Social Thought’, Columbia University Press; New Ed 
edition (13 Aug. 2004) p. 156. Also Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, 
Stanford University Press, 1998. p.3.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as second-order Observing’.New Literary Histo438 -
ry, Vol.24, No.4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and Cultu-
ralChange (Autumn,1993), pp.763-782.  p.780.
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ vol II Oxford University Press, USA; 1st 439
Published in Pbk. 2008, p.183-184.
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ vol II Oxford University Press, USA; 1st 440
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dinate position in respect to a being / nonbeing  [Seiendes / Nichtseiendes] 
distinction (with no space for a possible middle ground), and where noth-
ing else can exist; to a world, in other words, that is determined by an in-
side /outside distinction, as well as by the distinction of self-reference / 
other-reference . This is what Luhmann considers the latest epochal 442
shift: from ontology to functional differentiation in society (reflected in logic, 
philosophy, science and religion. Ontology is a mode of observation, and 
so is functional differentiation. No other epochal shift occurred after this 
even if society has acquired many different characteristics from that time 
and since then, this shift is what determined a shift from pre-modernity to 
modernity. 
 5.2 - Postmodernity, Deconstruction and the Paradox. 
 If modernity is complex enough a matter as being predicated on 
discussion, ‘postmodernity’ is even more controversial theme, and brings 
to the fore some further differences between Luhmann on the one hand 
and some other contemporary theories, which call themselves postmod-
ern, on the other hand; such as, for instance, Derrida, and most precisely 
the derridean theme best known in the English-speaking sphere, decon-
struction. Luhmann uses the term ‘postmodernity’ often, but at the same 
time says that the discourse on postmodernity is a “discourse without a 
future” . This is not in a negative sense. The discourse on traditional 443
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ vol II Oxford University Press, USA; 1st 442
Published in Pbk. 2008, p.195.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Observations on Modernity’, Stanford University Press, 1998. p.443
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modernity projected its promises onto the future in a way - Luhmann 
claims - to try and resolve the problem within the paradox of society. This 
does correspond to the argumentative stance of what Derrida 's decon-
structionist philosophy tries to achieve. 
 Luhmann argues that the term ‘postmodern’ does not offer new in-
formation; rather, its scope is limited to that of a question of semantics . 444
This is mainly because there is no new epochal shift since the Sixteenth or 
Seventeenth Century; there have not been in the Twentieth Century new 
“epochal breaks” with modernity to justify the term ‘postmodernity’. Nothing 
has really changed in the perception of society, no new structural changes 
within functional systems, no new mode of observation, not even with the 
advent of globalisation . Sometimes, Luhmann calls it the “so-called 445
postmodernity” . He claims that postmodernity does offer neither new 446
structures, nor new semantics; it only repeats modern  insights ; never447 -
theless, Luhmann recognises that there are two points in this “so-called 
postmodernity” that deserve detailed attention. One is the claim by the 
philosophical world that postmodernity represents “the end of grand narrat-
ives”; but here Luhmann points out that this is a narrative in itself, a 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as second-order Observing’.New Literary Histo444 -
ry, Vol.24, No.4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and Cultu-
ralChange (Autumn,1993), pp.763-782.  p.780.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol. II, Stanford University press, 2012 p. 445
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 This is in fact the title of the last chapter of his Theory of Society. Luhmann, N. 446
‘Theory of Society’, vol. II, Stanford University press, 2012 p. 345.
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“métarécit”. Moreover, Luhmann actually claims that, contrary to what had 
been claimed postmodernity, branded as the end of the ‘grand narratives’, 
is actually its beginning. In fact, he says, those all-encompassing ‘post-
modern’ theories have in a way a claim of society and of the world as a 
unity. Luhmann suggests, and this is the second point in his description of 
postmodernity, that “the unity of society or, from its perspective, the world, 
can no longer be asserted as principle, but only as paradox” . He calls 448
this paradox also “the orthodoxy of our times” .  449
 The presupposition of so-called “hierarchical oppositions” in law , 450
manifest themselves in any legal issue at hand, for instance when a new 
statute is introduced. As a matter of fact, Luhmann, in an illuminating art-
icle on deconstruction, which is arguably the main theory of postmodern-
ism, discusses various aspects of it and shows how in fact, Deconstruction 
leads to second order observing, as the way to deal with modernity and 
with its multitude of observations . On this point, Luhmann brings the ex451 -
ample of the discussion at the time in the US about the inclusion of homo-
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol. II, Stanford University press, 2012 p. 448
345 and ff.
 Luhmann, N. ‘‘Theory of Society’, vol. II, Stanford University press, 2012 p. 449
345. Luhmann also refers in note 429 that the same idea was  already illustrated 
at the very beginning of the Twentieth Century in ‘The Education of Henry Adams: 
An Autobiography’ (1907), where he quotes ‘but paradox has become the only 
orthodoxy in politics as in science’.
 As well as in any social system, on the basis of its own distinctive code, i.e. 450
legal / illegal for the legal system, government / opposition for the political sys-
tem, payment /non-payment for the economic system, true / false for the science 
system to name but a few. See Moeller, H. G. ‘Luhmann Explained. From Souls 
to Systems’, Open Court Publishing 2006, p.29. See also See Luhmann, N. ‘Die 
Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft’ Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp, 1988;
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as second-order Observing’. New Literary Histo451 -
ry, Vol.24, No.4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and Cultu-
ralChange (Autumn,1993), pp.763-782.
222
sexuals in the Army, where those oppositions - as well as the one coincid-
ing with the code legal/illegal, involved also the oppositions heterosexual/
homosexual; effectiveness/ineffectiveness (of the law); constitutional/un-
constitutional . These oppositions cannot be denied, or ignored, they 452
make up the gist of the discussion. It would be tempting to use deconstruc-
tion as a political instrument to destroy the presupposition of the hierarch-
ical oppositions, that is to destroy the idea of an ‘inherent’, or ‘natural’ idea 
that one of the two terms is superior , but this is - Luhmann points out - 453
not what Derrida means. Deconstruction simply means that any of these 
terms can have a different meaning or importance depending on time, use 
and context. Derrida's term for this is the French neologism différance, 
spelt here with an 'a' in the third syllable, to indicate its derivation from 
différer in the sense of postponing, rather than of showing distinctive fea-
tures (here the noun would be spelt différence).   
 The important case for social system theory, highlighted by this, 
refers to situations where a number of observers (second order observers) 
are present. The Army, the Political System, the Privates, the Officers, 
Heterosexuals and Homosexuals. They do not observe the issue in the 
same way. In other words, deconstruction does away with the boundary, 
there is no real ‘distinction’ anymore, in fact, Luhmann explains, “decon-
struction seems to recommend the reading of forms as differences, to look 
at distinctions without the hope of regaining unity at a higher (or later) 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as Second Order Observing’, New Literary His452 -
tory, Vol. 24, No. 4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and 
Cultural change (Autumn, 1993), pp. 763-782. p. 763.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as Second Order Observing’, New Literary His453 -
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level” . Moreover, it will not lead to “reflexivity, recursivity, [or] self-refer454 -
ence, resulting in stable meanings, objects or what mathematicians call 
eigenvalues[.] It seems that there is only Différance”.  Deconstruction is 455
“everything and nothing” . It is “almost a one-word discussion”  In 456 457
modernity, paradoxes had to be unfolded, or even replaced by “stable 
identities” and unfoldments, then, are the result of un-asking the 
question.”  The point is, Luhmann continues, that there are other post458 -
modern theories, such as post-metaphysical theories that use difference 
as a starting and as an ending point, use the concepts of recursivity and 
self-reference in order to “fix entities  in systems  (…) and to maintain 459
stability”,  and as a way of unfolding (or hiding) paradoxes . 460 461
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for instance Habermas, J. ‘Postmetaphysical Thinking: Between Metaphysics and 
the Critique of Reason’, The MIT Press; First Edition edition (1992). 
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 Interestingly, in traditional Greek and Roman rhetoric, and later in 
theology as well (Ockham), paradox was accepted, not hidden. There 
were no attempts to do away with it, but it was stated, recognised, ana-
lysed and accepted as an irresolvable conundrum or even as a starting 
point for further inquiry and disputes (questiones disputatae). The paradox 
left open is the foundation from which all knowledge becomes possible; 
“the normal doxa is questioned by the para-doxa,  and you have to make a 
decision” . So, we see again the distinction with two sides, like in George 462
Spencer-Brown’s model that shows two sides (a marked and an unmarked 
space), where the whole distinction is then observed as a form; In this in-
stance, the observer indicates one side or the other; reformulated in math-
ematical terms, this is the marking of the form (which can give rise to 
amazing degrees of complexity; more generally, however, any type of sys-
tem, whether biological or psychological, or sociological, is described “as 
determined by the distinction it uses”. In other words, any system of any 
kind - a piece of coding, a person, a social system such as the legal sys-
tem, describe themselves by their choices, and determine their next output 
by framing their own observations, so they self-determine on the basis of 
their distinctions.  
 Luhmann tries to put the paradox to fruition, so to speak. Law is ar-
bitrary, and cannot get away from the legal / illegal binary code; moreover, 
as Luhmann rejects the idea of a Grundnorm  of some sort, he is left with 463
the self-referentiality of the law. He brings to his aid some old cybernetic 
 Luhmann, N. ‘Deconstruction as Second Order Observing’, New Literary His462 -
tory, Vol. 24, No. 4, Papers from the Commonwealth Center for Literary and 
Cultural change (Autumn, 1993), pp. 763-782. p. 770.
 Teubner, G. ‘Economics of Gift - Positivity of Justice: The Mutual Paranoia of 463
Jacques Derrida and Niklas Luhmann’ Theory, Culture and Society 18, 2001, 29-
47.
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acquaintances and their theory in order to explain how this is the best pos-
sible way for the law to have a creative use of the inevitable paradox in-
herent on the legal / illegal code of operation of the legal system; This can 
only be temporary, there is no possible de-paradoxification of the law. 
Neither Derrida, nor Luhmann succeed in this, of course, but the paradox, 
as Teubner has pointed out, is their “common runway which they then, 
however, use for a take-off in opposite directions ” . Nevertheless, Teub464 -
ner, albeit recognising that autopoiesis and deconstruction or  “différance 
does not necessarily coincide with autopoiesis, it is at the same time its 
necessary supplement” . Inasmuch as Teubner continues, “the infinite 465
network of relations, the interplay of various aspects which occurs con-
tinuously without transferring them to a closed system - these are danger-
ous supplements to autopoietic closure. Différance cannot be systematic-
ally integrated into autopoiesis, it comes from outside, as a threatening af-
fliction of closed systems” . This is an important point with regard to 466
Justice as the contingency formula of the legal system. Let us not forget 
that the system is 'blind' to its environment (as well as to the other sys-
tems) insofar as it needs to construe whatever appears and happens at its 
outside. In modernity, it makes no sense to believe in Justice as being the 
absolute criterion for decision making. Due to the ever increasing complex-
ity of observations (case law, judges' views, circumstances of each case, 
 Teubner, G. ‘Economics of Gift - Positivity of Justice: The Mutual Paranoia of 464
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etc.), which go under the umbrella of contingency, justice still occupies a 
central position in the legal system. As Luhmann puts it “between ad-
equate social complexity of law and its internal consistency of decisions, 
justice mediates internal and external requirements” . 467
 5.3 - A New Dawn for  Legal Sociology. 
  
 Whether we agree with Luhmann on what postmodernity is or is 
not, we might consider that modernity has indeed changed, and most of all 
in matters of society. The modernity that is with us is a  new modernity, at 
least from the sociological view-point,. Since roughly one generation, a 
new form of non-explicit social contract is dawning upon us. What is new, 
and what constitutes the innovative fact, is the non-explicit social contract 
– the way in which everyone looks at their own social conduct, and thus 
“thinks of society”, and this,  without being in the least a sociologist, even 
less a social or  a legal theorist), indeed without being in any way intellec-
tually interested.  
 This means that institutions have changed — and are changing, as 
well. The primary legal positivist impetus has insisted, since Bentham and 
Austin, upon the separate being of the law with respect to morality, since 
Kelsen also upon the wholly different realm of “ought” (Sollen) construc-
tions as opposed to “is” (Sein) constructions . In one sense, this distinc468 -
tion has delivered the central modernist impetus in law – a form of the 
overarching enlightenment campaign the central desiderata of which con-
 Luhmann, N.  'Observing Re-entries’ Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal  467
199316: 485-498 : 214 and ff . See also Luhmann, N.  'Rechtssystem und 
Rechtsdogmatik'.  Stuttgart: Kohlhammer (1974) p. 23. 
 Kelsen, H. ‘Pure Theory of Law’, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. (2014).468
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sisted in assigning to religion and faith a function-specific - as opposed to 
a society-compassing - function, and in “emancipating” law from its com-
munal or communitarian definition. For instance, what is known as “Amer-
ican Legal Realism” goes, in a different manner, into the same direction, 
although it does so at a pace that is, if anything, even more resolute. The 
first round of modernity that had been legal positivism in matters of law, 
was, in short, a movement of “unbinding”, of “deregulating”, of shaking off 
bounds and fetters of the “tradition”, of setting law free from non-legal de-
pendencies and interventions, in short: of allowing law to reconfigure itself 
as an autopoietic and self-referential system, of making law into a system.   
 Systems theory, in its post-Parsons shape , in short-hand: Luh469 -
mannian systems theory, takes on board these classically modern lessons. 
Indeed, it fits particularly well with some of the further contributions of the 
legal-positivist school, such as by HLA Hart’s differentiation between 
primary and secondary rules .  Grown on a decidedly different ground 470
than the Luhmannian distinction between first and second order observa-
tion, the more inspired models of legal positivism carry, in their gesture, 
style and overall design, definite family resemblances with Luhmann’s the-
ory architecture. Indeed, Luhmann's theory model can be read as an im-
provement of Kelsen's. Kelsen's “Grundnorm”   is a term which, with its 471
distinction of "levels" one of which serves as a “ground” for all the others, 
seems to point rather to some sort of a pre-existing, fundamental, dis-
symmetric (transcendent) super-element, than to a universe of continuous 
 cf. the US “structural-functionalist” sociologist Talcott Parsons.469
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contingent-unforeseeable decisionmaking. If one of the foremost interpret-
ers of Kelsen's work, Joseph Raz, has claimed that for Kelsen there is no 
duality, as “Kelsen postulates the existence of basic norms because he 
regards them as necessary for the explanation of the unity and normativity 
of legal systems”,  one might feel tempted to nuance this criticism in 472
drawing attention to the fact that, while Kelsen theory of law is certainly no 
more dualism-averse than any other positivist conception, it remains true 
that Kelsen's proceeding is distinction-averse, or in other words that 
Kelsen, instead of "drawing distinctions" (as Luhmann does, following 
George Spencer Brown well-known injunction), is rather identifying pre-ex-
isting splits. 
 Indeed, there is no argument about the claim that there is a possib-
ility of comparing and also combining, alternatively as well as cumulatively, 
the Hartian re-invention, or renovation of legal positivism , inseparable 473
as it is from its own inbuilt and underlying “drive” towards self-reference, 
where a law may perfectly well refer to itself so long as it also refers to 
other laws ;  with some of the easier describable thematic features of 474
Luhmann’s  social systems theory. Firstly, there is the proximity of Hart’s 
(and all legal positivists’) tenet of a separation of law and morality, and the 
points Luhmann (a lawyer by training) makes in his challenge to the polit-
ics-via-dialogue model underlying Habermas’s old-European suggestion of 
 Raz, J, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of The Basic Norm’ The American Journal of Juris472 -
prudence,1974, 94-111. p.95.
 Hart, H. L. A. ‘The Concept of Law’, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961 (second 473
Ed. 1994). See also Fuller, L. L. ’Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A reply to Profes-
sor Hart’  Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Feb., 1958), pp. 630-672).
 On this point see Hart, H. L. A. ‘Self referring Laws’ in ‘Essays in Jurispru474 -
dence and Philosophy’ Clarendon Press 1983. Published by Oxford Scholarship 
Online 2013. See also Lacey, N. ‘H.L.A. Hart’s rule of law: the limits of philosophy 
in historical perspective’ (2007). Quaderni Fiorentini, 36, pp1203-1224.
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moralising politics via, not only the an underlying universal called "rational-
ity", but also  its integral ‘parlamentarisation’ by means of something like a 
permanent and ubiquitous constituting power endlessly laying its cards 
open  .  475
 There is also, secondly, the clear similarity between Hart’s re-foun-
dation of legal positivism and Luhmann’s re-appraisal (limitation, down-
grading) of the political system’s inherited pretension, to wield an incompa-
rable, unique over-all rule over society, based precisely upon its “sov-
ereign” character, in the wording of the old-European power-terminology. 
Hart’s re-foundation of legal positivism is done by replacing its Austinian 
substantive base (that is, the fact of sovereignty), with a process-shaped 
foundation, in which the existence and permanence of the legal order re-
sults directly (or even, we dare say, autopoietically, or indeed 'heterarchi-
cally') and the systems theoretical terminology. This applies without diffi-
culty to the step Hart makes against, (beyond, and on the basis of) 
Austin’s mechanical and hierarchical model of Legal Positivism from the 
everyday behaviour of the individual legal subject. 
 There is, moreover, thirdly, a group of parallel developments based 
upon a merely procedural, horizontal, emerging order-conception – the 
distinction of first-order and second-order levels in either of both authors. 
Hart’s self-referential secondary rules, which are “parasitic upon, or sec-
ondary to the first”  as opposed to first-order which “impose duties”, while 476
 The debate between Habermas and Luhmann dates from the late 1960s – 475
Hart’s own Concept of law, from the early 1960s.
 Hart, H. L. A. ‘The Concept of Law’, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961 (second 476
Ed. 1994) p. 79 and ff.
230
“rules of the second type confer powers”  or other-referential (command) 477
rules; and in Luhmann developed into a neo-cybernetic mathematics of the 
cognitive approach to social matters at large, based upon the distinction of 
first-order and second-order observations. Briefly, this means that the sys-
tem observes itself, but it is in turn observed by an observer in the envir-
onment. The importance of this in Luhmaniann theory is that the two-level 
observation does away with  “the idea of unilateral control” ; and also 478
brings the system (legal, economic, political etc.) from a situation of self-
organisation to an autopoietic one; and from an open system to a closed 
system . 479
 There is then, fourthly and finally, the trump card put by Hart in the 
hands of language, of statements, of ways of describing a factual situation. 
Let us think of the paradigmatic example of the difference in the accounts 
elicited by the respective communications with a bank-robber and a bank 
employee (in view of terms such as ‘obliged' or, on the contrary, 
‘obligated'), and the most radical of all of Luhmann’s theory-founding 
moves: the notion of society as composed of communications. Here we 
are confronted with the exclusion of subjects, individuals and other instan-
tiations of the human being, which is still kept as an (for now) irreplaceable 
condition, but this at the same time ranks as the existence of life, of a sun 
(or the like), of the presence of oxygen, of the noise-carrying capacity of 
the air, for instance. In substance, we can say that both Hart, in the more 
limited region of accounting for modern law, and Luhmann, trying to elab-
 Hart, H. L. A. ‘The Concept of Law’, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961 (second 477
Ed. 1994) p. 81.
 Luhmann, N., ‘Social Systems’, Stanford University Press, 1995, p.36.478
 Luhmann, N., ‘Social Systems’, Stanford University Press, 1995, pp.36-37.479
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orate a new type of theoretical account of the more compassing issue of 
modern society, are following up one of the two branches that Western 
scientific culture, in loose 'followership’ of Kant’s philosophical distinctions 
- between a “human” sphere of will and duty, and one general object-
sphere of knowledge - has started to distinguish throughout the 20th cen-
tury. Most important here is the work of the neo-kantian philosopher Ernst 
Cassirer.  Function, and difference, rather than ontology, or substance, 480
are at the heart of both Hart’s and Luhmann approaches. 
 So there is decidedly a communion or rather some degree of 'com-
munality' between the reformed or later 20th Century positivist outlook and 
some of the bases of the systems theory account of law. Yet, the “post-
modern” drive that moves the later Luhmannian theory,  goes far beyond 481
the position of mid-20th century Legal Positivism even in the reformed 
shape that HLA Hart has given it, which appears from the point of view of 
Luhmannian social systems theory still much too “classically modern”. Hart 
already is modernising positivism; he does this by way of criticising his 
predecessor by more than a century, John Austin. Hart’s Concept of Law, 
which is a series of rules, as opposed to Austin’s Command Theory, which 
instead embeds an older concept of authority, is more fitting for modern 
society, there is more of a modern understanding of the Rule of Law 
(rather than an absolute rule over people), which takes into account a 
pluralistic world.  Still, Hart’s view of the law in a modern world avoids all 482
 Cassirer, E. (1910). Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen 480
über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik, Berlin: Cassirer.
 Starting with Soziale Systeme 1984 - In English as Luhmann, N., ‘Social Sys481 -
tems’, Stanford University Press, 1995.
 On this see Lacey, N. ‘H.L.A. Hart’s rule of law: the limits of philosophy in his482 -
torical perspective’ (2007). Quaderni fiorentini, 36, pp1203-1224;
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ascription of ‘functions’, doubtlessly because it cannot make any other 
sense of it than that of an undue hermeneutical-theoretical interference in 
the matters of merely empirical or “descriptive” sociology (which The 
Concept of Law famously claims to cover simultaneously with its Legal 
Theory targets).  
 Hart, as a legal theorist, is of course careful to make sure that his 
multifaceted criticism of the old brand of legal positivism, still decisive in 
his life-time, sticks to methodological patterns commonly accepted and 
does not introduce a doubt that he is still dealing with the identical “real 
thing”. In this sense Luhmann is, not only not a ‘legal theorist’ according to 
the common understanding of the term (which would generally exclude the 
observation of law from a law-external view-point), nor is he a descriptive 
sociologist under the duty of remaining faithful either to the basic outline of 
a jurisprudential-doctrinal program or to the claim of being the legitimate 
follower of the positivist tradition.   
 It is definitively easier to find out what the proceedings of Luhman-
nian social systems theory is not than to find terms allowing to describe 
what it is. Even if ultimately insufficient, the historical reference to earlier 
achievements of social theory is necessary. There is an original campaign 
underlying a large gamut of politico-philosophical movements from the En-
lightenment  onwards heralding the advent of modern politics, a cam483 -
 The Enlightenment per se is a very large umbrella which covers many ideas, 483
revolutions, philosophical and political currents all over Europe, not to speak of 
the Arts and science. Perhaps the most representative works on Enlightenment 
are Newton, I., ‘Optiks’, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017; 
Locke, J., ‘An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Second Treatise of Go-
verment’, Wordsworth Editions, 2015;’, Kant, I. ‘What is Enlightenment?’ In 
‘Foundations Of The Metaphysics Of Morals And What Is Enlightenment?’ , In-
diana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company (1959). Firstly published in 1784 in November 
1784 in the  German periodical, Berlinische Monatschrift; and Foucault, M. ‘The 
Foucault Reader’, Penguin, 1991.
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paign that attempts to put a stop to the indefinite recycling of earlier institu-
tions or traditions that have started to look unacceptable in the light of re-
cent evolutions of political ideas. Legal Positivism is clearly part of this 
overriding political program or campaign.  It is related in this to a large part 
of what might be termed the common ideals of science, and of the whole 
bundle of attitudes that are referred as “enlightenment”: a new relationship 
to law and politics, weaned from the public hegemony of religion; a pursuit 
of the ideas, among other movements, of utilitarianism. There is a sense of 
the modernist pathos of liberation from the fetters of unjustified rights ac-
quired by birth, a sense of emancipation, of the liberation of a slave from 
slavery, but also of that of a son from the dependence from his power-
holding father, in the precise sense of “throwing-off some mancipium” (lit-
erally, the fact of being kept or captured in another person’s hand), i.e. of 
subjection, dependency, inferiority, in whatever form. The problem that ap-
pears at the threshold of this post-modern, or anti-modern or, if one 
prefers, “second stage”-modern moment, is that emancipation is not suffi-
cient for the continuation over time of a process such as the evolution of 
the legal system.  
 To draw a watertight distinction between “expository jurisprudence” 
and “censorial jurisprudence”  – calling it thus in order remind of Jeremy 484
Bentham’s idiosyncratic, but expressive and far from unfounded Romanist 
terminology  -  followed by the externalisation of the latter kind, has 485
 Bentham, J., Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence (hereafter 484
Limits), ed. p.Schofield (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2011), p.17. See also Ben-
tham, J. “Pannomial Fragments”, in Selected Writings of Jeremy Bentham, ed. S. 
Engelmann, Yale University Press, 2011, p.253.
 On this see for instance: Arnon, B. D. 'A reading of Bentham’s “Historical Pre485 -
face to A Fragment on Government – Intended for the second edition.” in Revue 
d’études Benthamiennes, 13, 2014. 
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provided an unquestionably successful technique of unburdening the judi-
cial praxis from the paralysing weight and sweeping claims to society-wide 
validity. As any student of Jurisprudence would remember, expository jur-
isprudence involves identifying the essence of law as it is: this demands 
purely scientific considerations of the ‘true propositions’ of  English law, 
which will lead in turn to a study of the source of legal commands, which 
are at the heart of that law .  486
 Censorial jurisprudence instead necessitates considerations on how 
our law ought to be . These two types are to be accepted as logically 487
separate and not as an unified jurisprudential outlook. Bentham is the first 
to speak of the distinction between expository and censorial jurisprudence; 
he is knowledgeable of the main components of the old Roman-republican 
office of the ‘censor', a political office which does absolutely not limit itself 
at designating the one who prohibits – although it is this prohibiting action 
that has become the only one among his many attributions for which the 
censor (cf. “censorship”) is known today -  but also the one who, as a pub-
lic household keeper or manager who is in charge of all important, existen-
tial non-political issues touching the Roman people or population.  
 The positivist innovation at the basis of Bentham’s distinction is 
precisely the distinction, the claim, or the admission, that both cannot be 
dealt with at the same time: it is the fact of neatly distinguishing between 
both attributions, on the one side, ‘expository jurisprudence’, a knowledge 
of the law as it has been positively established (de lege lata), in which 
quality it does nothing else apart from exposing, expounding, or repeating 
 Loring, R. ‘The Role of Universal Jurisprudence in Bentham’s Legal Cosmopo486 -
litanism’ in Revue d’études Benthamiennes, 13, 2014. 
 Bentham, J. ‘ Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’ eds. J.H. 487
Burns & H.L.A. Hart, intro. F. Rosen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1996), p. 294.
235
the law; on the other side, as ‘censorial jurisprudence', it gives rise to a 
separate knowledge (de lege ferenda), which, perfectly compatible with 
the fact that its choices are not for now implementable as being valid law', 
takes the managerial stance the position of an administrator asking himself 
or herself questions of how certain issues would be best legally dealt 
with .  488
 The postulate underlying their division being readily enough ex-
plained by comparing it to a basic fact, also, of an engineering activity: a 
motor cannot be at once used and repaired, an argument which, in paren-
theses, fits perfectly the positivist onslaught against natural law. But, of 
course, it fits much more elegantly and much more relevantly into a tech-
nique of sense-making that Bentham could barely have encountered in his 
lifetime, namely into the neo-cybernetic (or second-order-cybernetic) dis-
tinction that among others, Niklas Luhmann’s draws between first-order 
and second-order observation.  For what else does the notion of an ‘ex-
pository jurisprudence’ stage than an actor who refers to, or observes (or 
precisely: exposes), a state of the world, say: the law as it stands, observ-
ing this law as it stands in order to apply it to the new cases that need 
presently to be dealt with. The reference to censorial jurisprudence, on the 
other hand, seems to fit equally precisely into a position taken by an actor 
who observes, not the law as it stands, but the process of legal decision-
making that results from her business of observing the law as it stands, 
from expounding and expositing the law, that is: from observing the first-
order observer. 
 Bentham, J. ‘ Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’ eds. J.H. 488
Burns & H.L.A. Hart, intro. F. Rosen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1996), p. 290 and 
ff.
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 However, when we ask whether Bentham’s proto-positivist sugges-
tion of un-coupling those two types of routines has been successful, it will 
be difficult to find an answer that can be entirely clear. On the one hand, 
Luhmann recognises the new ethics of modernity in both Kant and 
Bentham - thinkers who, far from merely describing what moral behaviour 
is, were checking the ethical foundations upon which morality is grounded. 
For Luhmann, “the ethics of utilitarianism and transcendental theory both 
aimed at a rational or vernünftig (reasonable) justification of moral judge-
ments (…). In this way ethics was established as a philosophical discipline 
of a different kind and under new conditions.”   On the other hand, Luh489 -
mann cannot bring himself to agree with the attempt of pairing law and 
ethics together, as according to him the result of such an enterprise can 
only be a further blurring of the issues at stake, most especially as it would 
tend to further leave unquestioned the invisible action of moral discourse : 
“[S]uch ethics do not provide a suitable description of morality in our 
present society.”  It is interesting how the the unquestioned faith in the 490
large and continuously growing gamut of claims made in the name of "eth-
ics", and especially how the coupling of law and ethics is difficult to do 
away with. Even the cyberneticist Norbert Wiener defines law as “the eth-
ical control applied to communication (…) in order for justice to be accom-
plished” .  491
 Two centuries after Bentham, we are confronted with the problem 
that in the legal order’s very own practice and proceedings, the two sepa-
 Luhmann, N. ’Political Theory In the Welfare State’ , Translated by John Bed489 -
narz Jr. New York De Gruyter 1990. P. 21.
 Luhmann, N. ’Political Theory In the Welfare State’ , Translated by John Bed490 -
narz Jr. New York De Gruyter 1990. P. 21.
 Wiener, N. ‘The Human Use of Human Beings’, Da Capo Press 1950. p. 205.491
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rate sets of rails upon which he has tried to place, on the one hand, the 
train of the everyday work of the legal professional (expository jurispru-
dence), and the train of the inquiry into the shape that the law should be 
given on the basis of the on-going experience of legal professionals, both 
sets of trains mutually, and sometimes dangerously, borrow each other’s 
railway network. The work of the professional lawyer is only all-too often a 
matter of continually referring to extra-legal value-related claims, and 
stretches the leeway of the legal system beyond its functional attribution 
(exposition /application of the law as it stands) in order to have it include 
the ‘censorial' way.   
 The emancipation of the legal system from external servitudes thus 
certainly has its importance; let us not forget that it features structurally in 
Luhmann’s systemic account of the legal order as functionally differenti-
ated social system . At the same time, it is true that we have reached the 492
point at which its effect, the self-emptying of the legal system from value-
dependency, appears as a false, unjustifiable claim, based on an unreal 
claimed innocence. Value-decisions are omnipresent in a quite micro-
structural, capillary way in each bit of judicial practice, and the legal sys-
tem must own up to this. It follows that the ‘emancipative turn’ of the first 
stage of legal modernity (i.e. the self-purification of law from morality, the 
expulsion of the question of justice out of the borders of the law, etc.) is 
insufficient as long as it is not supplemented by a second step, which does 
not abolish or neutralise the first, yet draws the necessary consequences, 
as they have come to appear over time.  
 On this see Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, 492
USA; 1st Published in Pbk. 2008, especially p. 142 and ff. 
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 In the core of this second part, as it were, of law’s journey toward 
modernity, we find what might be called ‘enabling instructions’, in the same 
way in which ‘emancipatory instructions' had been in the core of the first 
step. What is needed for the maintenance of a decision-based, functionally 
differentiated social system law is not only the abolition of submission, 
subjection, or heteronomy - the condition, which is perfectly accomplished 
by the basic positivist divides (especially the most fundamental one: 
between law and morality). What is needed is also the legal order's posit-
ive ability to relate to its own choices and decision-making  process. Posit-
ivism – Kelsen’s article “What is Justice?”  offers the most perfect illus493 -
tration of this point, has undergone a surgical division from normative pro-
jections, re-united, as they are, under the notion of justice. Rather than re-
jecting the claim to justice beyond its borders, the legal order must explore 
the ways in which it can make claim to justice in its own proceedings .  494
 In its current understanding, the decision-process stands under the 
requirement of operating, on the assumption that legal decision-making is, 
at every moment, in line with the cumulative totality of (A) its own earlier 
outcomes, and of (B) legislation. From these two “archives” follow suffi-
cient instructions for present legal decision-making. According to the un-
derlying idea, the present is sufficiently instructed legally by the outcomes 
of innumerable matters decided upon earlier on.  
 But is this enough? The question is meant to refer to one of Luh-
mann’s lesser spectacular postulates concerning the contingency formulas 
of the different function systems. Luhmann identifies Justice as the contin-
 Kelsen H. ‘What is justice? : Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of 493
Science : Collected Essays’ Berkely: University of California Press, 1957. 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Publi494 -
shed in Pbk. 2008, pp. 212 - 214.
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gency formula of the legal system, suggesting that silence of Legal Positiv-
ism about its own decision-routines, with the position that results from it, 
basically a doctrine of unreflected “continuation” of  the routines of the leg-
al order, does not provide enough guidance. The life of the law is also a 
learning process in the sense of building viable maxims, that is to say, of 
relating to inescapable contingency rather than simply submitting to it. The 
contingency of the legal system cannot be escaped, cannot be mastered, 
yet it still can be “formulated”, which, in the case at hand, means that it can 
submitted to the one over-arching “mission” of the legal order that is, very 
generally, assimilated with that of Justice .  495
 The totality of what, concerning a particular legal matter, has been 
decided up to now (stare decisis) is a necessary but not a sufficient condi-
tion or instruction for legal decision-making. In other words, from what pre-
cedes alone, we can draw both too many and not enough instructions. 
This explains that the reference to Justice, thrown out through the door, 
has come back through the window, and why the theology-inspired natural 
law theory and why its many secularised successor forms – socialist dur-
ing the time of Western Marxism (e.g. the Frankfurt School, Luhmann’s 
intimate adversary), human rights inspired since Rawls, Dworkin, and the 
‘rights-revolution’, or finally, starting from the development in Jacques Der-
rida’s latest deconstructionist work. 
  Derrida famously claimed “Deconstruction is justice” . His doubt496 -
lessly most faithful legal follower, the systems theorist Gunther Teubner, 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Publi495 -
shed in Pbk. 2008, p.142 and ff.
 Derrida, Jacques.. ‘Force of law: The mystical foundations of authority’. In 496
‘Deconstruction and the possibility of justice,’ ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosen-
feld, and David Carlson. London: Routledge. 1992, p. 15.
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claimed a notion of a transcendence formula Justice , pushing Luhmann 497
almost beyond Luhmann. While Teubner clearly takes his inspiration in this 
point from Derridean suggestion , the more decisive issue is   According 498
to Teubner, Derrida and Luhmann propose “the most important theory irrit-
ations to law and society of the last decades, contribute two directions of 
thought. These are, first, reconstructing the genealogy of justice and, 
secondly, observing the decisional paradoxes of modern law” . But Der499 -
rida does not seem to say with his affirmation that he is simply giving a tool 
for critical thinking about justice, by saying “deconstruction is justice” he 
makes deconstruction a movement about law and justice. If justice seems 
incalculable then “‘incalculable justice requires us to calculate” , both in 500
“territories of juridico-politicisation”  already well known and in new 501
areas. 
 Teubner, G. ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula 497
of Law’ 2009, Modern Law Review, Vol. 72, pp. 1-23.
 Derrida, Jacques.. ‘Force of law: The mystical foundations of authority’. In 498
‘Deconstruction and the possibility of justice,’ ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosen-
feld, and David Carlson. London: Routledge. 1992.
 Teubner, G. ‘Self-Subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula 499
of Law’ 2009, Modern Law Review, Vol. 72, p. 2. See also Derrida, J. ’Prejuges 
devant la loi’ in Derrida, J. La faculte
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 What Derrida claims is that texts, including legal texts, need to be 
deprived of their powerful status, and be made part of the world of their 
readership, rather than an oracle that imposes its stamp upon them.  A text 
is read without subjugating the reader; in fact Derrida says, the text does 
not ‘prescribe’ anything, but simply give many interesting indications to the 
reader, with the condition that the reader does not accept its command. In 
so doing, deconstructing it, the legal text becomes less powerful, but more 
true, and to put a legal text through this treatment would be the action of 
doing justice; “deconstruction (…) exposes the presumption of a determin-
ant certitude of a present ‘justice’ as defined by any current legal system, 
including legal positivism” . The reference to anything outside positive 502
law is being denied by positivists, as “[l]egal positivism, when left unchal-
lenged, creates a system, a kingdom which reigns over possibility and ex-
cludes the dream of a truly different future”  and “reminds us of the re503 -
sponsibility of judges, lawyers, and law professors for what the law “be-
comes”” .  504
 The reference to Justice does not make an exception here. “Decon-
struction protects the divide between law and justice. This exposure of the 
aporias of justice is in and of itself ethical. The aporias, or more precisely, 
justice conceived as aporia, is an uncrossable limit which continually re-
turns us to an inherent and ultimately irresolvable paradox. Justice so con-
 Cornell, D. (1990) ‘Time, Deconstruction, and the Challenge to Legal Positi502 -
vism: e Call for Judicial Responsibility’, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities: 
Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 4. p.267.
 Cornell, D. (1990) ‘Time, Deconstruction, and the Challenge to Legal Positi503 -
vism: e Call for Judicial Responsibility’, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities: 
Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 4. p.267.
 Cornell, D. (1990) ‘Time, Deconstruction, and the Challenge to Legal Positi504 -
vism: e Call for Judicial Responsibility’, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities: 
Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 4. p.269.
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ceived resists its own collapse into law” . Strictly speaking justice needs 505
be eliminated: but its elimination will generate unexpected outcomes. Cast 
out, exorcised from the legal system, it will become allocated within politics 
instead and pose the question of the politics-inseparability of law. It will 
come back, either under the heading of 'the second, political agenda that 
is at stake in everything legal’, under the heading of valid rights or claims 
(including, in the field of theory, ‘validity claims’, as in Habermas), or under 
the heading of the deconstructionist philosophical take on judges as de-
cision-makers under aporia / undecidability conditions.  
 It is undeniable that both Derrida and Luhmann identified the same 
problem with law and justice, the problem of decision. Not only but they 
“are in agreement that arbitrariness, inconsistencies, antinomies, para-
doxes, and even violence, lie at the bottom of the most refined constructs 
in economic and legal action” . Nevertheless, their initial agreement on 506
where the problem lies is, alas, their only common point. If Derrida, study-
ing aporias, rejects a original principle, a sort of  Grundnorm, “[s]ince the 
origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can’t by 
definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence 
without ground” , Luhmann, studying paradoxes,  also sees “the paradox 507
of the binary code applied to itself”  508
 Cornell, D. (1990) ‘Time, Deconstruction, and the Challenge to Legal Positi505 -
vism: e Call for Judicial Responsibility’, Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities: 
Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 4. p.267-268.
 Teubner, G. ‘Economics of Gift - Positivity of Justice: The Mutual Paranoia of 506
Jacques Derrida and Niklas Luhmann’, Theory, Culture and Society 18, 2001, 29-
47. p. 31.
 Derrida, J. (1990) 'Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority’ Cardo507 -
zo Law Review 11: 919-1046. p.943.
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 Rather than making Justice homeless within the legal system, 
thereby condemning it to look wherever it can to lay its head to rest, the 
question has become how Justice can be kept within the legal system. 
What role can a functioning modern legal system attribute to Justice 
(Gerechtigkeit)? The problem which positivism had found with Justice and 
which has lead it to its expulsion from the legal order – Kelsen’s famous 
article on justice  offers an excellent yardstick here – how did it come up 509
in the first place? Kelsen points to Justice’s unruly and dysfunctional char-
acter, to the fact, in other words, that everyone has a different notion of 
Justice and that there is no efficient cure that helps to unify these diverging 
projections. For reasons profoundly integrated in its semantic build-up, es-
sentially the incompatibility between individual identifications and border-
less or universal breadth of intended validity, Justice remains an inoperat-
ive concept in law, at best a mere denominator, a means of dramatic ex-
pression, or simply the proper name of the aspirations of the ones and the 
others.   
 In these terms, the Kelsenian verdict is difficult to reject. The point 
is not that Kelsen was incorrect in his deductions – the point is rather that 
the further evolution, the most recent legal-systemic chapter of modern le-
gal history, teaches that Kelsen has been, in a sense, too optimistic. The 
legal system has proven its inability to part ways with Justice (too opti-
mistic because, for Kelsen and not only for Kelsen, ‘justice' used as a 
maxim to be directly applied to the management of a legal order's every-
day life, is a pathetic and pathogenic non-starter). This poses the question 
 Kelsen H. ‘What is justice? : Justice, Law, and Politics in the Mirror of 509
Science : Collected Essays’ Berkely: University of California Press, 1957.
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of how finding a viable employment within the legal system for the notion 
of Justice – the question that is at stake in the Luhmannian notion of the 
contingency formula Justice. Consider the two ways in which a process, 
any process, can be understood as ‘contingent’: either in view of the large 
amounts of results that have come up – here it is the sheer amount of  di-
verging results, which shows that the situation from which they commonly 
derive, can be seen as contingent – or in view of divergent ways of dealing 
with one identical situation – here, on the contrary, one speaks of contin-
gency thinking of the width (or, on the contrary, the narrowness) of possi-
ble ways of dealing with the one situation at hand. An example of the first 
are the many transactions that are involved in the evolution of prices and 
markets, an example of the second, the way in which a person driving a 
car in urban traffic deals with the contingency of the situation on the road 
in front of him.  
 While the first case offers an example of what might be called bare 
contingency, or of contingency without a formula, of purely emergent con-
tingency, in the second case one could speak of a contingency that is al-
ways-already underlying a contingency-processing practice, a contingency 
that is not merely emerging, but always-already translated into a ‘formula’ 
for an on-going practice – in our example the continuing (that is to say, 
successfully accident-avoiding) driving of a car through the urban traffic. In 
the first case, the regularity of the emergent over-all result is predicated 
upon the almost numberless contingent (or simply: unpredictable) events 
summarised. In the second case, contingency is understood as a state of 
things that a special form of human conduct can venture to act upon.  
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 5.4 - Contingency in Decision Making. 
 According to a traditional view, the decision-making situation in law 
is perfectly expressed by means of a contingency account of the first kind. 
Stare decisis is understood to mean that “what the law is”, law made up to 
now, the ‘decisa’ here invoked, constitute themselves, as it were the demi-
urge at work in law in the making, the past of the law is directly the maker 
of the present decision . Many critics  have pointed out, over the last 510 511
decades, the fictional or in any case severely unrealistic character of this 
account of legal decision-making, where the law of precedent takes the 
shape of an “incomplete constraint”  and is “often apt to fail” . Not only 512 513
that, but also other risks of applying stare decisis as “a majority of the 
Court should continue to reject the Chief Justice's (...) approach to consti-
tutional stare decisis because it risks irreparable damage to the Court's 
prestige and to constitutional law” . Luhmann’s suggestion of a contin514 -
gency formula is simply more synthetic than these criticisms. The notion of 
the contingency formula Justice is proposed as a new theoretical account 
of how a functionally differentiated process can be observed – yet needs 
 On this see Emmert, F. 'Stare Decisis - a Universally Misunderstood Idea?' 510
Legisprudence, 6(2) · May 2012. 
 On this see for instance Collier, C. W. 'Precedent and Legal Authority: A Criti511 -
cal History', 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 771 (1988); Gerhardt, M. J., 'The Pressure of Pre-
cedent: A Critique of the Conservative Approaches to Stare Decisis in Abortion 
Cases' (1993). Faculty Publications. Paper 991 ; 67-86; Farber, D. A. 'The Rule of 
Law and the Law of Precedents', 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1173 - 1203 (2005). 
 Farber, D. A. 'The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents', 90 Minn. L. Rev. 512
1173 - 1203 (2005), p. 1203.
 Farber, D. A. 'The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents', 90 Minn. L. Rev. 513
1173 - 1203 (2005), p. 1203.
 Gerhardt, M. J., 'The Pressure of Precedent: A Critique of the Conservative 514
Approaches to Stare Decisis in Abortion Cases' (1993). Faculty Publications. Pa-
per 991 ; 67-86, p.85.
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to go on by its own means (not that of the observer!) regardless. The non-
coincidence between the inherently legal first-order observer-perspective 
and that of the sociological second-order observer of society at large, or in 
other words, the acceptance of the notion that lawyers cannot, any more 
than those involved in the communications of any functionally differentiat-
ed system, make themselves dependent upon a “panoramic vision” of the 
social totality, and need nonetheless find resources of their own present 
decision-making.    
 Of course, the immense wager that is inbuilt in the point about the 
contingency formula justice as suggested by Luhmann – a point which in 
itself is everything but well-known (even among social systems theorists) – 
and that risks to be unacceptable for most readers whether social scien-
tists or lawyers, is the one that is enshrined in the provocative co-occur-
rence and encounter of the two terms  ‘justice’ and ‘contingency’. People 
are normally perfectly able to deal with the one or with the other. There 
are, once again, two classical possibilities – either the expulsion of Justice, 
the refusal to accept any reference to Justice in law, or on the contrary ac-
cepting Justice – but then instead of contingency. The one in front of the 
other, without expulsion of either, pinpoints the real difficulty of the formula, 
as well as of the importance of the contribution made by the notion of con-
tingency formula.  
 One should understand the notion of a 'contingency formula' as re-
ferring to the attempt made by the functionally differentiated system law, 
like any other social system “a matter-of-fact complex of so many mecha-
nisms”   in order to develop something like “politics [in a totally un-tech515 -
 Anderson P. 'A new Germany ?' New Left Review May-June 2009, 5-40. p 26.515
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nical understanding!] of its own”  – something comparable to the notion 516
of the 'driving' (not 'steering' – steering comes complete with a promise of 
success, it includes a notion of mastery, while driving (a car, especially in 
an urban street network) is an open process, which comes complete with 
the ever unredeemed dangerousness of each new situation, and always 
remains subject to contingency). The 'contingency formula' thus describes 
a mode continually encountered by each one of those functionally defined 
differentiated systems which, according to systems theory, constitute 
modern society. The discovery and multiple exploration of contingency has 
resulted, in the society described by systems theory, in the build-up of 
these 'agencies'.       
 There is more. The problem of the legal system as 'driving' through 
the contingent situations it encounters at every turn, is that we are now liv-
ing in, or with, a society without integrally omnipresent values. There might 
be society-compassing, overarching values, but the direction in which so-
ciety evolves increasingly limits them to overarching (in the sense of "offi-
cial" or macro-) contexts, while they increasingly absent from certain types 
of social micro-contexts. Values and certainties had structured in depth the 
social world contemporary to only a few generations earlier. Theirs had 
been a social world that was by its nature consensual. The legal order had 
expressed the law, the norm which the individual felt bound to accept as 
an ultimate standard of its decisions, as its normativity, as its normalcy as 
well. is this still the case? What determines behaviour today is only excep-
tionally law in the strict sense.  Much is 'outsourced' to a wide spectre of 
different 'normativities' – in one account, advertisement plays indeed a 
 Anderson P. 'A new Germany ?' New Left Review May-June 2009, 5-40. p 36.516
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normative role.  Yet, the legal order continues to serve a slimmed, yet 517
still a decisive portfolio of agendas. The normative effects it bring forward 
allow for more precision, for a higher sustainability, for more reflections on 
its own interventions. It does accomplish its decision-making labour under 
uncontrollable, irremediably contingent conditions, yet it can relate its de-
cision and interventions to its own earlier decisions and interventions. This 
is where the contingency formula presents itself as a formula that tries to 
enable the legal system to deal with contingency – with a new type of un-
escapable contingency - not as with mere happening, i.e. in an non entire-
ly contingent way.– one could say: precisely in a formulatedly contingent 
way.  
 There had never been, before the current chapter of the history of 
societies, a shortage in such common values as offering themselves to be 
taken for granted by everyone. This is what people are really referring to, 
when they refer, e.g., to a community, or indeed – and largely, though not 
entirely, correctly so – to a particular society. (Not entirely correctly, as 
Luhmann’s argument, first suggested in 1970, that there is today only one 
society: world society,  an argument which, admittedly, makes things 518
very complicated for empirical sociologists, has not been seriously contra-
dicted.)  
 Cfr. Coccia, E. 'La norma iconica', Politica e società, I /2015, 61-80.517
 Luhmann, N. 'The World Society as a Social System', International Journal of 518
General Systems, Vol. 8, 1982, issue 3. p. 131-138. Luhmann, N. 'Globalization 
or World Society : How to Conceive of Modern Society', International Review of 
Sociology March 1997, Vol. 7 Issue 1, p. 67. See also Albert, M. and Hilkmeier, L. 
'Observing International Relations.  Niklas Luhmann and World Politics'  Rout-
ledge, London, 2004. 
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 The presence of common values has characterised society, not only 
as far back as reaches historical memory, ie. “for a time out of mind”,  519
but also at all early-modern times including those of the entire ancien 
régime, that is through in the entire time-span of humanity before posi-
tivism, when the division or differentiation between religious and legal 
sphere was still largely unachieved. The non-differentiation of the two 
meant that the common value was integrated, as it were, into the law itself. 
With the modernist onslaught of legal positivism, what has changed? For 
instance, utility itself has been such a commonly shared value, though not 
necessarily inside law, but within law’s overall social context. What was no 
longer legitimately doable under the universal heading of compassing or 
integrating values, was still legitimately doable under the universal heading 
of a notion of utility.  
 In any case, and importantly for the understanding of Luhmann’s 
conceptions, today, there is no such thing as a 'system of values' in con-
temporary social reality.  This type of a 'system' is what is not part of the 520
modernity we are contemporary to. Systems consisting of entities, systems 
in the long-time valid sense of ‘edifices of stable or structural values’, have 
been replaced by systems that consist strictly speaking, of nothing, as all 
that matters for them is their continuation through the taking place of spe-
cific events (communications, in the case of Luhmann’s teaching about 
society), more exactly of large numbers of those events, for only large 
 In the language of the 17th century founding fathers of the common law. cf.  519
Pocock, J.G.A . 'The Ancient Constitution and the Common Law', (1957), Cam-
bridge University Press; 2 edition (2008). 
 On this see Leydesdorff , L. 'Luhmann Reconsidered: Steps Towards an Em520 -
pirical Research Programme in the Sociology of Communication?', in: Colin 
Grant (ed.), 'Beyond Universal Pragmatics: Essays in the Philosophy of Commu-
nication'. Oxford: Peter Lang. 2009.
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enough numbers are capable of giving rise, producing, sustaining, a new 
type of process-reality. One needs to grasp the entire width of the change. 
A system of that latter kind is no longer something of which it can be said 
that it can and will be encountered in objective reality, a “being out there”, 
a reality that is among other realities that are, that needs to be counted as 
one among the many components of the universitas rerum, the general 
inventory of the creation; instead, it is a sequence of chance happenings, 
overwhelmingly many enough for every new event of the same sort to be 
sufficiently assured that the series will not stop. 
 This means that all legal history looking backwards from classical 
antiquity toward the Ancient Empires or alternatively forwards into our own 
direction, including parts of the 20th century, that is including all modern 
history up to us, has been, schematically speaking, provided with such 
common values, beliefs, convictions.  The situation to which Luhmann’s 521
sociological and theoretical thinking are attempts to provide the appropri-
ate medium, is precisely that the social parameters of human existence 
are, in the present time deprived of such common, integrating values. In-
stead there are different value horizons for each of the function systems. 
Values need to be – like everything else – reproduced within the function-
ally differentiated social systems and their routines. This is also the case of 
the legal system, including the Judiciary.  522
 Luhmann, N. ‘Theory of Society’, vol I Stanford University press, 2012;' See 521
also Halsall, F. 'Niklas Luhmann and the Body: Irritating Social Systems', the new 
bioethics, Vol. 18 No. 1, May, 2012, 4–20.
 See Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st 522
Published in Pbk. 2008; See also Messner, C. 'Introduction to Special Issue SI: 
Luhmann', Int J Semiot Law (2014) 27:313–324.
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 5.5 - Common Values, Politics and Structural Coupling. 
 Within a modern legal order based on positive law, the one certainty 
is that the internal chain of legal events constitutes an internally homoge-
nous network, that there is no orientation by reference to a “nature” that 
would exist outside of the legal system, no common value sense of what is 
good and just and to which the legal order could, therefore, simply sub-
scribe. Such beliefs in a possible guidance from the outside do persist – 
but, as soon as systems theoretical criteria are applied, these values dis-
qualify themselves as being continually reproduced by other differentiated 
societal systems or quasi-systems, such as the media. This is precisely 
the reason why a limited internal guidance is required: the model of “un-
formulated” contingency, which in most cases means (under current condi-
tions) market-type contingency, poses issues of governability, in such a 
way that any attempt of a reduction to the “purely ideological” (as men-
tioned above), confronts the legal order with the need, in order for its deci-
sion routines to make sense at all, to expose them continuously to the val-
ues and/or convictions. In other words, the chief value for law, Justice, 
needs to be continually invoked in order for the legal system to continue a 
meaningful trajectory - even if this continuous exposure or confrontation is 
de-frontalised by the fact the the legal order does not subject itself to over-
arching values, but refers to them exclusively as to the result of second-
order observation. If, according to Luhmann, the work upon Justice as 
contingency-processing device or a contingency formula is to become the 
new conditio sine qua non of the production and reproduction of the legal 
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order,   this should not be taken in the sense that the legal system ceas523 -
es to be functionally differentiated, by finding its master in some overarch-
ing consensus. By referring to Justice, the legal order refers to the exer-
cise of its own identity-providing function.  
 Moreover, whoever is speaking of 'common values' cannot avoid 
transgressing the border, watertight according to the requirements of legal 
positivist doctrine, between law and moral discourse. In the pre-modern, 
pre-positivist section of legal history, it is difficult to see the discourse on 
justice detached from an ethical dimension. In fact, however, the situation 
is not exclusive of the legal discourse. In politics Luhmann has allocated 
some theoretical effort and attention to these moral issues in relation to 
politics, to economy, as well as to law. As we know only today, after the 
publication of a number of manuscripts written especially in the 1970s, but 
not published in his lifetime, Luhmann’s position did not change from his 
first publications to the last ones : politics is not a function of ethics; and 
law is not a function of politics.  
 This is certainly a point in his theory which caused much controver-
sy and earned him strong opposition, from the consensualist sociological 
colleague of Luhmann, Jürgen Habermas  to those on the left who were, 524
throughout the 1970s discovering themselves as followers of Carl Schmitt. 
The case of Schmitt is particularly significant in the luhmannian context. 
Schmitt took the position that politics is the highest possible endeavour, 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Publi523 -
shed in Pbk. 2008.
 Rasch, 'Niklas Luhmann's Modernity. The Paradoxes of Differentiation'. Se524 -
ries : Cultural Memories in the Present', Stanford University Press, 2000.
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superior to any other by dint of its higher grade of intensity.  Schmitt’s 525
“suprematist” concept of politics, which defines politics by the fact of mobil-
ising the highest degree of 'intensity' (rather than any functional character) 
understands political happening in the light of what it calls the Ausnah-
mezustand or state of exception.  Luhmann’s efforts are animated by an 526
ambition that is located at the opposite of the Schmittian one. In its central 
scope is the question of the conditions under which social systems can 
continue their communicating existence. His efforts are therefore directed 
toward an understanding of politics as a functionally defined system. For 
Schmitt, any significant human activity is, at its core, a political matter; poli-
tics only produces the basis of public life, the only basis which guarantee 
the keeping of promises in a wide, general sense. Schmitt, in Luhmann's 
view, fails to understand the phenomenon of modern society in terms of its 
sustainability as a process. Schmitt has a politicised conception of social 
or public life, and one which focuses not at the conditions of its continued 
existence, but rather at the location of the highest political stake: power. In 
his lifetime, Schmitt's ideas were seen, whether correctly or incorrectly so, 
as those of a ‘conservative’. On closer looks, the notion of a "conservative" 
is, at least in its 20th century appearance, however, marred by a funda-
mental ambiguousness. There had been conservatives of the positivist 
type,  in the centre of whose attention we find power as effectively and in-
 On this see Thornill, C. 'Niklas Luhmann, Carl Schmitt and the Modern Form 525
of the Political ', European Journal of Social Theory, Volume: 10 issue: 4, page(s): 
499-522. See also Rasch, W. 'Locating the political: Schmitt, Mouffe, Luhmann, 
and the possibility of pluralism' International Review of Sociology, Volume 7, 
1997, Issue 1, 103-115.
 Schmitt, C. 'The Concept of the Political',University of Chicago Press; Enlar526 -
ged edition edition (2007);See also Szabo, M. 'Politics Versus The Political. Inter-
preting ‘das Politische’ in Carl Schmitt', Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 7, 2006, 
Issue 1. 27-42.
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stitutionally in use, or "constituted power"; other "schools" of conservatism 
followed a diametrically opposed direction. Indeed, they shared with politi-
cal revolutionaries the exclusive attention not for the everyday aspects of 
the reference to power, but for the question of underlying, conditioning, 
constituent power. Ultimately their questions about power are not "how"-
questions but rather "who"-questions.  
 It is interesting how, instead, at the very end of the 20th and in the 
first years of the 21st Century, Schmitt's views have given rise to a follow-
ership that was, to its largest part, politically marked as a leftist follower-
ship.  The notion of a legal order is, as it were, integrally politicised, inso527 -
far it is dominated by political ‘intensity’.  It is true that politics itself ap528 -
pears thus not as a function but as an ethical commitment.   This is easi529 -
ly understood in terms of yet another paradigm shift within modernity. If we 
compare in detail social systems theory, complete with the micro-decision-
ism of its conception of society as the outcome of numerous communica-
tion, with the militant, yet traditionalist argumentation of Schmitt's (and his 
contemporary followers') macro-decisionism, we are confronted, not only 
with a progressive vs conservative front, but also with an unexpected inter-
relation between a politico-ethical as opposed to a systemist front on the 
one hand . Social systems theory dares, effectively, to ‘de-fundamentalise' 
the social fabric or process by forestaging differentiation and heterarchy in 
 Negri, A. Hardt, M.  'Empire' Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 527
2001), p. 45-46;
 Strauss, L.  'Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political,” postscript to 528
Carl Schmitt, ‘The Concept of the Political’, University of Chicago Press, (2007); 
pp. 97-122. 
 On this see for instance Paler, T. G. 'Carl Schmitt: The Philosopher of Conflict 529
Who Inspired Both the Left and the Right' Foundation for Economic education, 
2016.
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society; with Schmitt, it is defined by views about its totality, integrality and 
hierarchy. 
 The process of Luhmannian functional differentiation takes serious-
ly the social phenomenon, while the process of totalisation or of Schmittian 
integralisation is intrinsically political - political in the traditional, old-Eu-
ropean sense that politics is the master of society. Yet, it would not be 
easy to argue that Luhmann, at least in Germany or in the German-speak-
ing world, where he has been read by a large public, has not really 
changed anything in the widespread mentality and perception of society. 
When his first works were published appeared, slightly more than fifty 
years ago, Luhmann was frequently misunderstood, for instance as a mas-
ter-thinker of a technologically imposed eclipse of politics – classically in 
the influential publication of the controversy between Niklas Luhmann and 
Jürgen Habermas, who has co-authored with Luhmann a volume on the 
topic.  But if we look at the perception of society now, in the 21st Centu530 -
ry, social system theory and the functional differentiation of society is even 
less comprehended or "seen" by contemporaries. Even among social sci-
entists, the interest in society as subject of evolution ranks far behind the 
everyday issues linked to the most recent or next elections. This is a 
symptom indicating that the leading discourse on society still has not taken 
on board Luhmann's suggestion to look at society, as at social systems 
generally, in a mode that no longer foregrounds traditional, e.g. left-right-
related relationships. Forestaging politics at the expense of society is still 
the ground-line of discourses determining the media and their take on mat-
ters social. It results in the reduction of the complex, cluttered matters of 
 Habermas, J. Luhmann, N. ‘Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. 530
Was leistet die Systemforschung?’ , Frankfurt a.M. 1971.
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society to the easily imaginable because personalisable, polarities of the 
political landscape. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, under such 
conditions, what is at stake is nothing social, but rather a knot of relation-
ships that boil down to personal issues or, at best, issues of personal 
ethics. 
 The need of correctly assessing society as a complex result of pro-
cesses and evolutions ultimately anchored in functional differentiation 
should however not obfuscate the fact, repeatedly recognised by Luh-
mann, that the ethical perspective plays an important role – a more deci-
sive role, precisely, than that of a merely philosophical question, to the ex-
tent to which the Social Sciences have come up with results that are not at 
the reach of the philosophical tradition.  It has been said many times that 531
the evolution of society in the 21st Century has given rise, among other 
tendencies and “turns”, to an ethical turn. Whether this is is so, or whether 
the more straightforward way of looking at this evolution would be to con-
clude that ethical interrogations are  today an un-displaceable ingredient of 
media and education, is of course an open question. Nevertheless, the 
great distance between social system theory and the ethical interrogation 
remains unaltered. 
 The more directly confrontational issue in respect to the luhmannian 
systems approach to society, is however the topic of morals. It has been 
dealt with numberless times by Luhmann, especially in view of the devi-
ously obtained legitimacy that the question good/evil boasts of on the back 
of an argument which claims that to ask the question good/evil is in itself 
good, while not to ask it, and/or to ask other questions instead, is evil. This 
 Luhmann, N. 'The Sociology of Morals and Ethics', International Sociology, 531
1996, Vol 11, Issue 1, pp. 27 - 36. 
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underlying moralist argument has been used frequently, referring to the 
'state of emergency' often linked to the need of preempting a terrorist at-
tack, or to political decision-making at large about the vexed question of 
"just war". Social systems theory, instead of contributing to this issue as to 
a field of polarities, prefers to contribute to it as to a field of study. The 
concept of structural coupling and its foregrounding follow this theory-
ethics.   
 That autopoietic systems are closed systems means, first of all, 
that, whatever their ambitions and attempts, they cannot achieve the goal 
of communicating with their environment, or with other systems. Function-
ally differentiated systems have the capability of drawing a boundary, a 
limit for their own sytem-specific operations. However enthusiastic in the 
pursuit of any system-transcending goals, they must end up producing gist 
on their own mill, that is, will reproduce their own self-reference and au-
topoiesis. This is what functional differentiation consists of, in practical 
terms. What thinkers like Maturana and Luhmann call structural coupling 
concerns the modality in which such autopoietic and (mainly) self-referen-
tial systems relate to each other (however, as we have already said, with-
out communicating with each other). The idea of an open communication, 
enthusiastic and sympathetic as it appears, is not a possible mode for au-
topoietic social systems. There are nonetheless modes, if not of intersys-
temic relationships, at least of diverse forms of co-existence, with the pro-
viso however, that the form of their commonality or sociability is one of 
"coupling". One needs to understand a term like "structural coupling" as an 
implicit rejection of concepts that would derive the capacity of coupling 
from a foregoing provision of structures, the point about structural coupling 
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- rather than, say: "coupling structures" - being the fact that any structures 
are merely emerging structures, owing to the fact of coupling. In other 
words, structural coupling happens when “a system permanently presup-
poses certain characteristics of its environment and relies structurally on 
the very same.”  To be clear, structural coupling is not a causal relation532 -
ship, it does not alter the unique code of the system involved, nor does it 
alter the internal communication and autopoietic operations within each 
system. Instead it is, as Luhmann repeatedly insists, a "highly selective 
form", which “excludes much more than it includes.”  533
 To be clear, structural coupling does not avoid, nor diminishes con-
tingency; it is simply a way of describing the workings of different systems 
and their interaction, albeit limited. The paradoxes of the law remain, they 
might be made invisible, but this does not provide a way of getting rid of 
them - even if the hope that such a way can be provided had an important 
position within deconstructionist and other postmodernist theories. 
 Conclusions 
          The aim of this thesis was to discuss the concept of the Contingency 
Formula Justice on the backdrop of both mathematical and philosophical 
theories and concepts that have influenced or at least inspired Luhmann. 
 Luhmann, ‘Law as a Social System’ Oxford University Press, USA; 1st Publi532 -
shed in Pbk. 2008, p.144.
 Luhmann, N. ‘Die Politik der Gesellschaft’, Suhrkamp Verlag KG (2002), p. 533
374 ; Luhmann, N. ‘Einführung in die Systemtheorie’, Auer-System-Verlag Carl, 
(2017), p. 116. My translation.
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Cybernetics,  the idea of the the steersman, evokes an image of a circum-
scribed situation in a position of peril; a boat in the sea as an analogy of a 
system in its environment. The steersman must govern the boat effectively 
to arrive safe to land. Cybernetics, with its maritime semantics, should be 
compared to management and indeed to oikonomia, with their “house”-re-
lated semantics. The ship is permanently in the dangerous situation of be-
ing environed by the fluid element, which threatens every passenger with 
drowning. The house, on the other hand, is environed by other houses, 
which like itself are rigorously acting in favour of their own chances and 
perseverance. Both images are instructive about what it is to govern. The 
idea of government is related to politics and power. Cybernetics associ-
ated to social system theory, and in specific in this work, to the Contin-
gency Formula Justice, show the possibility for any social system, includ-
ing law, to have the possibility to govern itself. This is obviously dissimilar 
from the concept of reigning or ruling, and moreover from that of politics. 
Interestingly, Aristotle, at the start of his treatise on oikonomia, identifies 
oikonomia, house-related action, with monarchy, and opposes it to politics. 
If one applies Agamben’s polarity between operative or oikonomic and in-
operative or glory-related agencies in the history of Western power, there 
is then an apparent contradiction between Aristotle’s notion of monarchy, 
for which the management-like decision-making of a despot of a closed 
unit such as a house is characteristic, and a today widespread notion of 
monarchy as something rather decorative or pompous, something much 
closer to the spectacular visibility of a reign, than to the effective policing 
that is done within the logic of the house.  534
 See Agamben, G. ‘Il Regno e la Gloria. Per una Genealogia Teologica dell’E534 -
conomia e del Governo’, Venezia, Neri Pozza, 2006, p.108 ff.
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Perhaps it is not possible for the law and for Justice to be con-
sidered autonomous (even only theoretically or at postulate level), but it 
can show effective governing. Considering the traditional institutional prob-
lematic of the King with a mortal body and an institutional body, which 
never dies  in modern terms of multiplicity with the differentiation of sep535 -
arate spheres, it might be asked whether, ultimately, the law does not reign 
anymore, as it has deconstructed its own hierarchy  but governs itself 536
even if it has to hide its own paradoxes in non-legal discourses. 
 Although normally it is spoken of the ‘rule of law’, could it be that the 
reign of the law is in decline and it is left with governing? There are obvi-
ously some problems to be considered. On one side the law has a purpos-
ive program, and here it is active, adaptive and oikonomic, on the other, it 
has a conditional program, and is rex inutilis, perhaps glorious (as a sov-
ereign).  It seems that in  modernity, especially in a modernity that sees 537
more and more a globalised society, even within each nation, what pre-
vails is a cybernetic administration. On the question of the opposition of 
rule and governing, Agamben, for instance, states that it is rather a ques-
tion of tension than of opposition or dichotomies. It is how the system 
works.  It is in a way the same conclusion to which Cybernetics arrive 538
 On this see Kantorowicz, E. ‘The King’s Two Bodies: A study in Mediaeval 535
Political Theology’,  Princeton University Press, 1997.
 See Teubner, G. ‘The King’s Many Bodies: Self-Deconstruction of the Law’s 536
Hierarchy’, 1997, Law and Society Review, Vol 31. No 4
 See Agamben, G. ‘Il Regno e la Gloria. Per una Genealogia Teologica dell’E537 -
conomia e del Governo’, Venezia, Neri Pozza, 2006, p.111.
 See Agamben, G. ‘State of Exception’, University of Chicago Press, 2005.538
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(although not relating to law and politics) by candidly state that it is the way 
of effective management , and allows the greater number of choices ,  539 540
At the same time, Luhmann claims that the Kontingenzformel justice has a 
role only within the legal system, it is not an aspect of an external repres-
entation of the legal system. It should work to make the system not 
stronger or bigger, but more critical.  
 Beer, S.’Cybernetics and Management', English Universities Press, 1959.539
 Foerster, H. von, ‘Ethics and Second Order Cybernetics’, 1991. In Foerster,H. 540
Von, ‘Undertanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition’, 
Springer, 2003;
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